University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1973

The Minnesota Supreme Court, 1971-1972
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Minnesota Supreme Court, 1971-1972" (1973). Minnesota Law Review. 3033.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3033

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
1971-1972
INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note is intended to present
a comprehensive survey of significant decisions by the court
during the 1971-1972 Term. The cases selected represent new
developments in Minnesota law. In some cases, however, the
questions decided are of national importance. The cases are organized under topical headings according to the most important
issue in each case. In some instances cross references to other
sections of the Note are provided.
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I. ATTORNEYS
A.

DISCIPLINARY ACTION

In the past term, the supreme court decided a number of
cases dealing with disciplinary actions against attorneys. Generally, the court seems to be announcing a policy of strict adherence to the Code of Professional Responsibility. Two of the
cases involved disbarment proceedings against an attorney, one
considered the criteria for reinstating a disbarred attorney, and
four others considered sanctions short of disbarment.
One of the disbarment cases involved a county probate judge
who appointed three appraisers to value a substantial estate consisting primarily of a large block of stock. Since the stock was
publicly traded, the appraisers did virtually no work but received a fee of $19,800 which they split equally.1 Subsequently
each appraiser contributed large sums to the judge's campaign
fund. The judge, who used the contributions to pay personal
expenses, was indicted for violations of the Minnesota Election
Law, a gross misdemeanor,2 and for asking and receiving compensation in excess of that allowed to a public officer by law,
a misdemeanor.3 As a condition of a negotiated guilty plea, the
judge resigned from the bench and a disbarment proceeding was
brought in which he offered but never produced a detailed accounting of the funds received from the appraisers. In ordering
disbarment, the court held that the judge lacked "that sense of
fidelity owed by lawyers and judges in matters of trust reposed
in them by the public." In re Bartholet, 293 Minn. 495, 198
N.W.2d 152 (1972).
It has been held that "[t] he purpose of disciplining an attorney is not to punish him, but to guard the administration of
justice and to protect the courts, the profession, and the public."'
Although an attorney will be disbarred if convicted of a felony
or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, it makes no difference if the "conviction" is the result of a negotiated guilty plea,
because the real question in a disbarment proceeding is the fit1. The appraisers at no time discussed the matter with each
other and made no physical inspection of any of the properties in the
estate. They simply signed the appraisal submitted to them by the
executors.
2. MINN. STAT. § 210.20 (1971).
3. MrNN. STAT. § 609.45 (1971).
4. In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 199, 19 N.W.2d 324, 325 (1945).
5. MINN. STAT. § 481.15(1) (1971).
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ness of the attorney to continue as a member of the legal profession. 6 Thus in Bartholet, the court did not base its decision
on respondent's statutory offenses alone; rather, the decision to
disbar Bartholet was based on his lack of a "sense of fidelity."
Although there is little question that disbarment was a
proper sanction in the instant case, two aspects of the court's
opinion are troublesome. First, the court's "lack of a sense of
fidelity" standard is not sufficiently precise to be a useful guide
for attorneys' behavior. Second, the court did not consider
whether, in the absence of a kickback, the unnecessary appointment of appraisers is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The court should have taken this opportunity to
suggest an appropriate sanction in such a case.
In the second case involving disbarment, an attorney failed
to file state and federal income tax returns for a number of
years. He pled guilty in federal court for failing to file federal
returns, received a suspended sentence and a fine, and agreed to
repay the delinquent taxes. In a disbarment proceeding the supreme court held that, in the future, failure to file income tax
returns would be considered a violation of a lawyer's oath of
office and of the Code of Professional Responsibility and would
be grounds for discipline by suspension or disbarment. However, the attorney in the instant case was placed on probation
for three years7 because of the prior practice of giving probation
in similar cases. In re Bunker, 199 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1972).
Although attorneys in Minnesota have been disbarred for
filing fraudulent income tax returns,8 no Minnesota attorney
has ever been disbarred for failing to file an income tax return.
In Bunker, however, the court abandoned its past practice and
held that probation, which was previously used in such cases,
is now reserved for "extreme, extenuating circumstances." In
view of the court's formerly lenient attitude, this position may
seem harsh. But since attorneys filing fraudulent tax returns
are subject to disbarment, it is only equitable to treat attorneys
who willfully fail to file in a similar manner.
6. In Te Peterson, 260 Minn. 339, 110 N.W.2d 9 (1961).
3.. Probation was for three years, or until he paid the government
obligations
he e.g.,
owed, whichever was longer.
8. See,
In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 23 N.W.2d 4 (1946);
In. re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297, 217 N.W. 356 (1927). In Diesen the attorney clearly defrauded the government by declaring he had an expense
which he never incurred. Two months after filing the fraudulent return, however, he confessed and requested to pay what he owed. Never.theless he was prosecuted for filing a fraudulent return, pleaded
guilty, and was then disbarred because of the conviction.
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In the instant action only the prospectivity of the decision
saved the attorney from disbarment. Because the court restricted its holding to "violations occurring hereafter," attorneys who have failed to file income tax returns prior to this decision will also receive probationY
A third attorney discipline case involved the reinstatement
petition of an attorney previously disbarred as a result of a felony conviction for swindling. Prior to his petition for reinstatement, the petitioner had served his sentence and was making
monthly payments in restitution to one of his victims, but the
others were never repaid. Following imprisonment he had
helped form a nonprofit organization to help felons adjust to
society after prison discharge and was currently employed by a
lawbook publisher. At his reinstatement hearing petitioner produced several character witnesses, including attorneys, who testified in his behalf. Although testimony was also given by a
psychiatrist concerning petitioner's problems, the psychiatrist
did not state that the petitioner was completely rehabilitated.
The supreme court found that to readmit him would not "be in
the public interest" and therefore refused his petition. In re
Herman, 293 Minn. 472, 197 N.W.2d 241 (1972).
The supreme court has held that the main inquiry in considering reinstatement of an attorney is "whether the applicant is
of such good moral character that he should be readmitted to
the office of attorney and recommended to the public as a trustworthy person fit to be consulted in matters of confidence." 0
In the cases dealing with reinstatement the theme is to protect
the public, courts and profession rather than punish the disbarred attorney. Indeed, it has been stated that "[w]hile a court
should be slow to disbar, it should be even more cautious in readmitting an attorney to a position of trust."'" One of the most
significant considerations has been whether the attorney's past
misconduct resulted from a mental or psychological aberration
or pressure which was transitory and susceptible to correction. 12
9. In re Bunker, 199 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. 1972).
In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 200, 19 N.W.2d 324, 326 (1945).
11. Id.
12. Reinstatement has been denied because there was nothing in
the record to indicate the existence of a mental or psychological aberation or pressure which was transitory and susceptible of correction.
In re Ossanna, 288 Minn. 541, 180 N.W.2d 260 (1970). In the case of an
attorney convicted of grand larceny who was readmitted it was crucial
that his dishonesty was due to his addiction to alcohol, which the court
was convinced was corrected at the time of the trial. He was reinstated even though some of his conduct since his disbarment indicated
10.
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In considering the evidence that the petitioner was of the
requisite moral character for readmission, the court first stated
that "[t]o the extent that remorse is represented either by communication with victims or efforts at restitution, it is clear that
petitioner's only affirmative act of that nature has been restitution, in monthly payments, to [one victim] ."3 It has previously
been held that restitution by an attorney of embezzled money is
merely a fact which, though taken into account, will not ordinarily be given much weight.1 4 However, the instant case indicates
that the lack of restitution will be given weight.
The underlying rationale for the decision seems to be that the
court believed petitioner's original conduct was not caused by a
psychological disorder capable of remedy. By noting that the
psychiatrist indicated that he could not determine the presence
or absence of the attorney's character defect, the court implied
that it was simply not convinced of the petitioner's recovery.' 5
It buttressed this conclusion by noting that, because the petitioner would have difficulty obtaining clients, he did not intend
to return to private practice. From this the court assumed that
potential clients' lack of confidence was justified. The same type
of reasoning was applied to the fact that no lawyer had yet offered to employ the petitioner.
In the area of lesser penalties, the supreme court delivered
two decisions relating to dilatory practices on the part of an attorney in handling his client's affairs. In the first case an attorney was found to have consistently neglected legal matters entrusted to him. Although his negligence had not caused financial loss to any client, the court found the "dilatory" practices
themselves to be a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but limited the attorney's penalty to severe censure. In
re Braggans,201 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1972).
Similarly in In re Henning, 201 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. 1972), the
court held that neglect in handling legal matters in a timely
fashion is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and that under similar circumstances disciplinary action would
be taken in the future. Because there was no fraud or misapa lack of restraint. In re Constantine, 258 Minn. 582, 103 N.W.2d 196
(1960).
13. In re Herman, 273 Minn. 472, 197 N.W.2d 241, 242 (1972) (emphasis added).
14. In re Smith, 220 Minn. 197, 202, 19 N.W.2d 324, 326 (1945).
15. The court apparently felt that the attorney did not regret his
actions, and that his victimization of many of his former clients was
"simply to preserve his own self-esteem."
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propriation of the client's money, the court concluded that severe censure of the dilatory manner petitioner followed was an
adequate penalty.
Prior to these cases complaints of dilatory action in handling
legal matters were not a basis for disciplinary action. The only
similar case involving dilatory action which resulted in disbarment was where the attorney failed to answer letters sent to him
in regard to adjusting a claim. 16 In that case, however, the attorney was affected by a mental condition which the court held
disqualified him as a competent attorney.
Although defining dilatory handling will be difficult, an even
greater problem will be the fashioning of an appropriate penalty.
The court warned it would take future action but did not define
the extent of that action. While in Henning and Braggans the
only sanctions were severe censure of activities, the court con17
sidered both situations to have extenuating circumstances.
Presumably the discipline could include disbarment, but this
penalty seems too severe unless the tardiness has caused substantial harm to a client. Although censure may be proper in
some cases, its deterrent effect may be questioned. Probation
is perhaps the most appropriate remedy.
Another case involved an attorney who defended codefendants in a criminal trial. On advice from the attorney one defendant withheld potentially incriminating testimony. The other
defendant claimed this was prejudicial to him. The court found
there was no prejudice because a separate attorney would have
advised the codefendant not to testify and because there was no
evidence that the codefendant's testimony would have exonerated the defendant. However, the court warned against representing multiple defendants except after careful investigation
has made it clear that no conflict of interest is likely to develop
and the defendants have given an informed consent to multiple
representation. State v. Wilson, 200 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1972).
Two prior Minnesota cases, State v. Martineau8 and State
v. Robinson,'0 dealt with the problem of an attorney representing multiple criminal defendants. In Martineau the attorney's
16. In re Chmelik, 203 Minn. 156, 280 N.W. 283 (1938).
17. In Braggans the circumstance was that no client was caused
any financial loss due to Braggan's negligence. This seems to be a
valid extenuating circumstance. In Henning, the respondent was a fulltime judge when the action was brought, and hence would no longer

have a private practice.
18. 257 Minn. 334, 101 N.W.2d 410 (1960).
19.

271 Minn. 477, 136 N.W.2d 401 (1965).
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representation was not criticized, even though the evidence presented on motion for a new trial suggested that the codefendant's testimony would have cleared the defendant. In Robinson no prejudice was found because both defendants testified
and each exonerated the other. However, the court did suggest
that in order to avoid a conflict of interest, one counsel should
represent more than one defendant only under the most extraordinary circumstances.
Since Robinson the American Bar Association's Standards

of Criminal Justice have been adopted, incorporating the position that an attorney should not represent multiple defendants
in the ordinary case.20 In Wilson the court stated that before
agreeing to represent multiple defendants, an attorney must
make a careful examination of the facts and, if he finds no conflict likely to develop, must then obtain the informed consent of
the codefendants. The question of whether a conflict is likely
to develop should normally be resolved in favor of avoiding dual
21
representation.
Another case involving professional responsibility was Blank
v. Kramer, 292 Minn. 460, 194 N.W.2d 289 (1972). There an attorney drafted a will which disinherited the testator's stepchildren and instead left $10,000 to the attorney's father. The will
was contested on the grounds that the attorney unduly influenced the testator because the attorney's father was a principal
beneficiary. The court found that the drafting of the will was
an unethical practice 22 and admonished the attorney for jeopardizing the bequest of the decedent and risking invalidation
of the other bequests in the will. However, the court then held
that other evidence was sufficient to overcome the inference of
undue influence and therefore held the will to be valid.
In two previous cases the court has admonished attorneys
for preparing wills in which they are interested. In In re Estate
20.

AivacAx

BAR ASSOCIAION,

STANDARDS

THE PROSECUTION FUNcTIoN AND THE DEFENSE

OF CRI=AL JUS77CE,

FUNCTION 3.5 (b) (Approved

Draft 1971).
21. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), may have an impact on dual representation. Argensinger held that lack of counsel in
any criminal case, no matter how small the penalty, is grounds for overturning a conviction where a jail sentence is involved. Since the argument in cases involving dual representation is that the complaining
party has been denied counsel, his conviction can be overturned in
even the smallest criminal case on a constitutional ground.
22. The court stated that the preparation of a will by a beneficiary was unethical and that the rule applied when the attorneyscrivener's children are beneficiaries. This language, combined with
the court's further criticism of the practice gives rise to a clear inference that the action in Blank was also considered unethical
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of Keeley, 23 the attorney was an actual beneficiary of the will.
There the court stated that "unethical conduct [is] inherently
involved in such transaction [s]. Propriety and delicacy would
infer that [an attorney] should not have handled the transaction. '24 In re Estate of Peterson25 held it improper for an attorney to prepare a will in which his children were primary beneficiaries. Blank extended the rule to parents of the interested
attorney. The court has made it clear that it is unethical for an
attorney to draft a will that benefits himself or his family. An
attorney who follows this practice in the future is likely to be
censured.
Finally, the court briefly examined the conflict of loyalties
problem facing counsel who represents both the insurer and the
insured. In Glen Falls Group Insurance Corp. v. Hoium, 200
N.W.2d 189 (Minn. 1972), the plaintiff-insurance company sought
to avoid defending and indemnifying the defendant who had
been involved in a fight, since its policy excluded coverage for
intentional torts.2 6 The trial court decided that Glen Falls was
obligated to defend its insured. The supreme court recognized
the conflict of interest faced by Glen Falls, since it had a stake in
a jury determination that the tort was intentional. However, it
echoed the trial court's expression of confidence that counsel for
Glen Falls "will adhere to the highest standards of the profes'27
sion and defend [the insured] with fidelity and ability.
At least with respect to possible ethical violations, however,
another court disagrees:
We have no doubt whatever that the lawyers who represented
[the insured] and the insurance company were activated by
honest, high and worthy motives and intent ... but this is not
the test for determining compliance with the Canons of Professional Ethics when a lawyer is confronted
with the necessity
28

of choosing between conflicting interests.
Moreover, a New York case held that if there is conflict of interest between the insurance carrier and the insured, an attorney
29
cannot simultaneously represent both.
23.

167 Minn. 120, 208 N.W. 535 (1926).

24. Id. at 125, 208 N.W. at 538.

25. 238 Minn. 446, 168 N.W.2d 502 (1969).
26. Another issue in this case was whether a prior guilty plea to
aggravated assault collaterally estopped the defendant from denying
that his tort was intentional. This issue is discussed in the judgments
section of this article.
27. 200 N.W.2d at 192.
28. Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 12, 179
A.2d 117, 122 (1962).

29. Trieber v. Hopson, 27 A.D.2d 151, 277 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1967).
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The leading Minnesota case is Newcomb v. Meiss, 30 which
held that an insurance counsel who represents a policyholder
owes the same undeviating and single allegiance that he would
owe to the policyholder if retained and paid by him. In Newcomb, insurance counsel defended a negligence action on the
theory of intentional tort, explaining to the trial court that the
statute of limitations precluded recovery in intentional tort absent an amendment to the complaint which would permit recovery in intentional tort. These facts distinguish Newcomb from
the instant case since Newcomb demonstrably did not involve
actual conflict of interest.
The Newcomb holding purports to solve the entire problem
by requiring insurance counsel to give the insured his total effort. Yet the adversary system is based upon the human difficulty of fairly representing two conflicting interests and the
relative ease of vigorously presenting one side. Although the
best attorneys examine with equal intensity the strengths and
weaknesses of both sides of a case, they are by training and experience most effective at trial when they pursue with singular
devotion the interests of one client. Moreover, insurance counsel are frequently on retainer to a company and thus may find
it difficult to argue against the company if that becomes necessary to aid the insured. In recognition of this ethical dilemma,
several courts have held that an attorney cannot represent both
insurer and insured where a conflict of interest exists3 1 or potentially may exist.32
The instant court, by allowing dual representation in this
situation, seems prepared to hinge the fate of the insured upon
the good faith of insurance counsel and the insurance company's
willingness to go unrepresented. Neither the insured nor insurance counsel should be made such uncomfortable bedfellows.
Even when insurance counsel represents the insured with total
fidelity a loss at trial may leave the insured with a feeling of
unfair treatment. The situation can only demean the legal profession in the eyes of the public.
The insured, of course, may always hire independent counsel at his own expense, but this defeats the insurer's contractual
responsibility to defend him. The insurer has experience in
30. 263 Minn. 315,116 N.W.2d 593 (1962).
31. See NFU Property & Casualty Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d 60
(9th Cir. 1964); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Keller, 17 IL. App. 2d 44,
149 N.E.2d 482 (1958).
32. Aiddleberg v. Middleberg, 427 Pa. 114, 233 A.2d 889 (1967).
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these matters and is in a markedly better position than its insured to appreciate the potential risk and hazard inherent in
such litigation. Moreover, the insurer has been paid a premium,
part of which properly may cover this very situation. A better
solution, and one that no court appears to have advanced, would
be to require the insurer to notify defendant of his right to independent representation at his option, to be paid for by the insurer.

B. ATTO' EY's FEES
Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 8.021 the Attorney General retained special counsel to represent the state in litigation
involving a charitable trust. Because funds sufficient to pay the
entire fee for the services of special counsel were unavailable,
the trial court allowed collection of the fee from the foundation,
which had been substantially benefitted by the litigation. On
appeal by the foundation the supreme court reversed, holding
that because special counsel were employees of the Attorney
General, Minnesota Statutes § 15A.91 (2) requires that their sole
source of compensation be the state. Bush v. Arrowood, 293
Minn. 243, 198 N.W.2d 263 (1972).
Under the "substantial benefit rule" which has been followed in a number of Minnesota cases, a private litigant who
institutes or appears in litigation which substantially benefits
a trust or estate or the beneficiaries thereof may, at the discretion of the court, be reimbursed for reasonable attorney's fees by
the trust or estate. 2 However, Minnesota Statutes § 15A.01 (2)
prohibits the Attorney General and his employees from accepting any compensation for their services in addition to their authorized salaries paid by the state. 3 Since special counsel were

Mn.i. STAT. § 8.02 (1971) provides in part:
The attorney general shall have power to employ such assistance, whether lay, legal, or expert, as he may deem necessary for the protection of the interests of the state through
the proper conduct of its legal business.
2. The purpose of the "substantial benefit rule" is to encourage
private litigants to present claims broader than their own interests by
offering the possibility of being able to recover attorney's fees. See,
e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in St. Paul Elec. Workers
Welfare Fund v. Cartier, 288 Minn. 483, 182 N.W.2d 187 (1970).
3. MnN. STAT. § 15A.01 (2) (1971) states:
The salaries provided in this chapter for the officers and
employees named herein shall be in full payment for all services that may be rendered by them either in the performance
1.
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employees of the Attorney General in this litigation, the court
concluded that Minnesota States § 15A.01 (2) barred their receipt
of any compensation from the trust under the "substantial benefit rule."
Since the Attorney General has a statutory obligation to represent the interests of the beneficiaries of a charitable trust in
cases such as this one, 4 it would be appropriate for the legislature to provide funds to pay special counsel who assist the Attorney General in meeting this obligation. If these claims, which the
court characterized as legitimate and reasonable, 5 go unsatisfied,
the Attorney General may be unable to secure the valuable services which can be provided by special counsel.
In two companion cases the supreme court set out evidentiary guidelines for determining the amount of attorney's fees
which may be awarded for services in connection with foreclosing of a mechanic's lien" and obtaining a default judgment on
a promissory note.7 The court suggested that attorneys should
offer both a description of the services rendered and an accounting of the amount of the attorney's time involved, but held that
any evidence which in the trial court's discretion was probative
of the extent of the services actually performed would be sufficient to establish a fee. O'Braske v. Woody, 199 N.W.2d 429
(Minn. 1972); O'Donnell v. McGee Trucks, Inc., 199 N.W.2d 432
(Minn. 1972).
In O'Braske the defendant argued that Minnesota Statutes
§ 514.108 as interpreted in the earlier case of Bierlein v. Gagnon,9 establishes the maximum amount which may be awarded
of their regular or special duties or while acting as a member or

employee of any state board or commission.
4. MnqN. STAT. § 501.12(3) (1971).
5. 293 Minn. at 257, 198 N.W.2d at 271.
6. The discretionary award of attorney's fees in a mechanic's lien

foreclosure is authorized by MINN.

STAT.

§ 514.14 (1971).

7. The promissory note contained a provision whereby, should
legal proceedings be necessary to collect the debt, defendant agreed to
"pay the reasonable costs of such collection including attorney's fees."
8. MqN. STAT. § 514.10 (1971) provides in pertinent part:
When an action has been brought.., by the lien claimant
to enforce his lien. . , application may be made ... to have
the property affected by any such lien released from the
lien ....
Upon a hearing upon an application the court shall
fix a sum of money to be deposited by the applicant with the
clerk [including] . . . (4) an amount not less than double the
amount of attorneys' fees allowed upon the foreclosure under
section 582.01, to cover any allowance the court may make
upon the trial for costs and attorneys' fees in the action or
upon appeal.
9. 255 Minn. 143, 96 N.W.2d 573 (1959). In Bierlein, the court
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for attorney's fees in actions to foreclose a mechanic's lien as
twice the amount allowed by Minnesota Statutes § 582.01 for
attorney's fees in certain real estate foreclosures.10 In rejecting
this argument, the court held that Minnesota Statutes § 514.10
was a guide to the reasonableness of fees only when no evidence
as to the extent of the services actually performed was presented. When evidence is produced the amount of the fees to be
awarded is to be determined by the trial judge "after due consideration of the evidence presented . . .and observation of the
services rendered.""
In weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court in
O'Braske held that in the absence of testimony as to the number
of hours spent by the plaintiffs' attorneys, uncontroverted evidence that the attorneys 1) underwent ordinary preparation for
trial, 2) encountered special problems in securing depositions,
3) were required to familiarize themselves with the dry wall construction business, and 4) expected to perform future services,
was sufficient to justify a fee in excess of $4,500. In O'Donnell
a fee in excess of $11,500 to collect $78,200 in notes due was considered justifiable in the light of evidence that the defendant
was close to insolvency so that future collection services would
be required of the attorney. 1 2 In both cases the court suggested
that the trial court could also consider factors such as the ability
and experience of the attorneys involved, the amount involved,
the responsibilities assumed by the attorneys, and the results
obtained. Although the court suggested in both cases that requiring the attorney to present evidence regarding the time expended in performing his services would be desirable and not
unduly burdensome, the paucity of evidence actually presented
in both cases indicates that almost any evidence which gives the
trial court some idea as to what services have been performed
will be sufficient to establish the amount of a fee.

suggested that in the ordinary case MiNN.

STAT.

§ 514.10 (1971) would

set the maximum fee which could be recovered.
10. M=N. STAT. § 582.01 (1971) allows $225 plus $50 for each
$10,000 of the lien over $10,000.
11. 199 N.W.2d at 432.
12. The defendant in O'Donnell had alleged that the only evidence that the plaintiff had brought forward to set the amount of a
reasonable attorney's fee was the Hennepin County Bar Association
Minimum Fee Schedule. The court suggested that although the fee
schedule would not in itself be sufficient to establish a fee, the trial
court had considered other relevant evidence such as the difficulty
that the attorney would have in collecting the plaintiff's judgment.
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H.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. JuRIsDIcTIoN & VENUE
The court decided two significant cases dealing with the extent of the power of Minnesota courts and when this power
should be exercised. The nebulous forum non conveniens standard was discussed in one case.
A Minnesota corporation brought a products liability action
against a truck trailer manufacturer incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place of business in Wisconsin. The defendant impleaded its supplier, a Missouri corporation, employing
long-arm service.' The district court quashed service on the
third party defendant. The supreme court affirmed, holding
that since Minnesota's interest in providing a forum for non-residents is minimal, quashing long-arm service on a third party defendant is not improper where the third party plaintiff is not
1. The court assumed that the reach of Minnesota's long-arm
statutes extended to the third party defendant. Whether this assumption was warranted is questionable. The use of MrNN. STAT. § 303.13
(1) (3) (1971), the corporate long-arm statute, is restricted to resident
plaintiffs. But see note 2 infra. Minnesota's general long-arm statute,
Mn. STAT. § 543.19(1) (1971), provides:
As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated
in this subdivision, a court of this state with jurisdiction of
the subject matter may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
foreign corporation or any non-resident individual, or his personal representative, in the same manner as if it were a domestic corporation or he were a resident of this state. This section
applies if, in person or through an agent, the foreign corporation or non-resident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this state, or
(b) Transacts any business within this state, or
(c) Commits any tort in Minnesota causing injury or
property damage, or
(d) Commits any tort outside of Minnesota causing injury or property damage within Minnesota, if, (1) at the time
of the injury, solicitation or service activities were carried on
within Minnesota by or on behalf of the defendant, or (2)
products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed within Minnesota in the ordinary course of trade.
Since this statute is operative only with respect to "acts enumerated in
this subdivision," subsection (d) is the only possible basis of jurisdiction in this case. Arguably the words "causing injury or property damage within Minnesota," do not include the economic impact of a collsion in Kansas caused by a defective component supplied by a Missouri corporation to a Wisconsin manufacturer who incorporates the
component into a truck trailer sold to a Minnesota corporation engaged in extensive interstate trucking operations. But cf. Hunt v.
Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 112, 172 N.W.2d 292, 312 (1969).
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greatly inconvenienced and has another forum available. MidContinent Freight Lines, Inc. v. Highway Trailer Industries, 291
Minn. 251, 190 N.W.2d 670 (1971).
Forum non conveniens is a self-imposed limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate otherwise justiciable controversies. Its prudent exercise is a valuable judicial tool at a time
when the bases of personal jurisdiction are rapidly expanding.
The doctrine's central premise is that there exists an alternative forum that is more convenient in terms of the interests of
the public and the parties. The instant court failed to fully examine these interests.
With respect to the public interest, the court indicated that
dismissal was heavily favored because both the third party
plaintiff and the third party defendant were non-residents.2 The
public interest behind long-arm statutes is to provide a forum
for residents aggrieved by non-residents. This interest does not
exist when a non-resident seeks to gain indemnification from
another non-resident because such indemnification is irrelevant
to the resident plaintiff's right to recover. But other public interests are involved here. "Traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" suggest that a non-resident defendant be allowed to bring in another party who may be obligated to discharge his liability. Barring serious inconvenience to the third
party defendant in litigating in the forum, there does not seem
to be any sound reason to litigate issues such as liability twice.
Moreover, as a component of an increasingly interdependent federal system, Minnesota has an interest in that efficient administration of justice which is the rationale for impleader.3 In a
2. The non-resident status of a foreign corporation should not be
determinative in every case. MINN. STAT. § 303.09 (1971) provides that
a foreign corporation that has obtained a certificate of authority to
transact business in this state "shall possess within this state the same
rights and privileges that a domestic corporation would possess .... "
In this case the third party plaintiff surrendered its authority to transact business in Minnesota shortly before the action was commenced.
The Federal Constitution's equal protection clause circumscribes
the extent to which a state can treat resident corporations and non-resident corporations differently. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
277 U.S. 389 (1928); Joseph Triner Corp. v. Arundel, 11 F. Supp. 145
(D. Minn. 1935).
3. This interest is particularly critical if in the main action evidence of the third party's activities is submitted. It would be wasteful to require another court to examine this same evidence when the
indemnification issue is tried. This demonstrates the need to examine
the substantive issues involved when considering the interest of judicial efficiency.
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given case, however, these interests may be outweighed by such
factors as difficulty in finding or applying another state's law,
extreme complication of the lawsuit, delay to forum parties, increased time demands on forum jurors and judges and increased
costs to forum taxpayers.
With respect to the interests of the parties, the court emphasized that dismissal would not greatly inconvenience the
third party plaintiff since it could seek indemnification in another forum.4 This conclusion, however, fails to consider
whether recourse to an alternative forum is in all respects as
adequate a remedy as impleader. Aside from the obvious convenience of a single lawsuit, one must consider the possible jeopardy to the third party plaintiff's chances for recovery in
another forum were that forum to apply different law than
Minnesota or were the third party defendant not estopped from
relitigating issues decided in the Minnesota lawsuit. It seems
appropriate, however, that the court also consider the impact
of impleader upon the resident plaintiff. While that impact may
differ depending upon the peculiar facts involved, the court
should consider such factors as: (1) whether impleader would
make the litigation unreasonably more complex; (2) whether
the third party defendant would join forces with the defendant
in an attempt to overwhelm the resident plaintiff; and (3)
whether disallowing impleader would permit plaintiff, if he lost
in the original action, to relitigate the identical issues by later
suing the prospective third party defendant. The third party
defendant could as conveniently defend a lawsuit in Minnesota
as in Wisconsin.
The court suggested that there may be circumstances in
which a non-resident would be permitted to use Minnesota's
long-arm statute. The determination of those circumstances
should include the full consideration of the interests of the public and the parties.
A second case dealt with venue.
Subject to considerations of impartiality of trial and convenience to witnesses, 5 most civil actions are properly venued in
4. Presumably the court meant a Wisconsin court. If the third
party plaintiff is forced to go to Missouri to seek indemnification, it
has been subjected to intolerable inconvenience by this decision.
5. MNi. STAT. § 542.11 (1971) provides:
The venue of any civil action may be changed by order
of the court in the following cases:
(3) When an impartial trial cannot be had in the county
wherein the action is pending; or
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the county where the defendant resided at the time the action
was initiated, or in the county where the cause of action or some
part thereof arose.0 However, due to peculiar phrasing in the
change of venue statute,7 it had been unclear which court was
to adjudicate disputed venue issues. In a case decided last term
the supreme court held that when a defendant requests a change
in venue, the district court in the county where the action was
initiated shall determine the defendant's place of residence and
whether any part of the cause of action arose in that county. 8
(4)

When the convenience of witnesses

. . .

would be pro-

moted by the change.
6. MINN. STAT. § 542.09 (1971) provides:
All actions not enumerated in section 542.02 to 542.08 and
section 542.095 shall be tried in a county in which one or
more of the defendants reside when the action is begun or in
which the cause of action or some part thereof arose. If none
of the parties shall reside or be found in the state the action
may be begun and tried in any county which the plaintiff
shall designate ....
7. MINN. STAT. § 542.10 (1971) provides:
If the county designated in the complaint is not the proper
county, the action may notwithstanding be tried therein unless, within 20 days after the summons is served, the defendant
demands in writing that it be tried in the proper county.
This demand shall be accompanied by the affidavit of the defendant, or his agent or attorney, setting forth the county of
his residence at the time of the commencement of the action,
the date of service of the summons, and stating that neither the
cause of action nor any part thereof arose in the county designated in the complaint. This demand and affidavit, with
proof of service thereof upon the plaintiff's attorney, shall be
filed with the clerk in the county where the action was begun
within 30 days from the date of its service and thereupon,
unless the county where the action was begun is a county
in which the cause of action or some part thereof arose, the
place of trial shall be changed to the county where the defendant resides without any other proceedings. If the county designated in the complaint is not the county in which the cause
of action or some part thereof arose and if there are several
defendants residing in different counties, the trial shall be had
in the county upon which a majority of them unite in demanding or, if the numbers be equal, in that whose county
seat is nearest. When the place of trial is changed all other
proceedings shall be had in the county to which the change is
made, unless otherwise provided by consent of parties filed
with the clerk or by order of the court and the papers shall
be transferred and filed accordingly. When a demand for a
change of the place of trial is made as herein provided the
action shall not for any of the reasons specified in section
542.11 be retained for trial in the county where begun, but can
be tried therein only upon removal thereto from the proper
county in the cases provided by law.
8. Because the defendant's residence is not subject to fragmentation as is the notion of a cause of action, the more likely issue is
whether part of the cause of action arose in the county where the action was begun. The procedure where there are multiple defendants
residing in different counties is set forth in MINN. STAT. § 542.10 (1971),
quoted in note 7 supra.
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Arctic Enterprises,Inc. v. Plastics, Inc., 292 Minn. 16, 192 N.W.2d
822 (1971).
This decision clarified some of the confusion in the prior case
law as to whether the transferor or transferee court should determine these questions. 9 Some cases held that a defendant was
entitled as a matter of right to transfer venue. If the plaintiff
wished to contest the change, he had to litigate in the transferee
court the questions of the defendant's residence and where the
cause of action arose.' 0 Other cases held that upon the defendant's demand, the court where the action was instituted was to

resolve these issues."
Considerations of judicial economy were the bases for the
instant decision. Automatic transfer raises the unseemly possibility "of beginning an action in one county, removing the files
to defendant's county, there conducting a hearing on where the

action arose, followed by a remand to plaintiff's county, then a
determination of the convenience of witnesses, culminating in a
possible change of venue to still a third county ... ,u'.Minnesota Statutes § 542.10 provides:
This demand ... shall be filed with the clerk in the county
where the action was begun ... and thereupon, unless the
county where the action was begun is a county in which the
cause of action or some part thereof arose, the place of trial
shall be changed to the county where the defendant resides
without any other proceedings. (emphasis added)
In State ex rel. American Hoist & Derrick Inc. v. Carew, 293 Minn.
388, 198 N.W.2d 552 (1972), the court indicated that the proper way to
contest the trial court's resolution of these issues is by direct appeal to
the supreme court of the order denying or granting the transfer, rather
than by seeking mandamus in the transferee court.
9. The piecemeal amendment of a statute originally enacted in
1881 has been the principal source of confusion, in particular the addition in 1961 of "the county where the cause of action or some part
thereof arose" as a basis of venue in addition to the county of the defendant's residence.
10. Brudzinski v. DeKalb Agricultural Ass'n, 279 Minn. 486, 155
N.W.2d 737 (1968); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Midwest Technical Dev.
Corp., 269 Minn. 325, 130 N.W.2d 497 (1964).
Prior to the 1961 amendment, supra note 9, this was the settled
resolution of the issue. Pavek v. Ceska Farmarska Vzajermne Pojistujici Spolecnost, 202 Minn. 304, 278 N.W. 367 (1938); Peterson v. Carlson, 127 Minm..324, 149 N.W. 536 (1914); State ex rel. Minneapolis
T.VL Co. v. District Court of Meeker County, 77 Minn. 302, 79 N.W. 960
(1899); Flowers v. Bartlett, 66 Minn. 213, 68 N.W. 976 (1896).
11. Industrial Rubber Applicators, Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co.,
285 Minn. 511, 171 N.W.2d 728 (1969); Rotering v. Jones, 277 Minn. 253,
152 N.W.2d 353 (1967); Fotopoulos v. Birkeland, 273 Minn. 284, 141
N.W.2d27 (1966).
12. Arctic Enterprises, Inc. v. Plastics, Inc., 292 Minn. 16, 20, 192
N.W.2d 822, 825 (1971).
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The court determined that the emphasized phrase indicates a
legislative intent that the court where the action was initiated
should decide where the cause of action arose. 13 According to
the court, this construction was buttressed by the fact that this
language was added to the statute in 1965, shortly after Agricultural Insurance Co. v. Midwest Technical Development
Corp.'4 had held that a defendant has a right to automatic
transfer of venue upon demand.
This portion of the holding appears sound. However, the
discussion concerning which court should determine venue
changes based on convenience to witnesses or likelihood of impartial trial is less clearly correct. The court stated:
[o]nce that question [where the cause of action arose and
where the defendant resides] is presented the matter of litigating . . . the right to a change of venue for convenience of
witnesses or to obtain an impartial trial logically follows. 15
This could mean that any issues regarding transfer for reasons
of impartiality or convenience are to be determined by the original court only after it has found that the defendant is not entitled to a change in venue under section 542.10. If this is the
court's position, then the decision is sound. However, if this
means that the court in which the action was begun always has
jurisdiction to resolve issues of impartiality and convenience,
then the statute has been incorrectly interpreted. 1
The last
sentence of section 542.10 states:
When a demand for a change of the place of trial is made as
herein provided the action shall not for any of the reasons specified in section 542.11 be retained for trial in the county where
begun, but can be tried therein only upon removal thereto from
the proper county in the cases provided by law.
This means that if the defendant does not reside in the county
designated in the complaint and no part of the cause of action
arose in that county, issues of impartiality and convenience are
7
outside the jurisdiction of the original court.'
13. By itself, this construction does not reach the question of
which is the proper court to determine the defendant's residence.
But see note 8 supra.
14. 269 Minn. 325, 130 N.W.2d 497 (1964).
15. 292 Minn. at 21, 192 N.W.2d at 825.
16. The syllabus by the court is clearly wrong in stating that:
[T]he court where the action was commenced is the proper
jurisdiction to decide all venue questions raised by either party.
Id. at 16 (emphasis supplied).
17. This uncertainty in the court's opinion will be resolved in a
case where the plaintiff, notwithstanding the absence of the defendant's residence or a geographical nexus with the cause of action, requests the original court not to transfer the action to the county of the
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This decision also gave content to the statutory language in
section 542.11:
The venue of any civil action may be changed by order of the
court in the following cases:
(3) When an impartial trial cannot be had in the county
wherein the action is pending; or
(4)

When the convenience of witnesses ...

would be pro-

moted by the change.
Parts of the causes of action consolidated in this opinion arose
and were instituted in the counties of the respective plaintiffs'
residence. The plaintiff was the largest employer in each of
these outstate counties and its business operations substantially
affected the welfare of the counties' residents.' 8 Furthermore,
in one case trial in the plaintiff's county would entail transporting 23 witnesses from the Twin Cities to Roseau, and in the other
transporting 14 witnesses from the Twin Cities to Thief River
Falls. On these facts, the court held that a change in venue on
defendant's motion was appropriate pursuant to section 542.11

(3) & (4).19
B.

JUDGmENS & VERDIcTS

In one significant case the court redefined a difficult collateral estoppel issue.
James Sheehan claimed that David Hoium had verbally provoked and spat on him in a bar; Sheehan punched Hoium. Sheehan later pleaded guilty to aggravated assault Glens Falls,
defendant's residence on the grounds that to do so would inconvenience
witnesses or preclude an impartial trial.
18. This fact, of course, goes to the probability of obtaining a fair
trial. In one county, 15% of the potential jurors or their spouses were
employees of the plaintiff. Also, the allegedly defective part supplied
by defendant and used in plaintiffs snowmobiles apparently caused
breakdowns in machines owned by residents of plaintiff's county.
292 Mlinn. at 21-22, 192 N.W.2d at 825.
19. The procedural posture of this case was skewed. The trial
courts in Roseau and Pennington counties had granted the defendants'
request for an automatic transfer to Ramsey county. The plaintiffs
then moved the Ramsey County District Court to transfer venue back
to their home counties. From the denial of this motion the plaintiffs
sought a petition for mandamus to require the Ramsey County District
Court to transfer the action. The supreme court denied the petition
because, although the actions should not have been automatically transferred, on these facts the defendants were entitled to have the action
tried in Ramsey county for reasons of convenience and impartiality.
Thus the rule articulated is prospective only.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:881

Sheehan's own liability insurer, brought an action against him
to determine whether it was obligated to defend and indemnify
him since its policy coverage excluded intentional torts. Glens
Falls argued that Sheehan's plea of guilty to aggravated assault
estopped him from denying that the tort was intentional. The
trial court found that Glens Falls was obligated to defend Sheehan, but declined to pass on whether the insurer must indemnify
Sheehan in the event Hoium won a judgment against him. The
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although
Sheehan's plea of guilty is admissible in evidence, it does not
conclusively prove that he committed an intentional tort; Sheehan would be allowed to explain why he pleaded guilty.' Glens
Falls Group Insurance Corp. v. Hoium, 200 N.W.2d 189 (Minn.
1972).
The Minnesota court thus followed the majority position that
a conviction does not preclude an attempt by a convicted person
in a later civil action to prove that he was innocent of the offense. 2 The court was influenced by the fact that defendant
pleaded guilty rather than being found guilty after full trial,
and by defendant's contention, supported somewhat by the record, that the lower court coaxed an admission of criminal intent
from him The court distinguished Travelers Insurance Co.
v. Thompson 3 by noting that there the defendant had vigorously
contested his guilt in the criminal trial; different considerations
are apparent where there is a guilty plea. For example, the
court noted that the defendant received a stay of imposition of
sentence 4 from which one might infer that the guilty plea was
the result of a bargain. If defendant Sheehan had had his "day
in court" in the assault case, it seems clear that the court would
have applied collateral estoppel to preclude a new determination
in the civil litigation.
But Sheehan's guilty plea was held to be admissible as an
admission against interest. Sheehan, however, would be allowed to offer evidence to explain "the inducements which led
him to enter his pleas." This solution does create the spectre
1. The trial court was ordered to submit special verdicts to the
jury without disclosing their effect in order to determine whether the
tort was intentional and whether Glens Falls must indemnify.
2. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
(1968); Jankowski v. Clausen, 167 Minn. 437, 440, 209 N.W. 317, 318
(1926). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 634, 636 (1955).

3. 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968).
4. See VINN. STAT. § 609.135 (1971).
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of inconsistent legal results arising from one set of facts but it
seems clear that the chance for prejudice to any party is minimal. Each party is allowed to introduce all relevant evidence
before the jury decides on the nature of the tort. The insurance
company has a fair chance to limit its liability while, insofar as
is practical under the circumstances, the policy of encouraging
plea agreements is preserved. Nothing would attenuate that
policy more than a strict rule that all guilty pleas to even relatively minor crimes would create an estoppel in subsequent civil
litigation. Such a rule would impose almost certain liability
in the subsequent civil action and would preclude the determination of difficult fact questions which properly is the function
of an impartial jury. Moreover, the person who may benefit
most from the court's holding in this case is the injured party; he
now has the opportunity to recover from either the insurance
company or the tortfeasor.
Collateral estoppel arose in a second case in the context of

a third-party claim.
The owners of a building destroyed by fire sued defendant
gas company, alleging that a gas leak in a negligently installed
heater had caused the fire. Defendant gas company initiated a
third-party indemnification action against Margo-Kraft, the
lessee of the building, claiming that it was responsible for the
fire. As a third-party defendant, Margo-Kraft exercised some
control over the action through retention of common counsel for
itself and the building owner, sharing of litigation costs, and participation in the trial. The jury found defendant gas company not
negligent and judgment was entered in its favor. Consequently,
the court dismissed the third-party claim against Margo-Kraft.
Margo-Kraft then commenced a second action against the gas
company that raised the identical issue of negligence asserted
by the building owner in the first action. The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant and, on appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that a party who participated in,
and exercised some significant degree of control over, the trial
of an action in which its interests were at stake is in privity with
the named party to that action and cannot relitigate any issues
in a subsequent action that collateral estoppel would preclude
the named party from raising. Margo-Kraft Distributors v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 200 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1972).
Collateral estoppel is a limited form of res judicata whereby
the judgment in a prior action is deemed conclusive evidence in
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a later suit between the same parties or their privies as to all
matters actually litigated and finally determined in the former
suit.5 The doctrine is founded on the policies that fairness between the litigants and the public interest in having disputes finally settled require that there be no further litigation of an issue between parties once decided by a court. 6 In addition, such
relitigation would unduly strain already limited judicial resources. Privies of parties are non-parties who participate in an
action, exercise some control over the presentation of issues by a
party, and have a proprietary or financial interest in the decision
of a litigated issue of fact.1 Those in privity are bound by the
resolution of such issues as if they were parties since, by actively
participating in the suit, they have had the opportunity to represent their interests in the issues to the court even though they
were not formal parties to the action. 8
Margo-Kraft unquestionably was seeking to litigate the
identical issue that was tried in the earlier action, that is, defendant gas company's negligence in the installation of the
heater. 9 Thus, to bar Margo-Kraft from litigating the issue, all
that was required was a finding that Margo-Kraft was in privity
with the plaintiff owners in the first action. In the former action,
Margo-Kraft had exercised substantial control over the litigation and had retained common counsel for itself and the plaintiff. Moreover, the decisions on matters of trial strategy were
made principally to protect Margo-Kraft's interests.1 0 MargoKraft managed the first trial on the assumption that if a result
favorable to the building owners was obtained, it could affirmatively assert collateral estoppel in a later action against the gas
company to preclude the company from denying negligence. 1
Since Margo-Kraft had a great deal of control over the previous litigation and a stake in its outcome, it was not unfair to
conclude that Margo-Kraft should be bound by the prior adjudication of defendant's negligence. Any other result would have
belied the role that Margo-Kraft had actually played in the earlier action. Moreover, it would be fundamentally inequitable
5. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289
DUN. DIG. § 5161 (3d ed. rev. 1971).
6. 10B DUN. DIG. § 5159 (3d ed. rev. 1971).

(1968); 10B
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGIENTS §§

Id. § 84, comment a at 391.
200 N.W.2d at 47.
Id.
Id. at 49.

83-84 (1942).
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to force the gas company to defend the same action twice against,
for all practical purposes, the same party.
The procedure for impeaching a verdict was outlined in another case.
Plaintiff and defendant were found equally at fault in an
automobile-pedestrian accident which occurred at night. After
trial, plaintiff's investigator questioned the jurors; on the basis
of the information he received, a hearing was convened to inquire into possible jury misconduct. The hearing revealed that
during deadlocked deliberations, while the jury was separated
for an evening, a juror had consciously observed the width of
roadway illuminated by a vehicle's low beam headlights. He
then reported his observation of this fact, which was crucial to
the litigated issues, to the other jurors. There was also evidence
that the juror did not disclose on voir dire that he knew someone who had been involved in a similar accident, although he
was not questioned directly on this point. The trial court
granted plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the grounds of jury
misconduct. The supreme court reversed on appeal, holding
that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial
because a juror's observations while conducting his ordinary affairs is not misconduct, and an undisclosed possible bias does
not justify a new trial when the opposing attorney failed to ask
questions on voir dire which would have elicited that bias. The
court also expressed distaste for post-trial interrogation of jurors
and promulgated guidelines for attorneys to follow when jury
misconduct is suspected. Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 291
Minn. 334, 191 N.W.2d 418 (1971).
The court recognized that the practicalities of litigation forbid granting a new trial in every case where a juror makes an
unauthorized observation of the scene of the accident. It made
the practical observation that it would be impossible for jurors
to separate the trial in which they are participating from knowledge acquired in the conduct of their ordinary affairs. Indeed,
one of the valuable qualities of a jury is that the application
of its collective experience to specific cases tends towards just
results. The court distinguished situations where a juror deliberately conducts an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining
damages or testing a witness's credibility. In such cases the juror
would be obtaining evidence that has not been received in court
nor been subject to the rules of evidence and the parties would
have no opportunity to explain or rebut the evidence thus ob-
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tained.1 2 Where prejudice is probable in such cases, a new trial
13
should be granted.
It is unclear whether the court's decision was based on the
unintentional nature of the observation, or on the theory that
observation of the width of light afforded by low headlight
beams is such a common, everyday experience that it could not
be prejudicial. In any case, if an unauthorized observance of the
accident situs or other object produces original evidence capable
of influencing the verdict and that evidence is first exposed to
the jury during their deliberations, then a new trial should be
granted. The fact that a juror's observation is not deliberate is
irrelevant to the existence of prejudice. Thus it is the nature
and character of the evidence to which the juror was exposed
and which he related to the other jurors that should control the
granting of a new trial.
The decision to grant a new trial based on post-trial discovery of possible jury bias depends largely on the trial court's
discretion. That court must consider the possible bias, the diligence exercised by the objecting party to ascertain in a timely
manner such bias, and other relevant circumstances.' 4 In the
present case, the fact that a juror was acquainted with someone who had been involved in a prior similar incident could have
been easily ascertained on voir dire. Refusal to grant a new trial
in such circumstances seems to be well-founded.
The court also delineated the procedure a losing party
should follow when jury misconduct is suspected. The court
stated that a "Schwartz hearing"'I5 should be requested in lieu
of ex parte interrogation of jurors after a verdict is rendered.
The parties should approach the court when jury misconduct is
first suspected for the purpose of obtaining such a hearing. The
juror would then be examined in the presence of the trial judge
and all parties. The court further recommended that the trial
court should be receptive to requests for such hearings and
stated that counsel's statements or hearsay affidavits should be
12. Rush v. St. Paul City Ry., 70 Minn. 5, 72 N.W. 733 (1897).
13. Spinner v. McDermott, 190 Minn. 390, 251 N.W. 908 (1933).
14. State v. Jackson, 275 Minn. 462, 147 N.W.2d 698 (1967); State
v. Durnam, 73 Minn. 150, 75 N.W. 1127 (1898).
15. The court referred to the approved procedure for questioning
jurors as "a Schwartz hearing." 291 Minn. 334, 343, 191 N.W.2d 418,
424 (1971). The form of hearing the court recommends was first approved in Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325,
104 N.W.2d 301 (1960).
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sufficient to justify a hearing. The court did not explicitly state
that this procedure must be followed, but its expressed distaste for juror harassment by losing parties properly could lead
trial courts to make such a procedure mandatory.

HI. CONTRACTS
A. GENERmLY
During the last term the court decided several important
contracts cases. In the most significant decision, plaintiff entered into a franchise agreement with defendant which provided
that "any controversy whatsoever, relating to this agreement
shall be settled by arbitration... before any action or proceeding can be brought or maintained." Another clause provided
for severability of the contract provisions. Plaintiff soon realized he had made a bad bargain and sued for rescission of the
contract. In order to escape his duty to arbitrate, plaintiff alleged that there had been fraud in the inducement. Defendant
moved for a stay of the action and an arbitration order. The
trial court's denial of defendant's motion was affirmed by the
supreme court which held that (1) the language of the arbitration provision did not clearly evidence an intent to arbitrate the
issue of fraud in the inducement; (2) severability of the arbitration clause was irrelevant since fraud in the inducement vitiated
the entire contract; and (3) compulsory arbitration could be
avoided on the ground of fraud in the inducement only if the
remedy sought was rescission of the entire contract. Atcas v.
Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972).
The first issue was whether the parties could agree to arbitrate a claim of fraud in the inducement. The Uniform Arbitration Act, as adopted in Minnesota,' provides that an agreement
to arbitrate "any controversy arising between the parties is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."2 The
federal courts have construed this language to mean that where
the fraud in the inducement is not directed at the arbitration
1. The Minnesota statute is an adoption of 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947)
and uses identical terminology.
2.

A

TmN.
STAT. § 572.08 (1963).
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provision, the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable.8 Thus
where the parties have expressed an intention to arbitrate fraud
in the inducement, that desire will legally control unless the
arbitration provision itself is directly challenged as induced by
fraud. The instant court agreed that
where the language contained in the agreement evinces an intent of the parties to specifically arbitrate the issue of fraud in
the inducement,
...
then that issue is a proper subject for ar4
bitration.
Apparently this means that the parties must specifically use the
word "fraud" in the arbitration agreement.
In determining whether the contract terminology used in the
instant case was broad enough to encompass fraud in the inducement, the court initially referred to Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota., That case held that where
the scope of an arbitration provision is reasonably debatable
"the issue of arbitrability will be initially determined by the
arbitrators subject to a party's right [to petition the court]. '"
Exactly when this standard becomes operative, however, is itself
debatable. Other jurisdictions have interpreted nearly identical
language inconsistently,7 although apparently arbitration has
been favored where the language specifically contemplated arbitration of acts preceding the execution of the contract.8 Federal courts have construed language similar to that of the instant
agreement as contemplating arbitration of fraud in the inducement." Nevertheless, the Minnesota court emphasized the lack
3. Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 291
F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd, 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969); Robert
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
4. 292 Minn. 334, 347, 197 N.W.2d 448, 456 (1972).
5. 266 Minn. 284, 123 N.W.2d 371 (1963).
6. Id. at 291, 123 N.W.2d at 376.
7. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 936, 941 (1963).
8. Id. at 942. The reasoning in the instant case provides at least
one rationale for this tendency. In Atcas, the court differentiated between disputes concerning contract formation and those dealing with
breach. It stated that the existence of a contract is primarily a question of law that should be decided by a court; whereas breach of contract raises questions of fact that can best be resolved through arbitration by experts in the particular field. See Milton L. Ehrlich, Inc. v.
Swiss Constr. Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 644, 201 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1960).
9. Compare text in first paragraph at section III.A. of this Note
supra with Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 801 (1960) ("any complaint, controversy or question which may arise with respect to this contract that
cannot be settled by the parties thereto") and Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 262 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("any con-
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of specific reference to fraud in the inducement and, therefore,
held that the language was not sufficiently explicit.10
The court's reasoning on this issue seems meritorious. The
rule seeks to prevent persons from being deceived into waiving
a judicial determination where no such waiver was intended. It
would be undesirable to require a contracting party, defrauded
with respect to the arbitration clause, to seek relief from a perhaps distant arbitrator unless he has specifically so agreed.1 2
The second issue was whether fraud in the inducement of
the principal contract also vitiated the arbitration provision. A
contract clause stated that all provisions were severable. The
United States Supreme Court has held that an arbitration clause
is severable from the principal contract and is independently
valid unless attacked as having been induced by fraud."3 While
such a rule prevents dilatory litigation, the Minnesota court
found this unpersuasive and held that where fraud in the formation of the contract is alleged, an arbitration clause is never
severable from the remainder of the contract. Although the
court thus ignored specific severability language in the contract,
this holding was necessary to a consistent result in the case.14
The ultimate issue is whether a party has been defrauded and it
troversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the
breach thereof").
10. This holding contradicts the thrust of Layne-Minnesota-although the arbitration provision was "reasonably debatable," the
court did not require that the arbitrators initially determine its coverage.
11. For example, in this case plaintiff, a resident of Minnesota,
would have been forced to arbitrate in Florida. 292 Minn. at 337, 197
N.W.2d at 450.
12. The court here undoubtedly followed the tradition that conflicts concerning contract formation should be decided in court unless
the parties have actually considered and perhaps bargained to have all
contract issues arbitrated. This assumes that if the parties have not
specifically contemplated the issue of possible fraud in the formation
of the contract, they would desire to reserve their right to seek judicial
review of any subsequent dispute.
13. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967).
14. See also Murphy v. Morris, 12 N.J. Super. 544, 80 A.2d 128
(1951); Big W. Constr. Corp. v. Horowitz, 278 App. Div. 977,105 N.Y.S.
2d 827 (1951); Manufacturers Chem. Co. v. Caswell, Strauss & Co., 283
N.Y. 670, 19 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1940). This position is also in accord with
Corbin, who states:
[elven if, for some purposes, the provision for arbitration is
declared to be independent and collateral, the factor that
makes the rest of the transaction void or voidable would affect
that transaction as a whole.
6A A.-Comix, CoNTRACTs § 1444, at 449 (1962).
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seems immaterial whether the fraud occurred in the formation
of the contract or only in procuring the arbitration clause. In
either case, the holding of Atcas properly protects an unsuspecting party.
The court also held that in order to avoid arbitration because of fraud in the inducement a party must seek rescission
of the entire contract. The rationale is that one who seeks damages necessarily affirms the contract in order to recover and
thereby affirms the arbitration clause as well. 15 This limitation makes practical sense. It allocates questions of law to the
courts while leaving factual determinations to the arbitrators.
This procedure allows both courts and arbitrators to decide questions for which each is best equipped.
In a second case, Watson Construction Company entered into
a prime contract to construct an addition to a public building.
Watson furnished a contractor's bond as required by statute. 10
Watson subcontracted with Twin City Millwork Company
("TCM") for the latter to furnish 1,107 wooden doors of various
types. Since TCM did not manufacture doors, it contracted with
plaintiff for their construction. Plaintiff custom-made the doors
to specification and delivered them to TCM, who delivered them
to the job site for installation by Watson. Before plaintiff had
been paid, TCM went bankrupt, and plaintiff brought suit
against Watson and its surety to recover on the contractor's
bond. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's judgment for
plaintiff, holding that one who contracts to provide goods that
comprise a significant part of a construction project and that
must conform to prime contract specifications is a subcontractor, and that one who supplies him with materials used in performing the subcontract is entitled in the event of such subcontractor's default to recover on the prime contractor's bond. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Twin City Millwork Co., 291 Minn. 293, 191
N.W.2d 401 (1971).
The traditional mechanic's lien does not protect laborers or
materialmen who work on, or supply services to, public projects. 17 Thus, a Minnesota statute provides that any contractor
15. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
(1st Cir. 1960); Carribbean S.S. Co. v. La.
140 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Va. 1956); Nelley v.
A.2d 234 (1960). See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d

Refining Co., 280 F.2d 915
Societe Navale Caennaise,
Baltimore, 224 Md. 1, 116
936, 947-48 & 950 (1960).

See also 6A A. CoRiwN, CowrTAcTs § 1444 A, at 465 (1962).

16. MINN. STAT. § 574.26 (1931).
17. Anderson v. Breezy Point Estates, 283 Minn. 490, 168 N.W.2d
693 (1969); Albert & Harlow Inc. v. Great Northern Oil Co., 283 Minn.
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who contracts with "the state, or with any municipal corporation or other public board or body" must furnish a bond to insure payment for such services or labor.1 8 This statute is governed largely by the same principles that govern the mechanic's
lien.19
Minnesota follows the majority position that one who furnishes material to another materialman is not entitled to a
mechanic's lien.20 To qualify as a subcontractor in Minnesota,
and thus be entitled to a mechanic's lien, one must contract to
fabricate materials according to prime contract specifications,
whether he or a third party actually installs them.21 However,
the prime contractor may not even know of the supplier's existence and, therefore, cannot provide a bond to insure payment
for the materials.22 Consequently, a majority of states have held
that to qualify as a subcontractor one must actually have constructed or installed something at the work site.23
Under the Weyerhaeuser rule, if the materials supplied are
246, 167 N.W.2d 500 (1969); Nelson v. Sampson, 186 Minn. 271, 243
N.W. 105 (1932); Johnson v. Starret, 127 Minn. 138, 149 N.W. 6 (1914);
Emery v. Hertig, 60 Minn. 54, 61 N.W. 830 (1895).
18. M5N. STAT. § 574.26 (1931). See Ceco Steel Products Corp.
v. Tapager, 208 Minn. 367, 294 N.W. 210 (1940).
19. See Annot., 141 A.L.R. 321 (1942).

20. Id.

21. Illinois Steel Warehouse Co. v. Hennepin Lumber Co., 149

Minn. 157, 182 N.W. 994 (1921); Pittsburg Plate Glass Co. v. Sisters of
the Sorrowful Mother, 83 Minn. 29, 85 N.W. 829 (1901). In fact, California has used Minnesota precedent to bolster the conclusion that one
need not install work at the job site to be classified a subcontractor.
A party must merely agree with the prime contractor to perform "a
substantial specified portion of the work of construction ..

. in accord

with the plans and specifications" of the prime contract. Theisen v.
County of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 170, 183, 352 P.2d 529, 538 (1960).
See also Bumb v. Petersmith Controls, Inc., 377 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.

1967). Other jurisdictions have recently begun to adopt this position
and the federal courts have construed language in a leading United
States Supreme Court opinion to hold that where a party takes over
part of the prime contract or builds materials to prime contract specifications, he is a subcontractor whether or not he actually installs the
materials. See Clifford v. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S.
102 (1944); J.W. Cooper Constr. Co. v. Public Housing Admin., 390 F.2d
175 (10th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Wellman Eng'r Co. v. MSI
Corp., 350 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. John A. Johnson &
Sons, 137 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1955). See also Continental Cas. Co. v.
Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 310 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. La. 1969); Executive House Bldg., Inc. v. Demarest, 248 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 1971);
Holt & Bugbee Co. v. City of Melrose, 311 Mass. 424, 41 N.E.2d 562
(1942).

22. Annot., 141 A.L.R. 321, 332 (1942).
23. Id. at 323-_25.
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custom built to specifications, rather than pre-fabricated, stockin-trade goods, and represent a significant portion of the prime
contract, the court will label the party dealing with the prime
contractor a subcontractor. While this rule seems burdensome
on the prime contractor, he may protect himself by requiring
that subcontractors providing custom-made materials which constitute a significant portion of the project furnish a bond to
cover their own materialmen. 24 Moreover, if loss occurs, it seems
fair to place it on the prime contractor, who has received the
goods and been paid for them by the state, rather than on the
shoulders of a supplier who has delivered the contracted material in good faith.

B.

INsURANcE

The issue whether an insurance company can avoid the use
of its name in a lawsuit arose in a significant case decided last
term. Plaintiff was severely burned in the course of his employment when the flame resistant clothing provided by his employer failed to protect him. His employer's workmen's compensation carrier, Aetna, paid him compensation benefits and
medical expenses. Plaintiff instituted suit against Leef Bros.
alleging that its negligent treatment of the clothing was the
cause for the clothing's failure to protect him. Leef Bros. joined
Aetna as a third party defendant, but at the opening of the
trial the complaint against Aetna was dismissed. The trial court
allowed Aetna, as assignee of the employer, to recover its entire
subrogation interest from Leef Bros. in the name of the employee.
Leef Bros. appealed from a substantial jury verdict, alleging that
it was prejudiced because Aetna was allowed to recover in the
name of the negligence-free employee, when Aetna's insured, the
employer, may have been contributorily negligent. The supreme
court held that, since Minnesota Statutes § 176.061 (5) allows
the employer to sue in the name of an injured employee if the
employee has commenced the action, the same right applies to
the employer's insurance carrier. Froysland v. Leef Bros., Inc.,
293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
The court took note of a federal case relied upon by defendant that had required the insurer to be impleaded in a situation
similar to this one. That case interpreted Minnesota Statutes
§ 176.061(7) as allowing the insurer a separate cause of action
24. Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102 (1944).
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against the third party tortfeasor.1 This could subject the third
party tortfeasor to multiple suits because, while the tortfeasor
might win the employee's suit, the insurer could still use its
subdivision 7 rights to get to another jury. Thus the federal
court demanded that the insurer be impleaded in the employee's
suit as an indispensable party under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 17(a) and 19. The Minnesota court distinguished the instant case on the ground that Aetna had agreed to be bound by
the decision in the employee's suit and therefore could not exercise any subdivision 7 rights it might have. The court pointedly refused to entertain the issue whether subdivision 7 in fact
gives the insurer a cause of action exclusive of that enjoyed by
the employee.
The court's holding that the insurer has the right to use the
employee's name in the lawsuit seems correct. The insurer sues
as assignee of the employer who has a statutory right to proceed
under the employee's name.2 Presumably employers were given
the right to sue in the employee's name to protect them from
jury prejudice against large businesses. Insurance companies
would face similar dangers if they could not sue in the employee's name. It is therefore reasonable to extend them the
same protection employers receive under the statute. As to
defendant's claim that suit in the employee's name was prejudicial because it barred introduction of evidence of the employer's
contributory negligence, it is well-established in Minnesota that
an employer's contributory negligence is not available to a third
party tortfeasor as a defense against an employee suing the tortfeasor.3 Thus, the court properly rejected defendant's claim of
prejudicial error.
In a second insurance case, the New Amsterdam Casualty Co.
required the officers of a construction company, including the
defendant, to become indemnitors on several performance bonds
issued for the company. The construction company defaulted
on its obligations and its assets were assigned to New Amsterdam.
The defendant notified New Amsterdam that foreclosure should
not be permitted on certain mortgaged equipment which was
worth more than the balance of the mortgage. New Amsterdam did not pay off the mortgage and made no reply to the defendant's communications. Later, when a sheriff's sale was held
to dispose of the mortgaged equipment, a substantial amount
1. Braun v. Hassenstein Steel Co., 21 F.R.D. 343 (D.S.D. 1958).
2. MmNN. SAT.§ 176.061(15) (1971).
3. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952).
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of machinery had disappeared. A supplier subsequently sued
New Amsterdam for an unpaid account of the construction
company, following which New Amsterdam brought a third
party action for indemnity against the defendant. New Amsterdam also commenced a direct action against the defendant
and other officers for indemnity on another contract which was
consolidated with the third party action for trial. During the
course of the litigation, the supplier offered to settle for a sum
substantially less than the amount of its claim; without notifying
the defendant, New Amsterdam rejected the offer.
A judgment was returned against New Amsterdam for the
full amount of the supplier's claim. In the suits against the defendant, the trial court granted indemnity on the supplier's claim
but not on the claim asserted in the direct action. The supreme
court affirmed the judgment against New Amsterdam in the direct action, but reversed the judgment granting indemnity on
the supplier's claim, holding that an indemnitee owes a duty of
good faith to its indemnitor and that any act which prejudices
the rights of the indemnitor will release his obligation to the extent of the prejudice. 4 New Amsterdam had violated this duty
by failing to notify the defendant that it did not intend to satisfy
the mortgage on the equipment and by not communicating the
offer of settlement to him. The case was remanded for retrial
on several remaining disputed issues of fact,' with New Amsterdam's claim limited to the amount of the settlement offer plus
attorney's fees and costs incurred to the time of the offer of settlement. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Lundquist, 293 Minn.
274, 198 N.W.2d 543 (1972).
The court thus provided two concrete applications of the
general rule that an indemnitee owes a duty of good faith to the
indemnitor. First, an indemnitee is required to notify the indemnitor if he does not intend to protect assets under his control
which would be available to reduce the liability of the indemnitor.0 Second, an indemnitee must communicate to the indemni4. The court further held that this duty of care could not be
waived by agreement between the parties.
5. Among the issues left to be tried were (1) the amount of the
offset, if any, to be allowed because of New Amsterdam's failure to
notify the defendant of the cancellation of the contract for deed on real
estate owned by the construction company; and (2) whether there was a
breach of good faith by New Amsterdam in failing to notify defendant
that a supplier was applying payments on current contracts of the company to past due accounts incurred by its president prior to incorporation.
6. 293 Minn. at 285-86, 198 N.W.2d at 550.
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tor all offers of settlement which affect the indemnitor's obliga7
tion to the indemnitee.
Prior to the instant case, the court had held that, although
a principal has a duty to the surety to avoid active negligence in
managing collateral, mere inaction or passive negligence in failing to protect collateral is not sufficient of itself to release the
surety from his obligation to pay the debt 8 The court in New
Amsterdam qualified this general rule by requiring the indemnitee to give notice to the indemnitor if he does not intend to
accept a settlement offer or take action to preserve the collateral
The ruling allows the indemnitor to protect his interest in the
collateral without forcing the indemnitee to actively conserve it.
Any more stringent rule would require the court to determine
what steps the indemnitee should have taken to protect the collateral, and thus become involved in complex questions of business judgment.
It is not clear from the court's language whether the only
requirement for discharge is that the indemnitee's act prejudice
the indemnitor's rights, or whether bad faith is always necessary
in the absence of active negligence. However, given the courts
willingness to premise a finding of bad faith on a failure to give
notice, it is unlikely that this issue will ever arise.

IV. CRIMINAL LAW
Disclosure of withdrawn guilty plea at trial is reversible error. Defendant, convicted of burglary and aggravated robbery,
argued on appeal that the disclosure by the state during trial
that he had attempted to plead guilty at the preliminary hearing
deprived him of a fair trial. During direct examination of a
7. Id. at 287, 198 N.W.2d at 551. The court compared the duty to
notify the indemnitee of settlement offers to the duty of an insurer
to inform the insured of all proceedings, including communication of
settlement offers.
8. Elk River Concrete Prod. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 268 Minn.
284, 292, 129 N.W.2d 309, 315 (1964); Manchester Say. Bank v. Lynch,
151 Minn. 349, 186 N.W. 794 (1922). The court in New Amsterdam, citing American Cas. Co. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, 328 F.2d 138 (9th Cir.

1964), stated that the principal-surety relationship is so similar to the
indemnitor-indemnitee relationship that "there appears no reason for
differentiating the rules as they apply to one pair or the other."

Minn.at 282, 198 N.W.2d at 548.

293

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:881

police officer the prosecutor elicited evidence of defendant's behavior at the preliminary hearing, including his attempt to plead
guilty. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the conviction
and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the introduction of such evidence deprived defendant of his right to a fair
trial. State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182, 193 N.W.2d 829 (1972).
It is a well-settled rule that evidence of a withdrawn guilty
plea or of a prior attempt to enter such a plea is inadmissible.,
The rationale for the rule is that the effect of a court order permitting withdrawal is to render the initial plea meaningless. 2
Thus, a withdrawn plea ceases to be evidence. 8 Its introduction
at trial would not only render the privilege of withdrawal worthless, but would also directly conflict with the prior judicial de'4
termination that "the plea of guilty be held for naught.
In Sha the state argued that regardless of the error the verdict should be affirmed because the defendant had waived the
pretrial Rasmussen hearing 5 and because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. 6 The court first rejected the argument based on waiver of the Rasmussen hearing, stating:
[W]e need only say that failure to ask for the hearing does not
give the prosecutor license to introduce evidence which he
knows, or ought to know, is both inadmissible and highly prejudicial.7
Further, the court refused to accept the argument that when
there is overwhelming evidence of guilt the defendant cannot be
prejudiced. Due process, it stated, cannot be suspended even
where there is a strong factual case." The court placed emphasis
1. State v. Hayes, 285 Minn. 199, 172 N.W.2d 324 (1969) (evidence
of a prior plea of guilty subsequently withdrawn was inadmissible);
State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 73 N.W.2d 192 (1955) (it is improper
to inform the jury of a withdrawn guilty plea in argument or by innuendo). See also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
2. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 229 (1927).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Rasmussen hearing is the pretrial procedure in which
evidence that the state intends to present is measured against defense
objections based on constitutional and statutory challenges. See generally State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3
(1965).
6. The state's case included evidence that the victim's wallet was
found on defendant when he was arrested. Also, the victim identified
defendant as his assailant and defendant's fingerprints were found at
the scene of the crime. 292 Minn. at 183, 193 N.W.2d at 829.
7. Id. at 184-85, 193 N.W.2d at 831.
8. Id. at 185, 193 N.W.2d at 831. Accord, State v. Reardon, 245
Minn. 509, 513-14, 73 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1955).
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on the overriding obligation of the prosecutor to insure that the
defendant, no matter how strong the proof of guilt, receive a
fair trial. The prosecutor knew or should have known that evidence of defendant's attempted plea of guilty was going to be
brought before the jury when he questioned the police officer.
He also should have known that such testimony was inadmissible
due to its highly prejudicial impact Thus, because this misconduct was the prosecutor's fault, the best solution was to require the state to try the case again.0
However, in another appeal alleging prosecutorial misconduct the court reached the opposite conclusion. In this case the
defendant did not testify in his own behalf, but during the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense witness a prior conviction of the defendant was revealed. The conviction was affirmed
because the record indicated that the prosecutor had not intentionally revealed the defendant's prior record. State v. Barness,
200 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 1972).
Generally, evidence of a defendant's past record is inadmissible, except for purposes of impeachment. 10 Although there are
several well-defined exceptions to this general rule, the prosecution must furnish the defendant with a written notice indicating what it intends to show before it can introduce such evidence. 1 Since here the defendant did not testify, evidence of
his prior record obviously could serve no impeachment purpose,
and the court's statement that it would have reversed had the
prosecutor intentionally revealed the prior record made it clear
that no other exception to the general rule was applicable. In
holding that a conviction will not be reversed if a legitimate
question elicits unexpected, inadmissible evidence, this decision
is in accord with the majority view.12
9. See State v. Gegen, 275 Minn. 568, 569, 147 N.W.2d 925, 926

(1967), where the court stated:
If prosecutors and police officers persist in trying to inject into
a trial indirectly matters which they know they cannot introduce directly, the only solution is to let them try the case over.
10. See State v. West, 285 Mlinn. 188, 173 N.W.2d 468 (1969); State

ex rel. Black v. Tahash, 280 Minn. 155, 158 N.W.2d 504 (1968).

11. State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965), lends its
name to the required notice, i.e., the "Spreigl" notice. Such evidence
of past crimes is admissible only to prove identity, intent, knowledge,
or the presence of a common scheme or plan. See State v. Clark, 286
Minn. 419, 176 N.W.2d 123 (1970); State v. Billstrom, 276 Minm. 174,
149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).
12. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So. 2d 847 (1971)
(purely gratuitous and unresponsive answer to prosecutor's question
could not be charged to state); People v. Romana, 337 Ill. 300, 169 N.E.
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The permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest
was decided last term by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The
court affirmed a trial court determination that a revolver had
been properly seized and thus properly admitted into evidence.
State v. Cox, 200 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1972).
Acting on confirmed information from two informants,
seven police officers went to defendant's apartment and were
admitted by his girlfriend. The officers found Cox in the bedroom dressed in his underwear; they handcuffed him and, contemporaneously with or immediately after the handcuffing, thoroughly searched the bedroom. They also searched the remainder
of the apartment, even though they had no search warrant.',
The only tangible evidence seized was the revolver which was
found under a cushion of a davenport located in the bedroom.
The hiding spot was five to eight feet from where defendant
had been when the officers entered the bedroom and about three
feet from the chair on which he was sitting after he had been
14
handcuffed.
On appeal, defendant argued that the weapon should not
have been admitted into evidence since it was seized in violation
of his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 15 The court disagreed, holding that the
United States Supreme Court decision in Chimel v. California"
was controlling. The narrow holding in, Chimel was that a
search incident to a valid arrest is permissible if confined to
182 (1929) (where answer was gratuitous and was stricken from the
record, the prosecutor was not guilty of misconduct).
13. The court stated that this aspect of the search "was clearly impermissible" but, since no incriminating evidence was produced, there
was no issue of suppression. 200 N.W.2d at 309 n.4. However, this
additional search was in violation of defendant's fourth amendment
rights. It squarely raises the issue of whether there should be a remedy for such action. One suggestion is that, when an improper search
occurs in conjunction with a proper one, evidence obtained from the
proper search which would otherwise be admissible should be excluded.
14. 200 N.W.2d at 309.
15. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. iv. Evidence seized in violation of this right cannot be used as evidence against a defendant in a
state court. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The scope of a search incident to an arrest
is deemed reasonable if limited to "the arrestee's person and the area
'within his immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at 763.
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the immediate area of the arrestee, the area from which he could
obtain a weapon or destroy evidence.
The court in Cox appears, however, to have erroneously
focused on the physical boundaries of the room in which Chimel
was arrested. It is rather clear that Cox was not going to obtain
any weapon or destroy any evidence while handcuffed and
guarded by seven police officers. The court therefore appears
to have determined as a matter of law that a search incident
to an arrest is valid if confined to the room in which the suspect
was arrested. It is somewhat surprising the court did not feel the
degree of restraint imposed upon Cox distinguished this situation
from other cases validating searches of the room in which a suspect was arrested. 17
In another case involving a warrantless search, the court
approved the search of a parked pickup truck following an arrest of the owner inside his residence. State v. Coy, 200 N.W.2d
40 (Minn. 1972). In Coy, a 16 year old girl was awakened at
about 3:15 a.m. by a man lying next to her. He told her to remain silent or he would stab her and then instructed her to disrobe. However, she broke away and ran into her parents' bed18

room.

Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived at defendant's residence and determined, based on the temperature of the radiator
in his truck, that the vehicle had recently been driven. One officer looked through a window of the truck and observed an
empty knife sheath. The officers then went to the residence and,
after being admitted by the defendant's wife, placed him under
arrest. He was then taken outside and placed in the police vehicle. The officer who had originally observed the knife sheath
returned to the truck and discovered a knife under the front
seat. Both knife and sheath were subsequently introduced at
defendant's trial for aggravated assault'
On appeal, the defendant argued that both pieces of evidence
should have been excluded since they were obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The supreme court disagreed, holding on
17. In both State v. Fulford, 290 Minn. 236, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971)
(knife seized from suspect's coat on a chair a few feet from his person)
and State v. Sinberg, 288 Minn. 175, 179 N.W.2d 141 (1970) (search of
suspect's trousers on chair six feet from point of arrest), there was no
mention of handcuffing. Both searches were upheld.
18. 200 N.W.2d at 42.
19. Id.
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the authority of Chambers v. Maroney20 that the search and subsequent seizure were both valid. The supreme court pointed out
that the search was of a readily movable vehicle, was conducted
at 4:00 a.m., and defendant's wife was home and could have removed the evidence or the truck.
The court's reasoning, however, is questionable. First, the
reliance on Chambers is misplaced. That case involved a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a highway, not of a
parked truck. Second, the court held that Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,2 1 though it was analogous to Coy, would not be given
retroactive effect. In Coolidge, the United States Supreme Court
stated that the police must obtain a search warrant before conducting a search of a parked vehicle if the defendant is arrested
within his home and is unable to gain access to the vehicle. The
fact that the defendant's wife was present was irrelevant since
the police could guard the vehicle until a valid search warrant
was obtained.
The court's reliance on the retroactivity doctrine is also misplaced. Whether a case is to be deemed retroactive is a difficult
'2 2
question, one that has "no inflexible constitutional rule.
However, the prime prerequisite is a change from prior law for
the purpose of overcoming an aspect of the criminal trial that
substantially impairs its truth finding function,2 8 and Coolidge
did not express new law. It basically held that, on the facts before it, the controlling case was Carroll v. United States.24 That
case did distinguish between searches of permanent structures,
such as stores and homes, and searches of various types of vehicles. But the basis for the distinction was the danger of a vehicle being moved.2 5 In Coy, there was little danger of the truck
being moved, especially if one police officer guarded it until a
warrant was obtained.
The question of what facts are needed to support a probable
cause determination for arrest without warrant and for issuing
a search warrant was again addressed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court last term.
20. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

"In terms of the circumstances justifying

a warrantless search, the Court has long distinguished between an au-

tomobile and a home or office."
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
21.

403 U.S. 443 (1971).

399 U.S. at 48, citing Carroll v. United

22. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 651 (1971).
23. 200 N.W.2d at 44, citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S.

646 (1971).
24. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

25.

Id. at 151, 153.
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While investigating the shooting death of Nicholas Morales,
police were given key information by two informants. One of
the informants, who in the past had given the detective reliable information, stated that he had heard from somebody else
that one Joe Cox had shot a Mexican. The other informant, who
was known by the officer and was thought to be reliable, stated
that he too had been told that Cox had shot a Mexican. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that this information
plus verification done by the police was sufficient to establish
probable cause for a warrantless arrest. State v. Cox, 200
N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1972).
The court agreed with defendant that if there had not been
any confirmation of the informants' statements this case would
have presented a more difficult fourth amendment issue.2 0 However, the fact that the officer had an independent pool of knowledge coupled with the informants' statements provided a sufficient basis to justify the arrest. Some of the factors pointed to
by the court were that the officer knew: 1) that Morales was
Mexican; 2) that Morales had been shot a short time before he
died, at a time when tippling houses were open; 3) that the defendant was a frequent visitor of one tippling house; 4) that
Morales was a bartender in the immediate vicinity of the tippling house; 5) that the tippling house was on the second floor
and that the medical report indicated that Morales had been shot
from an elevated position; 6) that Cox had a prior record for a
crime of violence; and 7) that Cox had a white Mustang and it
was parked in front of the tippling house.2 7 This information
coupled with the tips of the two informants was sufficient for a
police officer acting as a reasonable and prudent man to make
the decision to arrest Cox. However, the language of the court
that is important for further cases is contained in a footnote.
There the court indicated that if an informer is a private citizen,
apparently engaged in a lawful occupation, and has had no occasion to have been a prior informant, he will be presumed reli28
able.
The requirement for a reliable informant was also articulated in State v. Daniels, 200 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 1972). There a
search finding narcotic drugs was upheld by the court. It found
that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was sufficient
26. 200 N.W.2d at 307.
27. Id. at 307-08.
28.

Id. at 307 n.1. See Pollack v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. App. 2d

548, 77 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1969).
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since the officer stated that the unidentified informant had previously given information leading to arrests and convictions in
narcotics cases.2 9 There were also sufficient facts to enable the
magistrate to decide that the informant received his information in a reliable manner since the informant said that he had
seen heroin on defendant and in defendant's residence within
30
the preceding 48 hours.
The court also upheld a "no knock" provision on the search
warrant,3 ' although it did say that "the last word on this important issue has not been written. '32 The court held that it was
not supporting a blanket rule allowing exceptions to the knock
and announce rule every time there is to be a search for narcotics; 33 the officers must indicate that they have strong reason

to believe that the destruction of evidence would occur should
they announce who they were and for what reason they were
there. However, it upheld the sufficiency of the statement in
this case when all the warrant application affidavit said was:
"Daniels is very much aware of the police."' 4 The court argued
29.

200 N.W.2d at 406.

The requirement that the informant be

shown reliable was set down by the United States Supreme Court in
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See United States v. Ross, 424
F.2d 1016 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
30. 200 N.W.2d at 406. This second requirement was also spelled
out in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The most recent case is United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
31. The terminology used indicated that the officer was granted
permission by the magistrate to enter the dwelling without announcing
his presence or intention. In Daniels the officers broke the door down
with a sledge hammer. There is no statutory language governing
whether such entries are valid, but in State v. Barker, 283 Minn. 127,
166 N.W.2d 347 (1969), the Minnesota Supreme Court set out the standards to determine if such a provision should be granted by a magistrate.
32. 200 N.W.2d at 410.
33. It did point out that the United States Supreme Court has yet
to rule in this complex area and that states have been divided in their
decisions. One line of cases represented by People v. De Santiago, 71
Cal. App. 2d 18, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353 (1969), has refused to

make the blanket rule of "no knock" in narcotics cases. On the other
hand, a line of cases represented by People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484
P.2d 1238 (1971), holds that such a rule is constitutionally permissible
as not violative of the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.
34. 200 N.W.2d at 404. The full portion of the affidavit applicable
here said:
My informant further states that Daniels is very much aware
of the police. The affiant believes that because the contraband
sought is easily disposed of, that an unannounced entry is
necessary. Id. at 404.

1973]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

that although this was conclusory, it was not unrealistic to read
it as a shorthand statement of fact since the defendant and the
informant apparently had a close relationship.3 1
The court did, however, draw the line in State v. Cvar, 293
Minn. 439, 196 N.W.2d 624 (1972), and held that an arrest based
solely on the statements of an unidentified informant was illegal. Thus the narcotics seized incident thereto were ordered suppressed.
In Cvar, an unidentified young male called the Hibbing police
and told them that the occupant of a white Chevrolet van had
offered to sell him narcotics. The caller gave the license number
of the truck and the direction in which it was proceeding. Two
deputy sheriffs then proceeded in that direction and learned enroute that the van was registered to a person known to them to
be a drug user by reason of information the officers had gathered
in the preceding nine months.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence seized from him on the ground that there was no probable cause for the search and seizure. The court upheld the suppression order. It stated that the bald, uncorroborated report of
an unidentified informant did not measure up to the standards
of the fourth amendment. The information regarding the registration was clearly not sufficient corroboration. Seizure based
on mere suspicion is not valid even if the search uncovers contraband. As the court wrote:
To allow authorities to proceed to arrest and search and seize
on the basis of a mere anonymous phone call would be to give
them a blank check to engage in exploratory searches and create a new principle by which results of the search will support
probable cause. It is so elementary that this proposition is repugnant to constitutional standards, as expressed by the Fourth
Amendment and interpreted by
innumerable decisions, that fur36
ther discussion is unnecessary.
Last term the Minnesota Supreme Court decided a number
of cases involving the implied consent provision and its concomitant license revocation procedures.
On October 10, 1970, a West St. Paul policeman arrested Michael Halverson while he was in his car which was in a private
35. 200 N.W.2d at 410. The closeness of the relationship is taken,
apparently, from the fact that the informant said that he had seen
narcotics within the preceding 48 hours at defendant's house.
36. 293 Minn. at 442, 196 N.W.2d at 626. Among the myriad cases
cited in support of its conclusion the court cited: Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959);
State v. Bagley, 286 Minn. 180, 175 N.W.2d 448 (1970); State v. Burch,
284 Mnn. 300, 170 N.W.2d 543 (1969).
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parking lot. Halverson refused to submit to a chemical test for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood.
Pursuant to the implied consent statute the Commissioner of
Public Safety informed him that his driver's license had been
revoked. At a hearing on the revocation issue, the Commissioner's revocation determination was rescinded and Halverson's
license was ordered reinstated.3 7 The Commissioner appealed
and the supreme court affirmed, holding that the provisions of
Minnesota Statutes § 169.123 (1971) do not apply to private property. State Department of Public Safety v. Halverson, 292 Minn.
468, 194 N.W.2d 573 (1972).
Minnesota's implied consent law, Minnesota Statutes §
169.123 (1971), provides in subdivision 2:
Any person who drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the
public highways of this state shall be deemed to have given
consent subject to the provisions of Laws 1961, Chapter 454, to a
chemical test of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of
determining the alcoholic content of his blood.
Subdivision 4 provides that if a person refuses to take the test,
it shall not be given. However,
the commissioner of public safety, upon the receipt of a certificate of the peace officer that he had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the arrested person had been driving
or operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways while
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and that the person had refused to permit the test, shall revoke his license or
permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege for a
period of six months.
Subdivision 6 provides for a hearing at which the arrested person can challenge the revocation by showing that he did not refuse to submit to the test or that if he did, there were reasonable
grounds for doing so.
The Commissioner argued that Minnesota Statutes § 169.02
(1) (2), the overall "scope" section of chapter 169, should control.
That section provides that
The provisions of sections 169.09 to 169.13 shall apply upon
highways and elsewhere throughout the state.
This broad scope, however, is in direct conflict with the first sentence of section 169.123(2) which states: "[a]ny person who
drives or operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of
this state"3 8 shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chem37. The statute provides that after a revocation has been ordered
by the Commissioner, the driver may appeal to the municipal court for
a factual determination as to the validity of the revocation. MINN.
STAT. § 169.123(6) (1970).
38. Emphasis added.
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ical blood alcohol test. In a terse per curiam opinion the court
held that the specific language of the implied consent statute
prevailed over the general language of section 169.02. It reasoned
that since section 169.123 provides severe sanctions,3 9 the court
could not assume that the general references in section 169.02
were meant to govern. Support for this position was further
found in the fact that the specific language of section 169.123
was adopted 24 years after the general language of section
169.02.40
In State v. Palmer, 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971), the
issue presented was whether a driver who has refused to submit
to chemical testing may later request a test and thereby avoid
license revocation. Palmer was arrested for driving while under
the influence of alcohol. After the implied consent law was explained to him, Palmer refused to submit to the test until he
talked with an attorney. He was allowed to call his attorney who
advised him to take the test. However, the officer in charge
then denied Palmer's request and notified the Commissioner of
Public Safety that Palmer had refused to take the test. The
Commissioner revoked Palmer's license for six months. The revocation was sustained in the municipal and district courts. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that once a person has refused
to submit to testing, he has no right to have the test administered if he later changes his mind and asks to be tested.
Palmer argued that not permitting him to withdraw his refusal after consulting counsel impinged on his constitutional
right to have assistance of counsel. The court rejected his argument since it is well established that all proceedings pursuant to
the implied consent statute are civil in nature and therefore em41
body no constitutional right to counsel
Palmer also argued that it was unreasonable to deny his request to be tested because he had not refused to take the test,
but had merely qualified his permission on being granted an
opportunity to consult with counsel. Responding to this argument, the court first looked to the statute: "If a person under
arrest refuses to permit chemical testing, none shall be given
."42 Since these words do not provide for a qualified re39. Loss of driving privileges for six months.

40. MAnN. STAT. § 169.123 was adopted in 1961 while MINN. STAT.

§ 169.02 was first passed in 1937.

41. State Dep't of Highways v. Halvorson, 288 Minn. 424, 181
N.W.2d 473 (1970); State Dep't of Highways v. Styrbicki, 284 Minn. 18,
21, 169 N.W.2d 225, 227 (1969).
42. MAN. STAT. § 169.123 (4) (1971) (emphasis added).
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fusal, the court stated that while the officer might well have
permitted Palmer to take the test, his permission was not compelled by the statute. To the extent that this argument is one
of legislative intent, reliance on this statutory language is somewhat misplaced. It is likely the legislature intended to forbid
physically forcing a suspect to take the tests.
The more satisfactory rationale offered by the court was that
a defendant should not be allowed to compromise the accuracy
of the test by delaying its administration. However, this rationale does not dictate an inflexible rule. If the change of mind
occurs soon after the refusal, and if qualified personnel are still
available to administer the test, the state is not prejudiced if the
test is permitted.
In his dissent Justice Otis agreed that a person detained
pursuant to Minnesota's implied consent law does not have a constitutional right to consult counsel. He argued that once Palmer
asked for an opportunity to call his lawyer, Minnesota Statutes
§ 481.10 (1971) imposed an absolute duty on the arresting officers before proceeding to notify Palmer's attorney of his request
for consultation. The statute states in part:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person
restrained of his liberty upon any charge or cause alleged, except in cases where imminent danger of escape exists ....
upon request of the person restrained, as soon as practicable,
and before other proceedings shall be had, shall notify any
attorney residing in the county of the request for a consultation with him.
While Justice Otis would not permit a defendant to delay his request in an effort to compromise the accuracy of the test,45 he
thought it was
arbitrary and unjust to deny a defendant who has been arrested for driving under the influence 44
the opportunity of making a phone call to determine his rights.
Another driver's refusal to submit to the chemical test was
determined to be reasonable by a judge of the Hennepin County
Municipal Court.45 Thus the Comissioner's revocation order
was rescinded. On appeal by the Commissioner, the court af43. "I would agree that ... the police need not consent to a delay
while an attorney appears in person or to any other delay which would
prejudice the accuracy of the test." 291 Minn. at 309, 191 N.W.2d at
192.
44. Id.
45. This decision was made following a hearing requested by the
driver after he was notified that his license had been revoked for six
months. The hearing was held pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 169.123(6)
(1971).
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firmed, holding that whether there was a reasonable basis to refuse the test was a factual question, and a lower court's determination would not be set aside unless it were "clearly erroneState Department of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn.
ous."' 4
483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971).
Beckey was arrested for driving while under the influence
of alcohol. The arresting officer told Beckey that he had a right
to have an attorney present and that he had a right to remain
silent. Just before Beckey was requested to submit to the chemical test the policeman again read him the "Miranda" warning
and informed him of the possible consequences of refusing to
take the test. Beckey refused and at the hearing on the validity
of the revocation order he testified as to the reasons for his refusal:
Because, sir, I didn't know-I didn't realize that that was necessary. I wanted-if I could have talked to somebody before, or
then. I found out since that I should have, that it would have
been a lot easier, through my attorney, but at the time I was
just shaken up and I just thought it would be best if I47just was
quiet and didn't do anything until I talked to somebody.
This testimony, taken with the uncontroverted fact that a
"Miranda" warning had been given immediately prior to the implied consent request and explanation, convinced the court that
the defendant was confused. and thought he could refuse to take
the test until he consulted with his attorney. If the arresting
officer does not clearly point out that the constitutional rights
to consult an attorney and remain silent do not apply to the
implied consent test,
it is not unlikely that confusion will occur, resulting in the arrested person's being misled into believing that he may remain silent and that he is being offered the option to postdecision and the chemical test until he can consult an
pone his 48
attorney.
An attempt to revoke a driver's license was dismissed with
prejudice by the Aitkin County probate court, municipal division, on the ground that the defendant had entered a guilty plea
in the criminal phase of the matter pursuant to a plea agree46. Since revocation proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature, the "clearly erroneous" standard applies. MINm. R. Crv. P. 52.01.
47. 291 Minn. at 485, 192 N.W.2d at 444.
48. Id. at 487, 192 N.W.2d at 445. The opinion made it clear that a
person has no constitutional right to consult with an attorney prior to
deciding whether to take the test. But whether there is a statutory
right to consult with an attorney under MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (1971) was
left undecided. See the discussion of Justice Otis' dissent in State v.
Palmer in text accompanying and preceding note 43 supra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:881

ment. The substance of the plea agreement was that if defendant pleaded guilty to careless driving and disorderly conduct,
the state would not pursue revocation proceedings for failure to
comply with a request to submit to chemical testing under the
implied consent law. The dismissal was appealed by the Commissioner of Public Safety who argued that the plea agreement
was invalid and could not be binding on his department. The
supreme court agreed, reversed the lower court's decision, and
remanded the case for a further revocation hearing. State Department of Public Safety v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 192 N.W.2d
93 (1971).
The basis of the court's decision was that the county attorney had no authority to grant the defendant immunity from
license revocation proceedings. Such proceedings are civil in
nature and a county attorney has no authority to represent the
state in a civil matter unless expressly authorized to do so by the
attorney general. 49 Hence the Department of Public Safety was
not bound by the bargain between the county attorney and the
defendant.
In House the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the agreement was invalid. Consequently it should follow that the defendant had the absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. This
may have been implicit in the court's reasoning but the opinion
fails to spell this out. The concluding sentence merely indicates
that the case should be remanded for a further revocation hearing.5" It would have been much better had the court clearly
indicated that the defendant had the right to withdraw his guilty
plea and go to trial on the criminal charges.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in one case established the
requirements that must be satisfied for the use of radar speed
meters in speeding convictions.
Defendant was convicted in municipal court of speeding
based solely on the reading of a radar speed meter operated by
a patrolman. On appeal the supreme court held that a court may
take judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of radar
speed meters, but that four requirements must be satisfied for
the reading of a particular instrument to be sufficiently accurate
to support a conviction. In this case requirements were not met
and the conviction was reversed. State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn.
352, 191 N.W.2d 428(1971).
49. MN. STAT. § 388.05 (1971).
50. 291 Minn. at 426, 192 N.W.2d at 95.
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Relying on Kopper's, The Scientific Reliabiity of Radar
Speedmeters,5 1 the court concluded that the reliability of speed
meters is a fact "of generalized knowledge ...
so universally
known [that it] cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute,"
and as such, is properly subject to judicial notice. 52 This is the
position of the courts in the great majority of jurisdictions,5 3 and
is not open to serious question.
The court distinguished between reliability of the radar
speedmeter technique and the accuracy of a particular instrument. Proof of accuracy sufficient to support a conviction requires:
1. The officer reading the device must have adequate training
and experience in its operation;
2. The officer should testify to the manner in which the unit
was set up and the conditions under which it was used;
3. A showing must be made that the machine was operated
with a minimum possibility of distortion from such external
interference as noise, neon lights, high-tension power lines,
high power radio stations, and other similar influences; and
4. On the occasion when the machine is set up, its accuracy
must be tested in some external manner by a reliably calibrated tuning fork or by actual test run, using54 another vehicle with an accurately calibrated speedometer.
In this case the conviction was reversed because the patrolman operating the unit had tested its accuracy only by means
of a tuning fork which was an internal part of the machine. An
external test is demanded because "[t] o test the machine by itself seems to be bootstrapping." 55 The preference for an external test is misplaced since it obfuscates the appropriate inquiry;
namely, the accuracy of the testing method. The validity of a
method cannot, in all cases, depend on whether external or internal devices are used.56 For example, there is no rational basis for preferring the accuracy of using another vehicle for a test
run over an internally self-testing mechanism. While the general accuracy of speedometers is perhaps subject to judicial notice, proof that a particular speedometer was "accurately calibrated" will raise many of the same problems as are involved in
proving the accuracy of a particular radar meter. The use of
51. 33 N.C.L. REv. 343 (1955).
52. State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 352, 355, 191 N.W.2d 428, 430 (1971).
53. See, e.g., State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365, 216 A.2d 625 (1966);
People v. Abdallah, 82 Ill. App. 2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1967); People v.
Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 147 N.E.2d 728, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
54. State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. at 359, 191 N.W.2d at 432.
55. Id. at 358, 191 N.W.2d at 431.
56. In this case there was expert testimony that the internal
tuning fork was an adequate check on the accuracy of the instrument.
Id. at 355, 191 N.W.2d at 429-30.
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tuning forks is preferable since their accuracy is less dependent
on such extraneous factors as road conditions, wear and tear
and the skill of the operator.
In this case, the adequacy of the operating officer's training
and experience was not in issue. However, the court implied
that one hour of training in the operation of the instrument at
the police academy, four hours on the job training with another
police officer, and periodic operation of the instrument for 14
months are adequate.
The decision concerned the sufficiency of the evidence where
the radar reading is the only evidence of speeding. The admissibility of an improperly tested reading as corroborative evidence
was not treated. Where there is other evidence of speeding, the
reading of an improperly tested radar meter should be admitted,
since independent evidence of speeding serves as a check on the
accuracy of the reading in much the same manner as the requirements enumerated in the court's opinion. One countervailing consideration, however, is the tendency of juries to place
disproportionate weight upon the accuracy of scientific evidence.
The test of criminal insanity was modified by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in a case decided last term.
Defendant was charged with third degree murder 57 for the
stabbing death of his father. He had a long history of mental
illness58 and at the time of the lethal attack was under the delusion that his father was plotting against him.5 9 The defense was
not guilty by reason of insanity, and expert testimony was given
that, although the defendant might have been able to know his
57. He was originally charged with murder in the second degree
and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. There was
no jury.
58. Significant incidents for the purpose of the defense of insanity
as interpreted on appeal were those evidencing defendant's delusions of
persecution: e.g., he attempted to flee to Canada to escape assassination
by the John Birch Society; he threatened his landlady with a pistol to
force her to confess what "tricks" she was playing on him; he fancied
himself a presidential candidate in danger of political assassination;
he refused to take vitamin pills given by his mother, believing his parents part of the plot against him.
59. Defendant's father, a college professor, was, on the night of
the attack, discussing campus disturbances with a colleague on the
phone. Defendant had just discovered his father had removed defendant's gun from its hiding place in the closet and rushed upstairs to
confront his father in time to hear his father say, "He will have to be
stopped," referring to a campus agitator. Defendant believed he was
the subject of the threat, grabbed a knife from the kitchen, and stabbed
his father.
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act was wrong legally,6 0 his judgment was suspended by rage
and fear, and he could not have avoided striking out to protect
himself. 61 However, in Minnesota, the test for determining criminal insanity provides that a person shall not be excused from
criminal liability unless he was laboring under such a defect of
reason as not to know the nature of his act, or that it was
wrong. 62 The trial court, relying on this definition, rejected the
insanity defense and found defendant guilty. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that the statute authorizing the
insanity defense should be liberally construed to allow the free
receipt and use of evidence pertaining to the elements of volition
and capacity to control behavior as well as to the defendant's
cognitive capacity to appreciate the nature of his act. 3 Because

such evidence had been admitted without objection by the prosecution, the court ordered entry of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity rather than remand the case for a new trial. State
v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 1972).
The source of the test of criminal insanity in the Minnesota
statute was the rule in M'Naghten's Case formulated in 1843.64
60. It was also possible that the defendant could not have realized
his act was "wrong" because: he believed the law did not apply to
him; he had his own sense of right and wrong due to his delusions;
and acting as he did in self-defense, he might have determined the attack was right "had he reflected upon [it]." (emphasis added). State
of Minnesota v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Minn. 1972).
61. The consensus of the psychiatric testimony was that a combination of factors deprived Mr. Rawland of his judgment and control:
he was impulsive, his general state of mind was abnormal, he was enraged and in fear of his safety, and he did not stop to reflect on the
consequences of his act. Id. at 777-81.
62. MiNq. STAT. § 611.026 (1969) read at the time of the trial:
No person shall be tried, sentenced, or punished for any crime
while in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity, so as
to be incapable of understanding the proceedings or making a
defense; but he shall not be excused from criminal liability
except upon proof that at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act he was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from one of these causes, as not to know the nature of his act,
or that it was wrong.
The language of the statute had been amended before the appeal by
the substitution of the words "mentally ill or mentally deficient" for
"idiocy, imbecility, lunacy, or insanity." Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 352, § 1.
This change was irrelevant for purposes of the appeal.
63. We now question whether the strict and literal construction of the statute "dicated by our previous opinions is consistent with the objectives of the judges in M'Naghten, the
intent of our own legislature, basic principles of criminal law,
or constitutional requirements.
199 N.W.2d at 785.
64. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep.
718 (1843).
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It was applied as common law 5 until codified in 1885. In the
first significant case tried under the statute, 0 an effort was made
by the accused to include "uncontrollable impulse" as a defense
in addition to the "right and wrong" test.0 7 The court rejected
this test saying, "The language of the statute is unambiguous,
and it prescribes the only grounds upon which the defense of insanity is allowed."6 s In 1960 the court acknowledged one of the
major criticisms of the statute-that, under modern psychiatric
concepts, man's reason is not the sole determinant of his conduct,
and emotional drives and pressures must be recognized in attempting to formulate a guide for criminal responsibility-but
refused to go beyond the clear words of the statute to include
consideration of "irresistible impulse."' 0 Later the court suggested that the "archaic" statute should be repealed so that the
courts could develop rules for determining mental competency
"more in harmony with advances made in this scientific field." 70
In two cases decided only five and six months prior to Rawland
the court again stated that the statute should be revised by the
legislature. 71
65. State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 315 (1868).
66. State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889).
67. This term is commonly used to refer to the M'Naghten test.
Generally, knowledge of the "nature and quality" of the act and knowledge of its "wrongfulness" have been interpreted as though synonymous. M. GuTmACHm & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 403
(1952). In some jurisdictions either of the two criteria is enough for
acquittal. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1451, § 3 (1956). In others, one criterion
necessarily implies the other. 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 34
(1962).
68. State v. Scott, 41 Minn. 365, 43 N.W. 62 (1889). The court said
it was a question of statutory construction-the element was left out of
the statute intentionally. Uncontrollable impulse was also rejected
in State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638 (1935).
69. State v. Finn, 257 Minn. 138, 100 N.W.2d 508 (1960). Scott,
Simenson and Finn rejected "irresistible impulse" as a defense because
of the existence of MINN. STAT. § 610.09 (1961):
A morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts, existing in the
mind of a person who is not shown to have been incapable
of knowing the wrongfulness of such acts, forms no defense
to a prosecution therefor.
The Rawland court said its repeal in 1963 "eliminate[d] one of the
primary reasons why this court refused to interpret the M'Naghten
rule in any other way than in its strictest sense." 199 N.W.2d at 789.
70. State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332, 339, 150 N.W.2d 61, 66
(1967). See also State v. King, 286 Minn. 392, 176 N.W.2d 279 (1970);
State v. Eubanks, 277 Minn. 257, 152 N.W.2d 453 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 964 (1968).
71. State v. Hoskins, 292 Minn. 111, 134, 193 N.W.2d 802, 817 (1972),
and State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 254, 194 N.W.2d 276, 280 (1972).
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Other courts, not bound to M'Naghten by statute, have in
recent years developed rules modifying, expanding or eliminating the M'Naghten test in an attempt to provide the factfinder
with evidence, beyond mere cognition,72 pertaining to the volition of the accused 3 and his capacity to control behavior. The
impetus for change has been the recognition that the traditional
M'Naghten test seems incompatible with society's requirement
that one who commits a criminal act be morally blameworthy,7 4
and with modern psychiatric concepts of integrated, rather than
75
decompartmentalized, mental functions.
The M'Naghten test only recognizes the accused's cognitive
deficiencies, i.e., his inability to know his act was wrong.70 This
does not allow for cases in which the defendant is unable to
make a choice, or cannot refrain from acting despite his knowledge of wrongfulness, or where deficient volition and capacity
Rawland emphasized the difference in its fact situation as reason for
departing from strict adherence to M'Naghten advocated by prior
cases. 199 N.W.2d at 787.
72. Cognition means the act or faculty of knowing or perceiving.
73. Volition means the faculty of conscious, and especially of deliberate action.
74. Modern psychiatry to the contrary, criminal law is
grounded on the theory that, in the absence of special conditions, individuals are free to exercise a choice between possible
courses of conduct and hence are morally responsible. Thus it
is a moral guilt the law stresses.
Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 1957).
75. S. GLUECK, LAw mAo PsyCHATRY ch. 1 (1962).
A third factor influencing change has been the question of the
constitutionality of a strict application of the AFNaghten test with reference to the eighth amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) and
the fourteenth amendment (due process). In three cases decided during the 1972 session (Hoskins, Mytych, and Rawland) the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the test. In the latter
case, however, after citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), which
upheld the Oregon version of M'Naghten because it was not unconstitutional "upon the basis of then existing scientific knowledge," Justice Gunn said, "As we construe the Minnesota statute § 611.026, and
apply it in this case we do not find constitutional invalidity." 199
N.W.2d at 786 (emphasis added). The inference may be drawn that
if the Minnesota statute were to be again applied literally it would be
found unconstitutional.
76. 199 N.W.2d at 788. This requirement of knowledge is included
in the broadest test that has been suggested so far-the Durham rule
as set forth in Durham v. United States, 94 App. D.C. 228, 241, 214
F.2d 862 (1954). It would appear, therefore, that insanity which meets
this test is a defense in all American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right and
wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity
should nevertheless be recognized. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 33 (1962).
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however, society would morally excuse wrongdoers in these cases,
and therefore it prefers that the criminal laws reflect this atti78
tude.
The major medical criticism of M'Naghten is that it "abstract[s] out of the total personality but one of its elements [cognition]," which is not even the most significant mental influence,
and "does not take into account those disorders that manifest
themselves largely in disturbances of the impulsive and affective
'79
aspects of mental life.
From the legal perspective the problem of finding the best
test to determine criminal insanity may only be one of semantics,
as some judges and commentators have claimed, 80 and it might
be "that a practical American jury in any given case . . . will
reach the same conclusion, whether it be instructed along traditional M'Naghten lines" or any other.8 ' The jury, however,
needs evidence to which it can apply the instructions of the
court, and the scope of the test has determined the scope of adnissible evidence. It has been suggested that when presented
with an unhampered psychiatric report on the accused's history
and condition,8 2 the jury "might more effectively and fairly ap77. See, e.g., State v. White, 270 P.2d 727, 731 (N.M. 1954). See
also S. GLUECK, supra note 75, at 50. Despite knowledge, the accused's
mental disease may be such as to compel him to act, destroying his
willpower so seriously as to affect his cognitive capacity.

One theory proposes that M'Naghten does not deny that the cognitive function is susceptible of being impaired by motivational and
emotional factors, but denies that this susceptibility is legally and
morally relevant to blameworthiness. Meehl & Livermore, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MIN. L. REv. 789, 823 (1967).

78.

A factor that cannot be overlooked is the public policy about

commitment of those acquitted by reason of insanity. 199 N.W.2d
at 786.
79. S. GLUECK, supra note 75, at 47.
80. The court in Rawland suggests that the rule every court and
legal writer is searching for is one that is consistent with personal
responsibility and constitutional limitations, and can, with justice,
fairness, and concern for the public interest, be applied so that mentally
ill persons are not found guilty of crimes which they did not at the
time have the legal capacity to commit. 199 N.W.2d at 784. Rawland's
solution is that, since the test of criminal responsibility in most cases
should be the capacity to form a criminal intent, the right and wrong
test of M'Naghten, "properly construed, may be as effective a means of
formulating a workable rule as any of the others." 199 N.W.2d at 790.

81.

Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967).

82. The jury is not compelled to accept psychiatric testimony and
may give it little weight or ignore it completely. State v. Hoskins,
292 Minn. 111, 137-38, 193 N.W.2d 802, 819 (1972). The judge, with no
jury, is not bound either. State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 252 194 N.W.2d
276, 279 (1972).
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ply whatever yardstick of irresponsibility the jurisdiction has
''

put its faith in. 8

3

Despite precedent which seemingly should have excluded
evidence on volition and capacity to control behavior, the trial
court in Rawland allowed the admission of sufficient evidence on
these issues to permit a direct reversal by the supreme court
when it applied its new interpretation of the statute to that evidence. For precedential purposes the court cited the then Judge
Blackmun's advice in Pope v. United States that "the trial judge
freely [admit] all evidence which appears to be relevant."8'
However, the court did not expressly authorize trial judges
to instruct juries that they might find a "defect of reason"
on the basis of evidence relating to volition or capacity to control behavior. This is a regrettable omission because with a
statute that refers to a "defect of reason" as the condition of
criminal insanity, a judge, following Rawland, must frame a
jury instruction which goes well beyond the statutory language.
If in doubt as to the exact phrasing and placement", of such an
instruction, a judge may prefer to read Rawland narrowly and
do no more than admit the evidence Rawland requires, leaving
it to the jury to infer that a "defect of reason" may involve volition and capacity to control behavior. Such an approach would
probably be reversible error since a trial judge is required by
statute to inform the jury of "all matters which [he] thinks
Hownecessary for its information in rendering a verdict."8
ever, to insure that defendants receive the full benefit of the
Rawland decision, Minnesota Statutes § 611.026 (1971) should be
amended to reflect the broader concept of criminal insanity approved by the supreme court.

83. S. GLuECK, supranote 75, at 62.
84. 199 N.W.2d at 782, citing 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967).
If all relevant evidence is admitted, and the elements of knowledge,
will and choice are emphasized in the charge as essential and critical
constituents of legal sanity, the charge will be usually regarded as
legally sufficient. Justice Blackmun believed this approach sound
"because it preserves and builds on the elements of M'Naghten and of
lack of control which are acceptable in the present day, and modernizes
them in terms which the jury can grasp and intelligently apply." Id.
85. Two possibilities are to include the elements of volition and
capacity to control behavior in the right-and-wrong portion of the
statute, or to add it as a third criterion, i.e., requiring the jury to find
the defendant was a free agent.
86. Mnn. STAT. § 631.08 (1971).
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V. LAND USE

A.

CONDEMNATION

The supreme court made important changes in inverse condemnation law. In one case, plaintiff-respondent's apartment
buildings suffered shock damage caused by pile driving during
construction under state contract of a nearby freeway interchange. The construction contract contained a hold-harmless
clause to protect the state from liability and required the state
to procure sufficient property damage liability insurance.'
Plaintiff sought damages by inverse condemnation, a mandamus
action to compel the state to commence eminent domain proceedings. The district court granted a peremptory writ, but the
supreme court reversed, holding that inverse condemnation cannot be obtained where there is an adequate alternative remedy
such as could be had by resort to the liability insurance required in the construction contract. Lowry Hill Properties Inc.
v. State, 200 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1972).
The Minnesota Constitution recognizes a right to compensation whenever private property is "taken, destroyed or damaged
for the public use.' 2 Inverse condemnation was developed as a
method to circumvent the state's sovereign immunity in tort
where property rights have been so infringed. Instead of initiating a tort suit, the damaged party seeks a writ of mandamus
to compel the state to commence eminent domain proceedings.,
Such an approach has been used where work on public projects
results in damages that were unforeseeable at the time the construction contract was made. 4 The rationale would appear to be
1. Prior to the instant case the supreme court had held piledriving to be an inherently dangerous activity and thus contractors
who engaged in such activity under contract with the state could not
avoid tort liability for resulting damages by invoking derivative sovereign immunity. Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co.,
291 Minn. 429, 194 N.W.2d 767 (1971).
2. MN. CoNsT. art. I, § 13. The court noted that the provision
for compensation for damaged private property was added to the Min-

nesota Constitution to avoid the hardships that resulted from a narrow
interpretation of "taking." Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. State, 200
N.W.2d 295, 296 (Minn. 1972).

3. The use of mandamus to compel inverse condemnation proceedings was established in State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19
N.W.2d 70 (1945).

4. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d
100 (1962).
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partly that it is inequitable to impose liability exclusively on
the contractor when no provision has been made in the contract for him to assume such contingent expenses. Moreover,
where the contractor has not insured against such liabilities or
is otherwise unable to satisfy a judgment, an injured party
would not have available any other recourse than to seek recovery from the state. In Minnesota, however, the right to compel
condemnation was judicially created and the tendency of the
supreme court has been to narrowly limit its availability. 5
Besides narrowing the use of inverse condemnation in state
contracting situations to exclude those cases where the contractor is adequately insured, the holding of the instant case avoids
the more difficult issue concerning the scope of the constitutional prohibition against damaging private property without
compensation. While a constitutional violation would no doubt
be found where, for instance, road construction requires actual
encroachment of the road surface upon a plaintiff's adjacent
property, it is not clear that the infringement is of a constitutional magnitude where, for example, a person living near an
airport suffers noise pollution. The court reasonably wished to
avoid the difficulties involved in distinguishing between constitutional violations and other types of harm.
Several practical considerations undoubtedly influenced the
court. If the state loses in the inverse condemnation litigation
it will seek recompense from the contractor or insurance company, either of which may resist. By preventing the injured
person from suing the state initially, the court precludes multiplicity of litigation. Furthermore, condemnation is an awkward,
inefficient procedure which is time-consuming and expensive for
both the injured party and the state. The plaintiff seeking inverse condemnation is particularly handicapped in having to
prove damage of a constitutional magnitude, and because such
issue is a question for the court, he does not have the right to a
jury trial. Such difficulties would not be encountered in a suit
against the contractor's insurer.
The court also clarified inverse condemnation law in the
context of denial of access. As a result of highway construction
which closed an adjacent cross-over, a motel that had had
5. In Thomsen v. State, 284 Minn. 468, 170 N.W.2d 575 (1969),
and State v. Prow's Motel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969), it
was held that the issue of whether damages to private property constitute a constitutional taking is a matter of law to be decided by the
court.
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access to both sides of a four lane highway was left with circuitous access to only one side by way of a service road nearly
half a mile away. 6 In an inverse condemnation action brought
by the motel, the trial judge found that there had been a denial
of reasonably convenient access sufficient to constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the Minnesota Constitution.' The
supreme court affirmed, but it remanded on the issue of damages,
holding that since denial of access to traffic in one direction is not
an unconstitutional taking, the recovery should be a measure
only of the interference with the access of traffic going in the
other direction. Prow's Motel, Inc. v. State, 200 N.W.2d 910
(Minn. 1972).
The court first disposed of the state's argument that prior
case law 8 required a change in the highest and best use of the
property in order that there be a taking. The court stated
that the test of change in the highest and best use of the property had merely been used in the past as a factor in fixing
damages. 9
It is well established in Minnesota that denial of a reasonably convenient access is a taking. 10 However, the denial of access in one direction, such as the addition of a median, is not
compensable. 11 Thus the court reasoned that where access to
four lanes moving in both directions is lost, compensation is
due only for the impairment of access to two lanes.
The measure of damages will be difficult to apply practically. Valuation of the loss of traffic moving in one direction
will be difficult to compute unless the decrease in property value
is used as a yardstick. Thus simple decrease in value should be
the proper measure of recovery. To require the jury to offset
the decrease in value due to the two lanes to which the landower has no right to access is practically unworkable.
6. This was the second appeal to the supreme court in this case.

The motel had originally won a jury verdict which the supreme court
reversed on the ground that the question of whether there had been a
taking was improperly submitted to the jury. State v. Prow's Mo-

tel, Inc., 285 Minn. 1, 171 N.W.2d 83 (1969).
7. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 provides that "[p]rivate property
shall not be taken . . . for public use without just compensation therefor...."
8.

Gibson v. Comm'r of Highways, 287 Minn. 495, 178 N.W.2d 727

(1970).
9. Prow's Motel, Inc. v. State, 200 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Minn. 1972).
10. State v. Gannon's, Inc., 275 Minn. 14, 145 N.W.2d 321 (1969);
Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964).
11. Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964).
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DRAINAGE

Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes § 106.201 (2),11 the Brown
County Board of Commissioners established a public drainage
ditch to drain two sloughs located within the watershed of Boise
Lake, which is a meandered lake.2 Of two alternate proposals
submitted, the board selected the one which drained the sloughs
into the Cottonwood River rather than into Boise Lake. An objecting landowner appealed this order to the district court which
affirmed the board's decision. On appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant claimed that since the ditch would partially drain Boise Lake, the county board could not establish the
ditch because the Commissioner of Natural Resources had not
determined that the lake was not public waters 3 as required by
section 106.021(2) .4 The supreme court affirmed, holding that
the district court's finding that the ditch would not effect any
appreciable drainage of Boise Lake was not clearly erroneous
and, therefore, section 106.021(2) was inapplicable. In so holding, however, the court concluded that the drainage of a meandered lake includes not only the removal of water already collected in the lake but also the diversion of surface waters from
the watershed of the lake, provided such diversion affects the
lake's water level. Balbach v. Moe, 200 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1972).
Faced with an issue of first impression in Minnesota, 5 the
court based its determination that drainage includes the diver1.

M nN.STAT. § 106.011 et seq. (1971)

is known collectively as

the Minnesota Drainage Code.
2. A '"meandered lake" is one around which a meandered line
was surveyed at the time the United States Government Survey was
made in the area. This line is shown on government plats of survey
and, once made, does not change. See Troska v. Brecht, 140 Minn. 233,
167 N.W. 1042 (1918; Op. ATT'Y GEN. MnTN. no. 602-E (June 25,

1957).
3. MnmN. STAT. § 105.38(1) (1971) defines public waters as those
"capable of substantial beneficial public use." See also MWNN. STAT.
§ 106.011(20) (1971).
4. M n .STAT. § 106.021(2) (1971) provides:

The board ... is authorized to drain in whole or in part lakes
which have become normally shallow and of a marshy character and are not of sufficient depth or volume to be of any
substantial public use; provided no meandered lake shall be
so drained except upon the determination of the commissioner
of natural resources of the state of Minnesota that such lake is
not public waters, or pursuant to the permit of the commissioner as provided in subdivision 3.
A permit is required only if the commissioner finds the meandered
lake to be public waters.
5. The court's resolution of this issue was, however, foreshadowed by In re Petition of Steven, 291 Minn. 263, 190 N.W.2d 482 (1971)
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sion of surface waters necessary to the maintenance of a lake's
water level upon two grounds: (1) the plain meaning of the
word "drain" and (2) the public policies expressed in several
state statutes. The court's interpretation of the word "drain"
seems realistic. A lake which depends on replenishment can be
drained as effectively by failing to replenish as by actually removing water from the lake itself.; As to the court's second rationale, the state has adopted a policy of promoting "the retention and conservation of all water precipitated from the atmosphere in the areas where it falls, as far as practicable. '7 In addition, the Minnesota Drainage Code requires that "due consideration [be given] to conservation of soil, water, forests, wild animals, and related natural resources, and to other public interests affected .
Finally, state statutes relating to water
law "must be considered as a whole to effect a systematic administration of water policy for the public welfare."
Thus, in
defining drainage in the context of these policies, the Balbach
court concluded that "any ambiguity in the word 'drain' in [section 106.021 (2) ] must be resolved so as to promote the consideration of the public interest in the conservation of natural resources."' 0 There can be little doubt that the court's broad definition of drainage serves to advance this public interest.
"..."I'

However, in placing the burden of proof upon the objector
to a proposed ditch, the court has inhibited the realization of
these same public policies. The policy of retaining and conserving water within its natural watershed coupled with the requirement that the conservation of water be given due consideration
would seem to create a strong statutory presumption against the
diversion of surface waters from a meandered lake's watershed.
Nevertheless, the court requires proof by the objector in each
case that a given plan will affect the lake's waterlevel. It would
be more appropriate to require the petitioners for the ditch to
show that the diversion of surface waters from a meandered
lake's watershed would be of greater public benefit than that
presumed to be inherent in their retention." As demonstrated
(diversion of surface waters from watershed of state-owned wetlands
entitled state to compensation for resulting damage to wetlands area).
6. The court's definition of drainage could be extended to include subsurface waters which also serve to replenish a lake.
7. MnN. STAT. § 111.82 (1971).
8.
9.
10.
11.

MIN. STAT. § 106.671 (1971).
MmII. STAT. § 105.72 (1971).
200 N.W.2d at 904 n.5.
INN. STAT. § 106.201(2) (1971)

provides as a prerequisite to
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in the instant case, the difficulty and expense involved in presenting clear evidence on this issue may often present insurmountable obstacles to an objector. Furthermore, although the
appeal to the district court is de novo, the county board's findings on this issue are entitled to prima facie weight. 12 In light
of these factors, placing the burden of proof upon the objector
often may result in the subversion of the public policies referred
to in the Balbach opinion. Finally, the Balbach court failed to
consider a third alternative-no drainage at all. Such an alternative would certainly seem to be suggested by the presumption
against the diversion of surface waters in a case such as this,
as well as by the corollary presumption that their retention
would be of public benefit as a matter of public policy.1 3
In two cases assessing a landowner's right to drain surface
water onto the lands of another, the court held that the right
did not extend to draining septic tank effluent onto a neighbor's
land and that the right to drain surface water did not allow the
appellant to use a pump. Kallevig v. Holmgrem, 197 N.W.2d
714 (finn. 1972); Pell v. Nelson, 201 N.W.2d 136 (Minn. 1972).
Under the "reasonable use" rule recognized in Minnesota,
surface water that is not part of a well-defined body of water
or natural watercourse is considered to be a "common enemy."
The possessor can drain this surface water onto the lands of a
neighbor provided that in doing so the possessor's land is used
reasonably and the neighbor is not unnecessarily or unreasonably injured.' 4 In the instant cases, the court was concerned
with whether the drainage of septic tank runoff and the use of
a sump pump to move surface water unreasonably burdened
neighboring land owners. In Kallevig, the court held that septic
tank overflow was considerably different in nature than surface
water and, therefore, the reasonable use rule did not apply. In
Pell, the court held that the effect of pumping was to divert surface water from its natural drainage and to discharge it where
it would not otherwise have flowed. Whereas the reasonable use
the establishment of a ditch that the county board find that the proposed ditch "will be of public utility and benefit."
12. Mnwn. STAT. § 106.631(4) (1971).
13. Appellant apparently did not argue that the preservation of
the sloughs in their natural state would itself constitute a public benefit. For the Drainage Code's definition of the term "public benefit",
see rMUN.STAT. § 106.011(14) (1971).
14. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894)
(the leading case). See also Collins v. Wickland, 251 Minn. 419, 88
N.W.2d 283 (1958); Enderson v. Kelchen, 226 Minn. 163, 32 N.W.2d 286
(1948).
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rule allowed the use of tiles and ditches to accelerate the natural
flow of water, pumps which changed the natural pattern of
drainage were impermissible. This decision seems correct in
so limiting a landowner's right to invade a neighbor's land.

C. ZONING
The most significant supreme court zoning case decided last
term involved municipalities with concurrent zoning power.
Following the reports of two site selection committees, the Rochester Common Council purchased property located in an agricultural area of Olmstead County to establish a solid-waste disposal system. Pursuant to a county zoning ordinance which required that a "special exemption permit" be issued before land
zoned for agricultural use could be used for sanitary landfill, the
City of Rochester applied for a permit. Both the Olmsted
County Planning Advisory Commission and on appeal, the
County Board of Adjustment, denied the application. The city
then appealed to the district court, with the township and nearby
landowners as intervenors in support of the county.1 The lower
court ordered that the permit be issued to Rochester, and the
supreme court affirmed on the basis of a new "balancing-of-thepublic-interests" test for determining when a city is bound by
county zoning ordinances. Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972).
Two distinct rules have traditionally controlled the effect
of local zoning ordinances on other governmental bodies. Governmental bodies have been exempted from zoning restrictions
where the property involved is to be used for a governmental,
rather than a proprietary purpose. 2 State agencies have also
been freed from zoning regulations by virtue of their right to
exercise the power of eminent domain. 8 Application of the governmental purpose versus proprietary purpose distinction to zoning conflicts has been criticized because the distinction was de1. The instant action was joined with an action the landowners had
brought seeking to enjoin Rochester from using the land as a waste
disposal station.
2. See, e.g., Nehrbas v. Incorporated Village of Lloyd Harbor,
2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.E.2d 241, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1957); O'Brien v. Town
of Greenburgh, 239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y.S. 173 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y.

582, 195 N.E. 210 (1935).
3. See, e.g., Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 Ill. 442, 14 N.E.2d
490 (1938); In re Petition of the City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 800, 14 N.W.2d
140 (1944). See also Op. ATT'y GEN. MINN. no. 59a-14 (1967).

1973]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

veloped to impose common law liability on municipal corporations for the negligence of their agents 4 and is inappropriate for
zoning purposes.5 The lack of relevant criteria to differentiate
between the two purposes in the zoning context has resulted,
for example, in sewage disposal systems being characterized as
both governmental 6 and proprietary.7 However, exempting governmental bodies from zoning restrictions because of their right
of eminent domain is justified upon the theory that the power of
condemnation is superior to other property interests 8 and thus
avoids the difficulty of differentiating between proprietary and
governmental functions. But the view that eminent domain is
a superior power because a sovereign power, is questionable since
zoning constitutes a valid exercise of the equally sovereign police
power. It is also not clear that a legislative grant to condemn
property for a public purpose should include blanket authorization to use land irrespective of other controls. This is especially
true where, as in Minnesota, municipalities are authorized to exercise eminent domain beyond their jurisdiction." The resulting condemnation without representation of the interests affected would seem to establish a minimum point at which recognition should be given to local property interests.
In rejecting both traditional rules, the supreme court recognized the "pungent realities of urban sprawl accentuated the
need for land-use planning and control,"1 0 and held that con4. See, e.g., State ex rel Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 888
(Mo. 1960).
5. See Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Govermental Land Use, 39 TEx. L. REv. 31, 319 (1961).
There is evidence that the governmental-proprietary test is obtaining such broad definitions of a governmental function "[t]hat the
distinction is disappearing from the law and that we are approaching
the time when all lawful municipal functions will be regarded as governmental except perhaps in the area of tort liability." Oswald v.
Westchester County Park Comm., 234 N.Y.S.2d 465, 468 (1962), affd, 18
App. Div. 2d 1139 (1963).
6. City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393,
268 P.2d 637 (1962).
7. Jefferson County v. Birmingham, 15 Ala. 436, 55 So. 2d 196
(1951).
8. See, e.g., State ex ret Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.
1960); State ex rel St. Louis Trust Co. v. Ferris, 302 S.W.2d 896 (Mo.
1957).
9. All cities and villages may exercise the right of eminent
domain for the purpose of acquiring private property within
or without the corporate limits thereof for any purpose for
which it is authorized by law ....
An=. ST.AT. § 465.01 (1971).
10. Township of Orornoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 471,
197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
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flicts between one governmental body's zoning ordinances and
another's right of eminent domain should be resolved by balancing the public interests involved on a case by case basis. In the
instant case, the court concluded that the immediate need of the
city of a site for solid waste disposal outweighed the county's
interest in controlling the use of agricultural land when the environmental impact of the landfill would be monitored by the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency."
The court's balancing test may avoid difficulties of the previous rules by focusing attention on more relevant land-use factors. Unfortunately, the decision did not fully resolve the important question of what criteria are to be used in striking a
balance of public interests. The court reached its decision solely
on environmental issues, without mentioning any basis the
county had for its zoning regulations. To properly balance the
"public interests" some consideration must be given to members
of the public who live near the proposed use. This is especially
true where, as in the instant case, the land is outside the jurisdiction of the city and within the jurisdiction of another governmental unit. Arguably, nearby landowners have relied on the
continued existence of the zoning regulations. 12 Although the
new balancing test provides a sound basis for the resolution of
conflicts between zoning and eminent domain powers, a complete
reformation of the previous rules should strike at their main
weakness by recognizing both the local zoning regulations and
the reasons for which they were enacted. Property values, aesthetics and interests in long range land-use planning should be
taken into consideration. However, the court's failure to mention other criteria beyond environmental factors leaves them
11. By relying on the wisdom and supervision of the PCA, the
court may have placed undue stress on this agency's authority. The
PCA is only empowered to evaluate environmental criteria in terms of
pollution hazards; it has no authority over site selection. All PCA permits require compliance with local laws. Hypothetically, a continued
reliance solely on the judgment of the PCA could result in the issuance
of an environmentally sound permit authorizing Minneapolis to establish a landfill in the relatively developed suburb of Edina, regard-

less of the latter's future landuse plans. Moreover, the question arises
as to whether action by other state agencies will carry such great force
when the court balances interests.
12. One court early in the development of the governmentalproprietary test held that, due to nearby landowners' reliance on the
continued existence of the zoning regulations, a city could not violate
its own zoning by the erection of an incinerator. O'Brien v. Town of
Greenburgh, 239 App. Div. 555, 268 N.Y.S. 173 (1933), aff'd, 266 N.Y.

582, 195 N.E. 240 (1935).

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

1973]

open for future consideration. When the court talks of implementing "enlightened land-use control," it must include controls
that are founded both on environmental and zoning considerations.
In several other zoning cases the supreme court did not treat
the power of the municipality as hospitably as in Oronoco. In
one case the city of Saint Paul was not allowed to circumvent
the statutory rezoning procedure.
Before rezoning, first class cities' 3 must obtain written consent of two-thirds of the owners of the descriptions of real estate within 100 feet of the area to be rezoned. Because consent
may be extremely difficult to obtain where many landowners
are affected, the city may dispense with the requirement if it
makes a representative survey of 40 acres or more and finds
that the number of descriptions of real estate affected by the
rezoning renders obtaining consent impractical. 4 In the instant
case, the St. Paul City Council requested its planning board to
survey an area for possible rezoning to permit construction of
apartment buildings. A total of 350 acres were surveyed; fourteen were recommended for rezoning, and seven actually rezoned.
However, in deciding that it could waive the consent requirement, the board stated only that it found it impractical to obtain consent with reference to the 350 acres, not as to the seven
acres specifically. Property owners within the rezoned area sued
to have the rezoning ordinance declared invalidl Developers
owning land within the rezoned area and intending to construct
apartment buildings intervened to defend the rezoning. In affirming a c.istrict court finding for the plaintiffs, the supreme
court held that a governing body that orders rezoning without
13.

Cities of more than 100,000 population are "first class" cities.
§ 410.01 (1971). Presently first class cities include St.
Paul, Minneapolis, and Duluth.
14. MAUN. STAT. § 462.357 (1971). Subsection 5 provides that the
governing body of a first class city
may, by a two-thirds vote of its members, after hearing, adopt
a new zoning ordinance without ... written consent whenever
the planning commission or planning board ... shall have
made a survey of ... an area of not less than 40 acres, within
which the new ordinance.., would take effect when adopted,
and shall have considered whether the number of descriptions of
real estate affected by such changes . .. renders the obtaining
of such written consent impractical.
ST. PAUL, MnW. C=-r CHARTER AND LEG. CODE § 64.06 (1970) provides
substantially the same requirements and further requires a "determination!' that the number of descriptions make obtaining consent impractical. For a commentary on the statute, see Fitzgerald, Land Use Controls, 24 BENcH &BAR OF MnN. 17 (Feb. 1967).

MbNN.

STAT.
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presenting evidence to sustain its determination of the impracticality of obtaining consent acts without jurisdiction and thus
its rezoning ordinance is invalid. LaCourse v. City of St. Paul,
200 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1972).
The purpose of the consent requirement is to allow those
who would be most affected by a potential rezoning to voice their
opinion in writing before the rezoning is approved. Refusal to
give consent does not preclude the city from acting; the effect
of the consent requirement is only to force the city to seek advice. 15 Thus in the instant case, the city was required either to
comply with the procedure of obtaining the necessary consent or
to show by sufficient evidence that it was impractical to do so
before any action could be taken.1"
In the context of the consent statute, "impractical" does not
mean "impossible"; rather, it means "incapable of being put into
use or effect or of being accomplished or done successfully or
without extreme trouble, hardship, or expense."' 7 But in the instant case, the council had the burden of proving the impracticality by objective evidence.' 8 Although obtaining consent with
reference to the original 350 acres might well have been impractical, only thirty different property owners were required to give
consent for the seven acres actually rezoned. The court found it
"inconceivable" that a city the size of St. Paul would find it too
difficult to identify these owners and negotiate with them for
consent. It felt that the test of impracticality turned on the
number of descriptions of real estate, not the difficulty of obtaining consent from any particular owner.1 9
LaCourse cautions cities that where a certain procedure is
requisite to obtain jurisdiction to amend zoning ordinances a city
may not cavalierly disregard that procedure. The case makes
15. The consent clause does not deprive a city council of its discretionary power; obtaining consent is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
the consideration of an application for rezoning. Consent is not binding
on the council. Leighton v. City of Minneapolis, 16 F. Supp. 101 (D.
Minn. 1936). Similarly, nonconsent is only advisory.
16. The court emphasized the language of the St. Paul regulation
that required a "determination" of impracticality. 200 N.W.2d at 908.
17. Id. at 909.
18. Id. at 908. The court cited Payne v. Kinder, 147 W. Va. 352,
375, 127 S.E.2d 726, 740 (1962), for the general rule that "a factual reality can not be changed or overcome by mere legislative fiat and ...
legislative declaration which is clearly contrary to the actual facts will
not be recognized or sanctioned in a judicial proceeding." 200 N.W.2d
at 909.
19. Id. at 908-09.
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it clear that a city, merely by making a large enough survey,
is not absolved from the responsibility of showing it made a reasonable attempt to obtain consent for the actual rezoning of any
portion of that survey. 20 The court's holding is clearly correct.
If the consent requirement were not so construed, it would be
possible for a city to rezone without ever attempting to obtain
consent simply by making a large area survey and pleading the
impracticality of obtaining consent within that large area, while
intending all along to rezone only a much smaller area that
could easily be canvassed.
In another case decided last term the court similarly restricted a municipality's use of the zoning power. Defendant
owned a home in a fashionable residential suburb. His property
was located between a lake and a street which served "more or
less as an alleyway" for properties bordering the lake on one
side and those bordering a major street on the other side. In July
of 1970 he applied for and received a permit from the village to
build a garage and began building. Although other garages were
situated along the narrow street, defendant's was conspicuous
because it was a larger, four-car garage. Five months later a
building inspector determined that the almost completed structure violated the setback requirement of the zoning ordinance
(computed on the basis that the property fronted the street) and
exceeded the floor space limitations of the building code. Defendant was charged with violations of the applicable city ordinances, convicted, and sentenced to 30 days in jail. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed, holding that application of a frontyard setback ordinance is "absurd and invalid" where the street
employed as the standard for measuring such setback was uniformly and effectively used as an alleyway rather than a "front
street." Since the village had no setback ordinance from the
rear property line, the supreme court ordered an acquittal State
v. Callender, 293 Minn. 451, 197 N.W.2d 216 (1972).
Municipalities unquestionably may establish reasonable setback-line requirements.2 1 As with any zoning ordinance, however, their validity may be challenged by affirmative proof that
20. The trial court had held that under the statute and the city
ordinance the council could dispense with the consent only when all
of the minimum 40-acre area surveyed was subsequently rezoned in
order to prevent strip or spot zoning. The supreme court did not find
it necessary to pass on this issue. Id. at 908.
21. See, e.g., State ex rel. McKusick v. Houghton. 171 Minn. 231,
213 N.W. 907 (1927).
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they are unreasonable or arbitrary as written, 22 or that their
application is discriminatory in a particular situation. 2 It also
may be necessary in some instances to allow a variance from an
24
otherwise valid ordinance to avoid hardship.
Because zoning decisions usually depend on the unique fact
situations involved, 25 Callender may not have much specific
value as precedent. A property owner may argue, however,
that the case stands for the general proposition that there is an
unreasonable application of a zoning ordinance to his land if:
(1) the application precludes the present use of his land; (2)
the present use is reasonable for his particular land; and, in some
cases, (3) the reasonableness of the use is supported by the similar use of adjacent land. At the very least, Callender suggests
that a landower should be able to use his land the same way the
municipality allows his similarly situated neighbors to use theirs.
In another significant zoning case last term the court again
found a municipality's action arbitrary. Plaintiff had acquired
a 20-acre tract zoned for retail business within a 300-acre,
planned development project. Under city ordinance a shopping
center was not a permissible use within that district but was
listed as a "conditional use."' 2 6 This required a permit, the issuance of which was subject to certain minimal standards designed
to insure against disruptive effects on community life.2 T Plaintiff applied for a permit, but the city council said it was not satisfied that the standards would be met and denied the permit.
The district court affirmed the council action, adding that although a "neighborhood" shopping center would be appropriate
for the land, plaintiff's project was either a "community" or "regional" shopping center and thus impermissible. The supreme
22. See, e.g., Kiges v. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522, 62 N.W.2d
363 (1953).

23. See, e.g., State v.Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn.
363, 37 N.W.2d 370 (1949).
24. Curry v. Young, 285 Minn. 387, 173 N.W.2d 410 (1969).

25. See, e.g., Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205,
81 N.W.2d 789 (1957). See also D.
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 101

HAGMAN,

URBAN PLANNING AND LAND

(1971).

26. "Conditional use" is synonymous with "special use" here.
Generally, however, conditional use refers to a public or semi-public
use, that is, airport, cemetery or educational facilities. 101 C.J.S.
Zoning § 274 (1958).

27. The two standards pertinent to this case were:

(1) The pro-

posed use will not cause traffic hazard or congestion, (2) adjacent resi-

dentially zoned land will not be adversely affected because of traffic
generation, noise, glare or other nuisance characteristics.
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court reversed, holding that (1) where the use of land for a
shopping center is no different from that customarily permitted
by retail business district zoning, plaintiff does not have the burden of proving suitability; and (2) where plaintiff sustains the
burden of proof that all standards in the zoning ordinance have
been met, the permit must be granted.2
Inland Construction
Co. v. City of Bloomington, 292 Minn. 374, 195 N.W.2d 558 (1972).
In Inland, the court contrasted a conditional or special use
with a variance in terms of the different burden of proof required for each. A variance, which relieves the individual property owner from a general zoning ordinance because of hardship, requires that a heavy burden of proof that the owner's
use is suitable be met, because it allows a use which has been
29
legislatively prohibited..
On the other hand, a conditional or
special use refers to a use that is generally compatible with the
use for which the surrounding land has been zoned and, although legislatively permitted, is not to be allowed as a matter
of right because of hazards inherent in the use itself or of special
problems with the proposed location. 30 The burden of proving
suitability here is quite light-a plaintiff need only show that he
has corrected or will correct the special problems in his proposed
use of his land and will comply with the standards set forth in
the zoning ordinance.
Plaintiff in Inland easily carried the burden of proof necessary to obtain a conditional use by showing that (1) its use for
retail business was precisely that for which the area was zoned;
(2) the city planning commission had voted unanimously to
grant the special use permit; and (3) the council's fear of traffic
hazards and adverse effects on residents was contradicted by the
facts and previous actions by Bloomington city officials. 31 In28. The court further found that the trial court erred in basing its

findings on reasons not articulated by the city council (see text following note 34 infra) and on a standard not included in the ordinance (the
only reference to a distinction between neighborhood, community and
regional shopping centers had been made unofficially on a guideline
map of the development).
29. Westling v. City of St. Louis Park, 284 Minn. 351, 170 N.W.2d
218 (1969). See also C.G. Rein Co. v. Bjorndahl, 290 Minn. 562, 189
N.W.2d 162 (1971).
30. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 195, 167 N.W.2d 45,
48 (1969). See Chandler v. Kroiss, 291 Minn. 196, 190 N.W.2d 472 (1971)
for the court's treatment of a "hybrid" variance/special use situation.
31. The city had helped plaintiff's predecessor plan the development to assure proper buffer zones of apartments and townhouses that
would separate the shopping center from single-family residences already in the area.
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deed, the court stated that a well planned shopping center
should be a "preferred" use of the land compared to the "helterskelter" retail development sanctioned by the zoning classification.3 2 Although the court bolstered this theory by noting the
city's own stated purpose to "encourage compact centers for
retail sales and services by grouping businesses in patterns of
workable relationhip,' '3 3 the original determination of what
uses are preferable is a legislative function.
A city's denial of an application for a special use permit
must be based on the fact that some reasonable standard of the
zoning ordinance was not met by the applicant's plans. 84 In the
instant case, once it was shown that the council's asserted reasons for its denial were without evidentiary basis, a prima facie
showing of arbitrariness was inevitable since no breach of any
standard could be shown. 5 The trial court had tried to save
the council's action by distinguishing between neighborhood,
community and regional shopping centers, but the supreme court
noted that the distinction was not specified in the ordinance as
a condition for obtaining a permit. In fact, these terms were not
even defined by the council. 36 In looking for an alternative motive for the sudden council opposition to the shopping center, the
court noted the concern evidenced over the nature of the prospective major tenant. Surrounding property owners desired a
more "high style" store than the discount variety store proposed.
Determination of the quality or nature of a tenant, however,
exceeded the scope of the council's authority. "7 Moreover, due
32. 292 Minn. at 378-79, 195 N.W.2d at 562.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 390, 195 N.W.2d at 568.

In Ostrand v. Village of No. St.

Paul, 275 Minn. 440, 147 N.W.2d 571 (1966), and Zylka v. City of
Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d 45 (1969), the ordinances contained

no standards to govern the disposition of special use permits; the
court, particularly in Zylka, emphasized the importance of including
objective standards in zoning ordinances.

Id. at 197, 167 N.W.2d at 50.

35. This is true even though the plaintiff has the burden of showing arbitrariness. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 167 N.W.2d
45 (1969).

36.

See note 28 supra.

37.

Cheltenham Township Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964).

The court would not allow a civic association that had participated
in planning a comprehensive development then under construction to
protest a planned shopping center when it learned the main tenant
was to be a discount store. Furthermore, restriction of use merely to
maintain a "neighborhood concept" is prohibited. Ostrand v. Village of
No. St. Paul, 275 Minn. 440, 147 N.W.2d 571 (1966); Olsen v. City of
Minneapolis, 263 Minn. 1, 115 N.W.2d 734 (1962).
Generally, "it is

not the motive that makes [the zoning ordinance] invalid but the
effect fortified by the fact that no justifiable reason within permissible
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to the state of Bloomington's ordinances, plaintiff could have
constructed the variety store separately and then built the other
retail businesses around it piecemeal. The result would have
been the same-but one approach required a permit and the
other did not.
Because the burden of proof necessary to obtain a special use
permit is ultimately one of showing that certain standards have
been met, a municipality has a difficult task justifying denial of
an application on grounds other than that the statutory standards have not been met. Inland strongly hints that a municipality that does not follow the standards set out in its ordinance
will always be open to charges of arbitrariness.

VI. LIENS
After an unlawful detainer action was brought against plaintiffs, who had refused to vacate premises owned by defendant,'
defendant removed plaintiff's personal property from the premises and stored it at his own expense. Pursuant to Minnesota
Statutes § 566.17 (1971), defendant thereby acquired a lien on
the property to cover the costs of moving and storage. In the instant action, plaintiffs claimed that their property should be returned without being required to satisfy the lien, alleging that
the property was exempt from liens under Minnesota Constitution article I, section 12 and Minnesota Statutes § 550.37. In rejecting this argument, the court held that the lien statute in
question was permitted by the state constitution and had the eflegal limits has been shown by the evidence."

Pearce v. Village of

Edina, 263 Minn. 553, 568, 118 N.W.2d 659, 669 (1962).
The planning commission report contained a frank admission by
the city planner that, although he was not pleased with the proposed
major tenant, that matter was beyond the city's authority. 292 Minn.
at 384-85, 195 N.W.2d at 565 n.2. The court was very impressed by this
and here, as in Ostrand v. Village of No. St. Paul, 275 Minn. 440,
147 N.W.2d 571 (1966), chided the council for not following the recommendation of its planning commission. Had the court not had the planning report before it in the instant case, the result would probably
have been the same, but the report certainly highlighted the arbitrariness of the council's action. A casualty of this decision thus may be
candor in the formal reports of city planners.
1. Plaintiffs had defaulted in payments on a contract for deed for
land owned by defendants, whereupon defendant cancelled the contract pursuant to MNN. STAT. § 559.21 (1971).
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fect of limiting Minnesota Statutes § 550.37, the general "exemption" statute. McPherson v. University Motors, Inc., 292 Minn.
147, 193 N.W.2d 616 (1972).
Article I, section 12 of the Minnesota Constitution states:
A reasonable amount of property shall be exempt from seizure
or sale for the payment of any debt or liability. The amount
of such exemption shall be determined by law.
In accordance with the constitutional mandate, the first legislative session enacted Minnesota Statutes § 550.37 which enumerated various items of property which would be exempt from lien.
Despite the fact that this statute has remained essentially unchanged up to the present, 2 there have been numerous special
statutes enacted, including Minnesota Statutes § 566.17, which
authorize liens on otherwise exempt property.3 The instant decision recognized that the state constitution merely authorized
the legislature to decide how much and under what circumstances property would be exempt from liens. Thus, the court
held that Minnesota Statutes § 550.37, the basic exemption statute, did not have the force of a constitutional provision and
could therefore be limited by the subsequent adoption of a statute specifically allowing liens on otherwise exempt property.
Although the court attempted to justify its position by suggesting that a person waived his right to the protection afforded
by the general exemption statute when he placed himself in
circumstances covered by a special lien statute, such justification
is unnecessary. 4 The effect of Minnesota Constitution article I,
section 12 was to make the exemption of property from liens a
matter of legislative judgment. Once the court determines, as it
has in this and in prior cases, 5 that the legislature intended the
special lien statutes to limit the general exemption statute, the
inquiry is properly ended.

2. MINN. STAT. § 550.37 (1971).
3. See, e.g., MIm. STAT. § 327.05 (1971) (innkeeper's lien on a
guest's baggage); MINN. STAT. § 345.10 (1971) (a storage lien on unclaimed property); MmxN. STAT. § 246.27 (1971) (lien for those who care
for exposed animals); MiNN. STAT. § 367.24 (1971)
(poundmaster's
lien).
4. The implication of the court's opinion is that the vendee in a
contract for deed knows of the existence and effect of MINN. STAT.
§ 566.17. However, the conclusion that the vendee knows his household
goods will be subject to a lien for moving and storage if he defaults on
such a contract is questionable.
5. See, e.g., Halsey v. Svitak, 163 Minn. 253, 203 N.W. 968 (1925);
Flint v. Luhrs, 66 Minn. 57, 68 N.W. 514 (1896).
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VII.

REAL PROPERTY

The court decided issues of first impression in several real
property cases. In each the court manifested its traditional con-

cern for purchasers of real estate faced with a substantial loss
due to foreclosure, cancellation or rescission.
In the first case, plaintiff-mortgagor sought to enjoin foreclosure proceedings, claiming a statutory right to reinstate the
mortgage, which contained an acceleration clause, by tendering
the amount actually in arrears. However, the trial court held
foreclosure could be prevented only by paying the amount due
under the acceleration clause. The supreme court reversed,
holding that payment of the amount actually due prior to the
foreclosure sale reinstated the mortgage. Davis v. Davis, 293
Minn. 44, 196 N.W.2d 473 (1972).
In Minnesota mortgages are fully reinstated
if at any time before the sale of the premises . . . the mortgagor... shall pay... to the holder of the mortgage ... the
amount actually due thereon and constituting the default actually existing in the conditions of the mortgage, at the time
of commencement of the foreclosure proceedings.'
Thus, the issue in Davis was whether "the amount actually due
thereon and constituting the default actually existing" refers
to the amount in arrears before acceleration or to the entire
accelerated balance.
In resolving the issue in favor of the mortgagor, the court
noted that the statute on which the plaintiff relied had been
enacted during the Depression and was intended to alleviate the
hardships caused by the numerous foreclosures which occurred
at that time. The court also looked to its earlier decision in
Needles v. Keys 2 in which a vendee sought reinstatement under
a contract for deed which had been accelerated by tendering only
the amount due prior to acceleration. In that case the court decided that tender of the amount previously due was sufficient to
reinstate the contract since to hold otherwise would result in a
forfeiture of the vendee's interest. Because mortgagees enjoy
substantially more protection 3 than vendees under contracts for
deed, however, it is questionable whether this consideration
should carry much weight in the mortage foreclosure context.
1. M lm.STAT. § 580.30 (1971).
2. 149 Minn.477,184 N.W.33 (1921).
3. See, e.g., MnfNx. STAT. § 580.23 (1971).
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On the other hand, foreclosures often result in forfeitures since
the price obtained at the foreclosure sale is often less than the
purchase price and since most defaulting mortgagors are financially unable to redeem the property.
The court also looked to the language of the statute which
states that the effect of tendering the "amount actually due" is
to "fully reinstate" the mortgage. The court reasoned that the
statutory reference to "reinstatement" could be given effect only
by construing the "amount actually due" to refer to the amount
due absent acceleration, since the effect of paying the accelerated
balance would be to satisfy the mortgage.
While this decision reflects the court's traditional concern
for mortgagors, 4 in the long run it may have an effect adverse
to their interests. Such restrictions on the rights of the mortgagee in the event of default diminish the attractiveness of mortgage investments and encourage mortgagees to be more restrictive in evaluating potential mortgagors as credit risks.
In the second case, a contract for deed provided that a substantial part of the purchase price was to be obtained through
a first mortgage given by vendors and vendees to a mortgagee
who paid the proceeds of the loan to the vendor. When vendees
defaulted on the mortgage installment payments, vendors assumed the payments and attempted to cancel the contract.5 Purchasers then brought an action to enjoin the cancellation. The
supreme court affirmed judgment for purchasers, holding that
vendees' default in making the mortgage payments was not a
breach of the contract for deed and did not give vendors the
right to cancel the contract. Briggs v. Johnson, 293 Minn. 49, 196
N.W.2d 470 (1972).
It is well established that the vendee under a contract for
deed is the equitable owner and that his interest may be mortgaged,( but the question of whether his default on such a mortgage constitutes a breach of the contract for deed was one of first
4.

See, e.g., Briggs v. Johnson, 293 Minn. 49, 196 N.W.2d 470

(1972), discussed following this case.
5. This was apparently pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1971).
6. In re S.R.A., Inc., 213 Minn. 487, 7 N.W.2d 484 (1942); Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N.W. 323, 46 A.L.R. 816 (1926);
Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N.W. 127 (1924); Shraiberg v.

Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032 (1917); Wellington v. St. Paul,

M. & M. Ry., 123 Minn. 483, 144 N.W. 222 (1913); Niggeler v. Maurin,

34 Minn. 118, 24 N.W. 369 (1885); Randall v. Constans, 33 Minn. 329,
23 N.W. 530 (1885).
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impression in Minnesota. In the earlier case of Kirk v. Welch,7
the court held that where the purchaser expressly assumes an
existing mortgage, his default on the mortgage constitutes a
breach of the contract for deed for which an action lies.8 The
court distinguished Kirk, however, on the grounds that in Briggs
there was no mortgage on the property prior to the purchase
and that the vendees had not expressly assumed payment of the
mortgage debt.9
The court also rejected vendors' argument that the reference
in the contract to a first mortgage imposed a duty on purchasers
to maintain the mortgage and that this duty was a condition of
the contract. The relevant language was instead construed to
indicate merely the manner in which the financing of the purchase price was to be accomplished. The obligation to maintain
a subsequent mortgage could be imposed on purchasers only by
3
including in the contract an express provision to that effect-Y
The fact that vendors had joined on the mortgage note and
had assumed the mortgage payments was regarded as largely
immaterial." The court recognized "the dilemma in which the
vendors find themselves."1 2 If vendors refuse to make the
payments and the mortgage is foreclosed, they may lose their
security interest under the contract. On the other hand, if they
continue to make the payments, they cannot obtain indemnification from purchasers by canceling the contract. As to vendors'
"dilemma" the court concluded simply that "[w] e need not anticipate the remedies available to [vendors] in order to enforce
3
their contract."'
The underlying rationale of the holding in Briggs is that "to
construe the contract in the manner for which [vendors] contend
would deprive [vendees] of their right to redeem within 6
7. 212 Minn. 300, 3 N.W.2d 426 (1942).
8. Id. at 306, 3 N.W.2d at 429.

9. 293 Minn. at 52, 196 N.W.2d at 472. A second case cited by
vendors, Gustafson v. Koehler, 177 Minn. 115, 224 N.W. 699 (1929), was
similarly distinguished.

10. In this connection, the court stressed the fact that the contract
had been prepared by vendors who were professional real estate
brokers.
11. While it was considered unlikely that the prospective mortgagee would make the loan without vendors' joining on the mortgage

note, the fact that this was not contemplated by the contract led the
court to characterize vendors as volunteers. 293 Minn. at 52, 196
N.W.2d at 472.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 53, 196 N.W.2d at 472.
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months and would reduce that period to 30 days. 1 4 By refusing
to hold that a default in mortgage payments constituted a breach
of the contract for deed, the decision is consistent with an analogous line of cases holding that if an executory contract to convey is in fact a mortgage, the vendee-mortgagor's right of redemption cannot be extinguished by his failure to cure during the
statutory 30-day period applicable to contracts.Y5 Briggs thus
reflects a long-standing policy of the Minnesota court to protect
a mortgagor's right of redemption wherever possible.
The third case involved the accidental destruction by fire
of real estate which was the subject of an executory contract of
sale. Although the contract was silent as to insurance against
loss by fire, the vendor had maintained insurance on the dwelling and collected the proceeds covering the loss. The vendee,
who pursuant to the contract was in possession at the time of
the fire, elected to specifically enforce the contract by bringing
an action to have the proceeds applied against the purchase price.
The trial court denied the requested relief and ordered rescission.
The supreme court reversed, holding that where an executory
contract for the sale of improved real estate makes no provision
for insurance against loss by fire and the improvement is accidentally destroyed by fire after the risk of loss has shifted to
vendee, 16 the proceeds collected by vendor under a fire insurance policy maintained at his expense are to be applied against
the purchase price. However, the credit to the vendee is limited
to the market value of the property before destruction less the
premiums paid while the vendee was in possession. 1
Gilles
v. Sprout, 293 Minn. 53, 196 N.W.2d 612 (1972).
14. Id.

In the case of a mortgage,

MINN.

STAT.

§ 580.23 (1971)

provides for a redemption period of at least six months. In contrast,
once a notice to cancel a contract for deed has been served pursuant to
MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1971), the purchaser has only 30 days in which
to cure the default.
15. Albright v. Henry, 285 Minn. 452, 174 N.W.2d 106 (1970); Stipe
v. Jefferson, 192 Minn. 504, 257 N.W. 99, 111 A.L.R. 831 (1934); Jeddeloh
v. Altman, 188 Minn. 404, 247 N.W. 512 (1933); Minnesota Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Closs, 182 Minn. 452, 234 N.W. 872 (1931); Sanderson v. Engel,
182 Minn. 256, 234 N.W. 450 (1931). See also Borgerding Investment
Co. v. Larson, 284 Minn. 371, 170 N.W.2d 322 (1969)

(vendee-mortgagor's

right of redemption cannot be extinguished by mortgagee's
of legal title from vendor).
16. In Minnesota the risk of loss is on the vendee in
Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N.W. 323, 46
(1926); Mark v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 159

acquisition
possession.
A.L.R. 816
Minn. 315,

198 N.W. 1003, 38 A.L.R. 310 (1924).

17. Arguably this limitation is too broad.

If, in effect, the yen-
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This decision in Gilles was foreshadowed by Cetkowski v.
Knutson."' In that case fire destroyed improvements insured
under a policy maintained by vendee. When the contract for
deed was rescinded because of vendee's fraud, the insurance proceeds in vendee's hands were impressed with a constructive trust
in favor of vendor as a substitute for the destroyed property,
which vendee would otherwise have been obligated to restore
upon rescission. The constructive trust was used to avoid the
traditional rule that insurance is a personal contract between the
insurer and the insured.
In Gilles the court did not use the constructive trust theory
to reconcile the apparent conflict between the personal nature
of an insurance contract and the equitable balancing of the
rights of vendor and vendee to the insurance proceeds. Its decision was based instead on the maxim that "Equity regards and
treats that as done which in good conscience ought to be done." 10
In applying this principle to the instant case, the court reasoned:
While the legal relations between vendor and his insurer
and vendor and his vendee are personal, beneath this external
form the essence of the agreement before the sale is completed
is that the purchase price ought to be paid to the vendor and the
land ought to be conveyed to the vendee. Where the final acts
contemplated by the parties can be achieved by requiring that
to reduce the purchase price, it ought
the proceeds be applied
20
to be regarded as done.

In support of its decision, the court noted that if the pro-

ceeds are not applied to the purchase price, "the vendor profits
by a fortuitous event, thus unreasonably forcing the vendee to
rescind even though, as here, he elects to compel specific performance ... .,,21 Even if the proceeds are so applied, "the bur-

den of the loss in the sense of replacing the dwelling rests on the
vendee. ' 2" 2 - Thus the vendee is also prevented from profiting
from the fortuitous event.2 3 Further, any prejudice to the vendee is to pay for the insurance while he was in possession he should
get all the proceeds. If his credit is limited to the market value of the
improvements he should only have to pay such premiums as would
have afforded that much protection. The further limitation that the insurance proceeds are to be applied against only the balance due on
the purchase price is inconsistent with the view that the insurance
proceeds are a substitute for the destroyed property.
18. 163 Minn. 492, 204 N.W. 528, 40 A.L.R. 599 (1925).
19. 293 Minn. at 59, 196 N.W.2d at 615.
20. Id. at 59-60, 196 N.W.2d at 615.
21. Id. at 58-59, 196 N.W.2d at 615.
22. Id. at 59, 196 N.W.2d at 615.
23. The court did not consider the possibility that in some cases
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dor because he paid for the insurance or because the market
value of the dwelling is less than the insurance proceeds is eliminated by limiting the vendee's credit to the market value of the
improvements prior to destruction less the amount of premiums
24
paid by the vendor under the insurance contract.
The result in Gilles is entirely reasonable. Whether the insurance was purchased by the vendor or the vendee is only secondarily relevant. 25 The insurance proceeds are a substitute for
the destroyed property. Although the decision may not comport
with traditional notions of the personal nature of contracts, it
clearly avoids both the undue hardship and unjust enrichment
that would otherwise result
Another case decided last term specified when the statute
of limitations begins to run for a prescriptive easement to maintain a private nuisance. Plaintiffs alleged that a fire hydrant
placed 13-3/4 feet from a utility pole narrowed their driveway so
as to create a private nuisance depriving them of reasonable access to their property. The trial court ordered that the hydrant
be moved. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that
although the hydrant had been in place for more than the 15
year period required to obtain a prescriptive easement, the statute of limitations had not begun running until the manufacture
of larger vehicles made the location of the hydrant a nuisance.
Schmidt v. Village of Mapleview, 196 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1972).
The right to interfere with the use and enjoyment of private
property in Minnesota can be established if the private nuisance
is maintained in substantially the same manner and with equally
injurious results for a period of 15 years. 20 In the instant case,
although defendant's hydrant had been in place for more than 15
years, it had effectively blocked access to plaintiffs' property for
a lesser period. Thus plaintiffs' suit was not barred since no
easement had arisen. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that the statute of limitation for establishing a prescriptive
easement can begin to run only from the time when the landowner first has a cause of action.
vendee may intend to destroy the building. In such cases the result
in Gilles might constitute a windfall for vendee.
24. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
25. The fact that the insurance was secured by the vendor was no
doubt relevant in limiting the vendee's rights in the insurance proceeds. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
26.

MINN. STAT. §

541.02 (1971).
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Two other cases dealt with issues concerning special assessments levied on land benefited by public improvements. In one
the landowner alleged that a special assessment levied on his

undeveloped industrial property for the construction of a larger
water main was invalid because the main did not benefit the
property. After the taxing authority showed that the property
had been benefited, the trial court affirmed the assessment even
though no evidence was introduced which correlated the amount
of the assessment, which was based on a technical acreage formula, with the value of the benefit. On appeal the supreme
court ordered a new trial, holding that once competent testimony
had rebutted the presumption that an assessment was valid, the
taxing authority must not only prove the property was benefited but also show a connection between the amount assessed
and the value of the benefit. In re Village of New Brighton
Resolution 862, 199 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1972).
The supreme court has long held that an assessment is presumed to be valid and conclusive on the courts in the absence
of fraud, mistake or illegality. 27 But an assessment levied on
property which is not specially benefited by the improvements
that caused the assessment is invalid as a taking without just
28
compensation.
The court in the instant case held that although the assessment itself is prima facie evidence of the benefits received, once
competent testimony questioned whether the property had received any benefit, two burdens were placed on the taxing officials. First, in order to avoid a taking they were required to
show that the property had in fact been benefited. This requirement was fully satisfied when several experts testified that
the enlarged water main would ensure a more adequate and dependable water supply, increase protection against fire, and meet
the demands caused by future developments of the property for
which the pre-existing supply would have been unsatisfactory.
Second, the officials were required to demonstrate that the dollar amount of the assessment was reasonably related to the value
of the special benefits conferred. The court reaffirmed that the
measure of the benefits was the change in the fair market value
of the property attributable to the improvements for which the
27. See, e.g., Village of Edina v. Joseph, 264 Minn. 84, 119 N.W.2d
809 (1962); In re Assessment for Improving Superior Street, 172 Minn.
554, 216 N.W. 318 (1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 628 (1928).
28. See cases cited id.
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assessment was levied. 29 The court ordered a new trial limited
to evaluating the benefits attributable to the larger main because the tax authority had not presented evidence showing a
relationship between the amount derived from the assessment
formula and the value of the benefit.
In the other assessment case, plaintiffs alleged that an assessment for a sewer should be levied on only part of their parcel of land because a portion of the parcel was a worthless swamp
which could not benefit from a sewer. The trial court divided
the parcel into two tracts and levied the assessment on the useful
area only. On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding that
the value of the benefits conferred by the sewer was to be determined solely by the increased market value of the entire parcel; the location or unusuability of a part of the parcel was irrelevant except as it affected the overall market value of the tract.
Gibbish v. Village of Burnsville, 200 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. 1972).
Although it is impossible to determine from the supreme
court's opinion, the trial court's decision was probably based on
a misapplication of the rule of Independent School District No.
709 v. City of Duluth.30 There the court affirmed a trial court's
division of a parcel so that an assessment for a new sewer would
be levied on only part of the land because the sewer was designed to serve only that portion. The remainder of the parcel
continued to use a different sewage system. The instant case is
readily distinguishable from Independent School District in that
the sewer was designed to serve plaintiff's entire parcel.
The supreme court's resolution of the Gibbish case is clearly
correct. If a portion of plaintiffs' land was in fact valueless both
before and after the installation of the sewer, none of the change
in the fair market value of the entire property could be attributable to the swampland. Thus it makes no difference whether
the entire parcel is valued or the worthless and valuable portions are segregated. In light of the administrative ease in valuing the entire parcel as opposed to separating out the portions
that have no value and valuing the remainder, valuation of the
whole is preferable.

29. 199 N.W.2d at 438. See, e.g., In re Assessment for Improving Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N.W. 318 (1927).
30. 287 Minn. 200, 177 N.W.2d 823 (1970).
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VIII.

STATE STATUTES & REGULATIONS

A. AD umirsRATmrE ACTION
Plaintiff, new owner of the Franklin Theatre Corporation,
applied to the Minneapolis City Council for transfer of the
license which had been granted to the theater's previous owners. Upon recommendation by a member of the Minneapolis Police Department assigned to investigate the application, plaintiff
sent a letter indicating his intention to continue the policies of
the previous management of the theatre.' Subsequently, the investigator discovered a newspaper advertisement indicating that
the theatre was showing a film containing numerous sexually
explicit scenes. Based on the investigator's recommendation, the
City Council denied the application for transfer of the license
on the ground that the applicant's letter had misrepresented its
film selection policies. Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief, but the trial court upheld the City Council The supreme court reversed, holding that there was no evidence in the
record that plaintiff had misrepresented its film selection policies. Franklin Theatre Corporation v. City of Minneapolis, 198
N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 1972).
This case involves the question of the proper scope of judicial review of administrative determinations. In numerous cases
the court has indicated that in reviewing an administrative order, the scope of review should be limited to a determination of
(1) whether the agency remained within its jurisdiction; (2)
whether the agency proceeded on a correct theory of law; (3)
whether its action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable;
and (4) whether the evidence reasonably supported the order in
2
question.
The court briefly noted that the requirement of such a
1. The full text of the letter from Franklin's president reads:
This is to inform you that I have been employed in the
Graphic Arts under the LPIU Local 229 for the past 24 years in
the city of Mpls, running printing equipment for commercial
shops exclusively.

I am now the present owner of the Franklin Theatre Corporation, and the only stockholder. I intend to run the Franklin with the same policy as the previous management.
198 N.W.2d at 559 nil.
2. See, e.g., Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. Comm'r of Taxation,
272 Minn. 403, 138 N.W.2d 612 (1965); Haaland v. Pomush, 263 Minn.
506, 117 N.W.2d 194 (1962); Krakowski v. City of St. Cloud, 257 Minn.

415, 101 N.W.2d 820 (1960).
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license is a legitimate exercise of the police power 3 and that
fraud in a licensee's application is a generally recognized ground
for license revocation. 4 There is no indication that the action
was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Instead, the court's
holding appears to be based on the fourth criterion, since it reversed the finding of the City Council and the trial court that
the policy of the prior theatre management was not to show sexually explicit movies and that Franklin's president had therefore made a fraudulent statement in his letter.,
Franklin may appear to represent a departure from the deference usually shown to administrative findings of fact! The
supreme court engaged in an independent review of the record
and concluded that it did not support the finding of the council.
As such the decision appears inconsistent with many cases that
uphold administrative action premised on a tenuous factual basis. On the other hand, in basing its decision on the absence of
evidence in the record in support of the Council's finding, the
court utilized a traditional doctrinal basis for reversing an administrative order.
It should be noted that Franklin Theatre does not limit the
power of the City Council to license theatres. It is likely that in
reversing the Council's action the court was influenced by the
possibility of infringement of first amendment interests inherent
in the licensing procedures. Thus, in dealing with such cases the
actions of the licensing agency will be subject to more rigorous
scrutiny by reviewing courts.
The decision of another administrative agency was reversed
in a case involving the dismissal of two members of a municipal
police department. The officers had drafted resolutions intended to improve department policies but which also contained
criticisms of their supervisors. The resolutions were submitted
3.

Lyons v. City of Minneapolis, 241 Minn. 439, 63 N.W.2d 585

(1954). For a discussion of the validity of the Minneapolis ordinance
requiring the licensing of theaters, see State v. Scaffer, 95 Minn. 311,
104 N.W. 139 (1905).
4. In re Disbarment of Bauer, 167 Minn. 350, 209 N.W. 31 (1926).
5. The court said the license investigator had no basis for his

recommendation.

There was no evidence that he could define the

"previous film policy or that he was familiar with film showings of

the previous management." Also, the evidence showed that the investigator knew that the former management had shown at least one
sexually explicit picture and that the department had received complaints about another. Franklin Theatre Corp. v. City of Minneapolis,
198 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Minn. 1972).

6. The court could have found, on the basis of evidence in the
record, that the films shown by plaintiff were more sexually explicit
than those shown by the prior owner. 198 N.W.2d at 559-60.
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to the officers' superior with a request that they be sent to the
mayor and village council." The Village Board of Personnel discharged the complaining officers because they had failed to follow grievance procedures and because they had allegedly shown
disregard for the truth of their assertions sufficiently reckless
to justify dismissal for "misconduct" and "just cause." Appeal
was taken to the district court which reversed the agency order.
The supreme court affirmed holding that the conduct of the officers constituted the submission of a grievance for which they
were protected from discharge by statute.8 The court also held
that since there was no evidence in the record indicating that
the officers' actions constituted just cause for dismissal,9 the trial
court could properly order them reinstated with back pay rather
than remanding the case to the agency. Ekstedt v. Village of
New Hope, 193 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 1972).
With regard to the grievance procedures available, the court
simply stated that the officers had not been informed of their
existence and that in any case such procedures had also been ignored by the village.' 0 The court also concluded upon review
of the record as a whole, that the officers' resolutions had not
been published with reckless disregard for the truth. As in
Franklin Theatre, this conclusion is somewhat inconsistent with
the deference traditionally shown by courts to administrative
findings of fact. On the other hand, the court also concluded
that the personnel board had proceeded on an erroneous theory
of law when it misconstrued the statutory terms "just cause"
and "misconduct" to include conduct which created friction on
the police force but which did not constitute inadequate police
Since the agency had proceeded on an erroneous theory
work
court was justified
of law, the court concluded that the district
12
in interfering with the agency decision.
A second question involved in Ekstedt was the propriety of
the order of reinstatement with back pay made by the trial court.
Generally when a court reviews an agency decision it simply affirms or remands the case for further agency action.' 3 In effect,
7. The text of the resolutions appears at 193 N.W.2d at 823 n.1
(1972).
8. MnmqN. STAT. § 179.53 (1969) (repealed Minn. Laws F_x. Sess.
1971, ch. 33, § 1).
9. Mnhix. STAT. §§ 44.08, 197.46 (1971).
10. 193 N.W.2d at 825.
11. 193 N.W.2d at 828-29.
12. Id.
13. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ. of Duluth, 213 Minn. 550,
7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).
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the agency is given an opportunity to act correctly once a court
has pointed out error because the presumption of agency expertise
pertains even after reversal. Nevertheless, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's disposition of the case since there was
no dispute as to facts and since reinstatement was demanded
by statute properly construed. 14 It would seem, however, that
when the agency has proceeded under an erroneous theory of
law, it should be given an opportunity to reconsider the case
under a proper theory. Facts thought irrelevant under the
agency's prior theory may be relevant under the correct theory
and thus a result other than reinstatement with back pay may
have been more appropriate.
In another case raising the question of the authority of a
trial court to modify an administrative order, the supreme court
decided that such modification was unauthorized. This case involved a highway patrolman who was discharged for failing to
report for duty for a two and one-half day period and for making entries in his daily reports which indicated that he had performed his duties on those days. The trial court modified the
commissioner's order of discharge, providing instead for a sixmonth suspension. In reversing the trial court's decision the supreme court noted that the certiorari statute", under which the
appeal from the agency proceeding was taken provides that the
district court may "modify" the commissioner's orders. Nevertheless, in matters relating to administrative policy, such modification of the administrative decision violates the provision of
the state constitution dealing with the division of governmental
powers. Wilkes v. Hoaglund,196 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1972).
Unlike Ekstedt in which the agency had erred in deciding
questions of law, the trial court in Wilkes was not free to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Apparently, therefore,
a trial court may "modify" the decision of an agency under Minnesota Statutes § 299D.03 (11) only where the agency has erred
in matters of law and where further factual determinations are
unnecessary. Where such determinations are necessary or where
the expertise of the agency is otherwise helpful, the trial court
must either affirm or remand the case to the agency for further
proceedings. 16
While Ekstedt and Wilkes mark no significant innovation in
14.
15.

16.

193 N.W.2d at 829.
MANN. STAT. § 299D.03(11) (1971).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550,

589, 7 N.W.2d 544, 564 (1942).
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the supreme court's approach to judicial review, another case decided by the supreme court last term broke new ground in state
administrative law. Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, 200 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 1972). Reserve Mining
had obtained permits in 1947 from the Water Pollution Control
Commission and the Department of Conservation'7 to discharge
waste iron ore tailings into Lake Superior. Subsequently the
Pollution Control Agency amended one of its regulations' s by
adopting an effluent standard, or secondary treatment clause.
Reserve brought an action in district court, challenging both the
general validity of the regulation and its specific application to
Reserve. The trial court held the regulation valid in its general
application, but arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to Reserve, and remanded the matter for negotiations between Reserve and the PCA regarding the issuance of a variance.
On appeal to the supreme court, the PCA first contended
that the appeal to the district court was dilatory because it was
not filed within 30 days of adoption of the amendment."' The
court held that the statutory time limit had not elapsed because
a copy of the regulation had not been properly served on Reserve as required by statute. In light of statutory language
20
which merely requires "receipt" of a copy of the regulation,
however, this determination seems questionable since Reserve
had actually, although informally, received copies of the regulation.
The PCA also challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court
to determine the validity of the effluent clause as applied to Reserve.2 1 The court resolved this issue by contrasting the spe17. These agencies have been succeeded by the Pollution Control
Agency and the Department of Natural Resources, respectively.
18. The regulation, WPC 15(c) (6), is quoted in the court's opinion.
200 N.W.2d at 146-47.
19. MnqN. STAT. § 115.05(3) (1971) provides in relevant part:
An appeal may be taken from any final order, rule, regulation,
or other final decision of the agency by any person who is or
may be adversely affected thereby . . . (w)ithin 30 days after
receipt of a copy of the order, rule, regulation, or decision, or
after service of notice thereof by registered mail, but not in any
case more than six months after the making and filing of the
order, rule, regulation or decision.
20. See note 19 supra.
21. A direct appeal to the court without having exhausted administrative remedies is proper when appellant challenges the validity of
a regulation in its general application; the court is then faced with a
question of law. Indeed, if an appeal had not been taken, the validity
of the regulation could not otherwise have been challenged. MnN.
STAT. § 115.05(10) (1971) provides:
If no appeal be taken from an order, rule, regulation, or other
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cific provision for appeal in the Water Pollution Control Act 2 2

with the general provision of the Administrative Procedure
Act.23

The court decided that the more specific procedure of the

Water Pollution Control Act must prevail. Since the Water Pollution Act requires the trial court to affirm the agency proceeding or to remand the case to the agency for further proceedings,
the supreme court maximized the PCA's freedom in the initial
24
application of the amended regulation.
Nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
finding that the regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable as
applied to Reserve. Due to the peculiar nature of the Reserve
decision of the agency as herein provided, or if the action of
the agency be affirmed on appeal the action of the agency in
the matter shall be deemed conclusive, and the validity and
reasonableness thereof shall not be questioned in any other
action or proceeding, but this shall not preclude the authority
of the agency to modify or rescind its action.
The trial court had held the regulation valid in its general application and this was not appealed.
22. MINN. STAT. § 115.05(7) (1971) provides:
The appeal shall be heard and determined by the court upon
the issues raised by the notice of appeal and return according
to the rules relating to the trial of civil actions, so far as
applicable. The court of its own motion or on application of
any party may, in its discretion, take additional evidence on
any issue of fact or may try any or all such issues de novo,
but no jury trial shall be had. If the court shall determine
that the action of the agency appealed from is lawful and
reasonable, and is warranted by the evidence in case an issue
of fact is involved, the action shall be affirmed. Otherwise
the court may vacate or suspend the action appealed from in
whole or in part, as the case may require, and thereupon the
matter shall be remanded to the agency for further action in
conformity with the decision of the court.
23. MiNN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1971) provides:
The validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition
for a declaratory judgment thereon, addressed to the district
court where the principal office of the agency is located, when
it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the
legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. The agency shall
be made a party to the proceeding. The declaratory judgment
may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in
question.
24. The court further emphasized the importance of the primary
jurisdiction principle in cases like Reserve, in limiting North Suburban
Sanitary Sewer District v. Water Pollution Control Commission, 281
Minn. 584, 162 N.W.2d 249 (1968). There the trial court was allowed to
apply a regulation directly to a party without remanding the case to
the agency in further proceedings. The agency in that case had indicated that no variance would be granted so that remand would have
served no beneficial purpose. The freedom allowed trial courts under
North Suburban will, therefore, be available only in cases in which
further agency participation will not provide the special expertise the
agency can provide.

1973]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT

operation, a literal application of the regulation would have increased rather than abated pollution. The court remanded the
case to the PCA "for the granting of a variance, such proceeding
to be in conformity with the decision of the trial court ....
This resolution of the issue might have been proper, but it is
unclear why the issue was even before the trial court. The appeal contemplated in Minnesota Statutes § 115.05 (7) is an appeal
from "any final order, rule, regulation, or other final decision of
the agency" as provided in section 115.05(3). The only final action taken by the PCA had been the promulgation of the amendatory clause of the regulation. The challenge to the application
of the regulation to Reserve was improper under the statute's
appeal procedure until the PCA had taken final action thereunder against Reserve. 26 In allowing the trial court to determine the applicability of the regulation to Reserve the supreme
court emphasized Minnesota Statutes § 115.05(7) which allows
the trial court to take evidence beyond that taken by the agency.
It would not, however, appear to authorize the court to take evidence on or resolve issues regarding matters not properly before
it under Minnesota Statutes § 115.05 (3) .2
25. 281 Minm. 524,162 N.W.2d 249 (1968).
26. Mmm. STAT. § 115.05(1) (1971) provides in relevant part:
No final order of the agency shall be effective as to the vested
rights of any person adversely affected thereby nor as to any
disposal system operated by any person unless the agency or
its authorized officer, member, or agent shall have held a hearing upon the matter therein involved at which evidence may
be taken, of which hearing such person shall have had notice
as hereinafter provided. Any person who will be directly affected by the final order therein shall have the right to be
heard at the hearing and to submit evidence thereat.
27. The court seemingly extended the scope of the trial court's
review power:
Reading these statutes together, it appears that the legislature
has unquestionably conferred upon the trial court the right to
take additional evidence, and derivatively, to make findings
with regard to that evidence.
Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 200 N.W.2d
142, 146 (Minn. 1972). The court did, however, reverse the trial court's
attempt to direct the negotiations between the PCA and Reserve regarding the issuance of a variance. The legal authority for such a
reversal is clear (Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope, 193 N.W.2d 821 (Minn.
1972), and Wilkes v. Hoaglund, 196 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 1972) ); but the
reasoning on this issue is cloudy. At first glance it seems anomalous
to reverse the trial court's remand to the PCA for the issuance of a
variance when the supreme court indicates at the same time that a variance is the proper proceeding on remand. However, it does appear
from the decision of the trial court that its order contemplated initial
and continued interference with the variance proceedings.
Appellant Reserve Mining Company shall submit to Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on or before May 15, 1971, for
its approval, such plans for modification as are necessary to
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B. ELECTIONS
The court dealt with qualifications for state elective office
in two significant cases that involved questions of constitutional
interpretation. In the first, Opatz, a nineteen-year-old student
at St. Cloud State College and a registered St. Cloud voter, filed
a timely application to have his name placed on the ballot in the
municipal primary election for alderman. When the city clerk
refused his request because he was not twenty-one years old,
Opatz sought a writ of mandamus 1 to compel the clerk to place
his name on the ballot. The district court issued an order discharging the writ, and, on appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that: (1) a constitutional amendment that
lowers the voting age to nineteen years but retains the officeholding age at twenty-one years does not violate article 14, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution which requires that two or
more alterations or amendments be voted for or against separately; (2) refusal to allow a registered voter to hold public office until he reaches the age of twenty-one is not a denial of equal
protection of the law; and (3) the twenty-sixth amendment to
the United States Constitution does not require Minnesota to
lower its office-holding age to the voting age. Opatz v. City
of Saint Cloud, 196 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1972).
The Minnesota Constitution previously limited the right to
vote to citizens twenty-one years of age or older,2 and anyone
accomplish [the reduction of pollution].

After such approval

by Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Reserve shall have
two additional years in which to build, install, and put into
operation such approved modified method of tailings discharge.
The District Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for
the purpose of insuring the implementation and good-faith negotiations towards a satisfactory modification of discharge and
a reasonable and equitable solution of this controversy.
Conclusions of Law 5 & 6, Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 6th Judicial District, December 15, 1970. This
clearly exceeded the limits of the "reverse-or-affirm" restriction and it
may be this type of supervision to which the supreme court objected.
1. MINN. STAT. § 203.38(1) (1971) provides in pertinent part:
When it shall appear by affidavit to any judge of the supreme
court in the case of a state election, or of the district court of
the proper county in the case of a county election:
(a) That an error or omission in the placing or printing
of the names or description of any candidate on official primary or general election ballots has occurred or is about to
occur: .

. .

. then the judge immediately shall order the offi-

cer, person, or board charged with the error, wrong, neglect,
or failure to correct the same or perform the duty forthwith
or show why he should not do so. Failure to obey the order
is contempt of court.
2. ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. Section 1. Every person of the
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"entitled to vote at any election shall be eligible to any office
elective by the people."'3 In the 1970 election, voters ratified the
following proposal to amend these sections:
Shall the Constitution of the State be amended to reduce the
age requirement for voting from 21 to 19 years and provide an
age requirement of 21 years to hold elective office?
Opatz contended that this proposal combined two amendments
in a single proposition in violation of article 14, section 1 of the
Minnesota Constitution, which provides:
If two or more alterations or amendments shall be submitted
at the same time, it shall be so regulated that the voters shall
vote for or against each separately.
The court rejected this argument, however, on the grounds that
since the amendment had a single purpose4 and the language of
the proposal was not misleading, the policies underlying the constitutional requirement were not infringed.
While this liberal construction of the constitutional language
has the virtue of emphasizing practicalities,5 rather than semantics, this case contravenes one of the primary objectives of the
prohibition-to avoid "logrolling." Logrolling is the process of
connecting proposals, either or both of which may be unacceptable to a significant percentage of voters standing alone, in the
hope that voters will approve both together. In this connection,
the MVinnesota Supreme Court has said:
It is the design of art. 14, § 1 that the voter should not be
placed in a position where to secure an amendment which he
feels is necessary or expedient he will be required to accept
one which he does not want.7
The amendment in the instant case constitutes logrolling because it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of
voters would not have approved a lowered voting age unless the
age qualification for holding public office was maintained at
age of twenty-one years or more .

.

state six months ...
next preceding
titled to vote ....
MnmN. CoxST. art. VI, § 1 (1857).
3. Id. § 7.
4. This holding comports with the
Holm, 187 Minn. 78, 244 N.W. 331 (1932).
tained a multifarious amendment on the
common sense... they may be logically
a single plan.

. . ."

244 N.W. at 334.

. who has resided in this

an election shall be en-

court's decision in Winget v.
In that case, the court susgrounds that "in the light of
viewed as parts or aspects of

5. 196 N.W.2d at 300.
6. Fugina v. Donovan, 259 Minn. 35, 38, 104 N.W.2d 911 (1960).
The other objective-to prevent the ordinary voter from being misled
by the language of the proposal-was clearly satisfied in this case.
7. Id. at 38, 104 N.W.2d at 916 (J. Murphy dissenting).
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twenty-one years. Conversely, many supporters of a lower voting age would have voted against a separate proposal for maintaining the higher age requirements for public office. Thus the
court, while utilizing a policy-oriented approach in construing
the constitutional requirement, overlooked one of its most fundamental bases in the process. Perhaps this aspect of the court's
decision is best explained by Justice Knutson's reluctant concurrence in Fuginav. Donovan8 in which he stated:
rather than jeopardize what the people have heretofore ap-

proved it seems the lesser of two evils to uphold what is here
proposed. 9

Opatz next argued that denying eligible voters the right to
hold office violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The amended
age qualification clearly discriminates between the class of nineteen to twenty-one year old voters and all other voters, by denying the former the ability to hold public office. This classification appears wholly analogous to that resulting from imposing an
age requirement on the right to vote. Such a restriction on the
right to vote has been held constitutional by every court considering the question.10 Since the right to vote is more fundamental than the right to hold public office, a fortiori an age restriction on the latter is not a denial of equal protection." Finally, it has never been suggested that equal protection requires
that every voter, no matter what his age, must be eligible for
12
every public office.
8. 259 Minn. 35, 104 N.W.2d 911 (1960).
9. Id. at 40, 104 N.W.2d at 915.
10. See, e.g., Stein v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 318 F.
Supp. 47 (D. Md. 1970), afl'd, 432 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1970); YMCA

Vote at 18 Club v. Board of Elections of City of N.Y., 319 F. Supp. 543

(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
11.

In Manson v. Edwards, 345 F. Supp. 719 (E.D. Mich. 1972),

plaintiff successfully contended that an age qualification to hold office
in excess of that required to vote denied equal protection to a class comprised of voters too young to hold office. The decision in Manson rests
on a shallow and tenuous application of the logic of Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972). Since the outcome in Manson is of dubious precedential value, a more thorough appraisal of that case is left to the
reader.
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 (representatives must
be 25 years old), art. 1, § 3, cl. 3 (senators must be 30 years old), art. 2,
§ 1, cl. 4 (president must be 35 years old); MINN. CONST. art. 5, § 3
(governor and lieutenant governor must be 25 years old).
Justice Todd argued in dissent that since MINN. CONST. art. 4,
§ 25 required that state senators and representatives only be "qualified voters" it would be unreasonable to require holders of all public
offices to be twenty-one years old when state legislators need only be
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The court in Opatz noted that time constraints prevented
consideration of all the possible constitutional arguments raised
by the facts. Consequently, it should not be assumed that even
those issues decided by the court are finally settled, especially in
view of the current volatility of opinion on questions of majority rights and responsibilities for young people.
The second case involved qualifications for holding judicial
office. Three disbarred attorneys and one person who had never
been -admitted to practice law in Minnesota filed for the offices
of associate justice of the supreme court and judge of the district
court. Minnesota Constitution article 6, section 7 requires that
candidates for these offices "shall be learned in the law."1 3 The
Secretary of State and the auditors of counties in which the filings occurred filed affidavits with the supreme court questioning
the eligibility of these persons for office under this requirement. 14 In response, the court issued an order to the four individuals to show cause why their names should not be excluded
from the ballot. Following a hearing, the court held: (1) being
"learned in the law" requires admission to the practice of law in
the state; and (2) an attorney who has been disbarred no longer
satisfies this requirement. In re Daly, 200 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.
1972).
The court in Daly relied heavily on the interpretation of
similar requirements by other state courts in reaching its decision. What limited authority exists supports the conclusion
that "learned in the law" requires either admission to the practice of law or entitlement thereto without examination.15 The
only Minnesota case dealing with the question, State ex rel.
nineteen years old. Notwithstanding Justice Todd's statements to the
contrary, such an anomalous result can be avoided by finding that
Mhm. CONST. art. 7, § 7 applies equally to all public offices, including
state senator and representative.
13. Mnwr. CoNsT. art. 6, § 7 provides:
Judges of the supreme court, the district court, and the probate court shall be learned in the law. The qualifications of
all other judges and judicial officers shall be prescribed by
law.
14. MnN. STAT. § 203.38(1) (1971) allows the filing of an affidavit
to contest the placement of a candidate's name on the ballot Any
eligible voter has sufficient interest in the election to raise such an
issue. Moe v. Alsop, 288 Minn. 323, 180 N.W.2d 255 (1970). In the instant case, state officials, rather than a generally eligible voter, made
the objections.
15. State ex Tel. Jack v. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425
(1914); Freiler v. Schuylkill CoL, 46 Pa. Super. 58 (1911); Jamieson v.
Wiggin, 12 S.D. 16, 80 N.W. 137 (1899).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:881

Jack v. Schmahl,16 held that the constitutional requirement "beyond question" contemplated attorneys at law.
This rule rests heavily on the need for an objectively measurable criterion of minimum knowledge, even though a "person
who has never been admitted to the bar may be profoundly
learned in the law, while one who has been admitted may be
as profoundly ignorant of its principles."" The formal education that is prerequisite to admission to the bar assures certainty
and uniform application of the requirement. Absent such certainty, "learned in the law" would be a fact question open to
constant and unnecessary litigation. Moreover, the matter could
not be left to the voters themselves since they are in no position
to make an informed judgment about the legal aptitude of judicial candidates.
The second holding in the case was premised on the assumption that initial satisfaction of the educational requirements cannot permanently qualify an attorney as "learned in the law."
Obviously, however, disbarment does not vitiate one's "learning
in the law" in any practical sense. Nevertheless, Danforth v.
Egan18 defined a legal education to include an understanding of
"legal ethics" and regarded disbarment as an indication of the
absence of such understanding. This decision equated "learned
in the law" with "admitted to the bar and in good standing."
But such reasoning is specious, since an administrative proceeding obviously cannot transmute one's education into ignorance,
nor can admission to the bar assure that one is learned in the law.
The Daly court further reasoned that since ordinary laymen
cannot run for judicial office, neither can a disbarred attorney
because his status is "reduced to [that] of a layman." ' If the
"learned in the law" qualification is intended to distinguish between people based on educational background, the court's logic
appears deficient. Disbarment merely deprives the attorney of
various privileges attendant to the license to practice, and in
16.
17.
18.

125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425 (1914).
Jamieson v. Wiggin, 12 S.D. 16, 18, 80 N.W. 137, 138 (1899).
23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021 (1909).

19. The court reasoned that:
[A] disbarred attorney is no more qualified ... than any
other lay person. By his disbarment he is reduced to the status
of a layman. The term "learned in the law" . . . clearly
prevents a layman from filing for or holding the office; and

it must therefore follow that a disbarred attorney is in no better position to file for ... or to hold [a judicial office] than any
other layman.
200 N.W.2d at 920.
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this sense reduces him to the status of a layman. It cannot be
regarded as equating his knowledge of the law with that of an
ordinary layman or other person who has not had his knowledge
tested by a bar exam Perhaps this holding can best be explained on the basis that the instant court simply felt that disbarred lawyers are unfit to be judges. If this is true, that determination is one for the legislature to articulate, not the courts.
It can forcefully be argued that "learned in the law" should
be interpreted simply as "having had a legal education" with no
requirement of bar membership implied. First, such an interpretation is consistent with the plain meaning of the words.
Other states explicitly require bar admission to qualify for the
judiciary. 20 Absence of any comparable provision in Minnesota
arguably indicates that a legal education should be sufficient.
Second, the standards of continuing bar membership are nebulous and subject to change. 21 If certainty in candidacy requirements is an actual concern of the court, a requirement of legal
education would better serve this goal. Finally, if disbarment
precludes judicial candidacy based on the lack of knowledge of
legal ethics, perhaps probation or even censure should also preclude candidacy. The legislature as well as the courts should
address the policy questions raised by the facts of Daly and
left unanswered by the court.

C.

MumcnPArnEys

During 1972, the court decided three cases of special relevance to the rights and liabilities of municipalities. In one case,
two villages each claimed jurisdiction over five parcels of land
on their common boundary. The Village of Lilydale had attempted to annex the parcels in 1955 prior to the incorporation
of the Village of Mendota Heights, whose charter described its
boundary as concurrent with the boundary of Lilydale. In 1959
and 1962, Mendota Heights zoned one parcel for single-family
20. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 17; KAx. STAT. ANN. § 20-2001
(1972).
21. Causes of "removal, suspension and discipline" have ranged
from intoxication, Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 692 (1968), and sexual misconduct, Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 735 (1971), to violations of securities regulations, Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1408 (1968).

There is no statute of limita-

tions in actions for disbarment, In re Heinze, 233 Minn. 391, 47
N.W.2d 123 (1951), and reinstatement is sometimes granted for "rehabilitation," In re Constantine's Petition, 258 Minn. 582, 103 N.W.2d
196 (1960).
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dwellings; thereafter, Lilydale issued a building permit authorizing the erection of two 80-unit apartment complexes in the
parcel. Mendota Heights sued for a determination of the boundary and also filed a notice of lis pendens to stop development
on the parcel. Lilydale asserted that since it had continuously
and openly exercised sovereignty over the parcels, Mendota
Heights' claim was barred by laches. The trial court granted
summary judgment for Lilydale and also granted the developer's
motion to discharge the notice of lis pendens. On appeal, the
supreme court held that the discharge of the notice of lis pendens
was proper but that the facts on the record were insufficient
to support summary judgment, and remanded the action for a
trial on the merits. In the event that the trial court should find
that Lilydale's annexation proceedings had been invalid, the
court directed it to consider both the extent to which each village engaged in municipal activity within the disputed area and
the injury which would result to property owners, before deciding whether Mendota Heights was guilty of laches. Village of
Mendota Heights v. Village of Lilydale, 199 N.W.2d 803 (Minn.
1972).
By allowing the defense of laches, the trial court is permitted to disregard the literal construction of the village charters
and use its discretion to reach the most equitable result under
the circumstances. In setting out guidelines for determining
when the defense is to be allowed, the court quite properly focused on the hardship to the municipality which had undertaken
to supply municipal services for the disputed area' and on the
hardship to property owners who had developed land in reliance
on one municipality's sovereignty.
However, in affirming the trial court's discharge of the notice of lis pendens, 2 the court places a municipality attempting
to protect its interest in an awkward position. Since a factor in
laches is the injury the delay has caused to property owners,
some procedure is needed to give them notice of the existence of
a boundary dispute. In holding that notice of lis pendens is
available only to allow a person to protect a proprietary interest
1. The court suggested that municipal services to be considered
included levying taxes, maintaining streets and roads, levying special
assessments, providing fire protection, constructing sewers and water
lines, enacting and enforcing zoning ordinances, providing street addresses, issuing bonds, granting building permits, and issuing business
licenses. 199 N.W.2d 803, 805.
2. Notice of lis pendens is authorized by MINN. STAT. § 557.02
(1971).
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in title to land, and not to a municipality attempting to protect
a sovereign interest, the court has left municipalities without any
3
effective notice procedure.
A second case involved the liability of a municipality for
the wrongful acts of a private developer. Jandric, Inc., the developer of a subdivision in the Village of Inver Grove Heights,
agreed with the village that its wholly owned subsidiary would
construct a sewer system which would be donated to the village
upon completion. The village accepted the completed system in
1966 and assumed responsibility for its operation. Plaintiffs,
purchasers of homes constructed by Jandric, sued, alleging that
their homes had been negligently connected to the sewer system.
Jandric brought a third party action against the village. On
Jandric's appeal from the trial court's dismissal of its third party
claim, the supreme court held that the village was not a proper
third party defendant under Rule 144 because Jandric's claim
was for negligent operation of the sewer system while the
primary claim was for negligent construction. Altendorfer v.
Jandric,Inc., 199 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1972).
It is settled in Minnesota that a municipality is liable for
negligence in the construction of a sewer system which it builds 5
and for negligent operation of a system regardless of who built
it. 6 In the instant case the court held that, absent an agreement
to assume liability, a municipality is not liable for negligent construction by a private developer.7 Thus, Jandric's third party
claim was improper because under Rule 14 a third party claim
must allege liability for concurrent negligence, not liability
which would be subject to a separate cause of action between
the plaintiff and the third party.8 In the instant case, Jandric
3. A municipality could attempt to obtain a temporary injunction enjoining construction in an area until the dispute is resolved.
However, a temporary injunction is normally issued only on a clear
showing that the party seeking the injunction will prevail on the merits.
MiNN. R. Civ. P. § 65.02.
4. MiNN.R. Ci. P.§ 14.
5. Simmer v. City of St. Paul, 23 Minn. 408 (1877).
6. Pettinger v. Village of Winnebago, 239 Minn. 156, 58 N.W.2d
325 (1953).
7. The only authority from other jurisdictions suggests that although a city is not liable for a private developer's negligent construction of a sewer, it may be liable if it knows that the private sewer is
deficient and still connects it to the municipal sewer system. City of
New Castle v. Smith-Jackson Co., 87 Ind. App. 418, 161 N.E. 692 (1928).
8. See Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn.
368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960). This is also the federal rule. See, e.g.,
Rauley v. Southern Ry., 31 F.R.D. 519, 523 (E.D.S.C. 1963), and cases
cited therein.
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alleged only that the village's negligent operation of the sewer
system damaged the plaintiff, not that the village was concurrently liable for negligence in construction of the sewer.
The court's holding that a municipality is generally not
liable for the negligent construction of a sewer by a private developer subjects a home buyer to large risks where the developer
has become judgment proof. Although the contrary rule would
impose liability on the village for acts by persons not directly
under its control, the village is in a far superior position to
oversee the proper construction of a sewer system than are future home buyers.
In a third case, a municipality was sued for the negligence
of its building inspector. Several persons were injured and one
was killed by a fire at the Owatonna Inn Towne Motel. The injured parties sued the motel owner, alleging that they were
trapped on the second floor of the motel because the motel's
stairway enclosures had been constructed in violation of the local building code. The motel owner brought a third party action, and one plaintiff brought a direct action, against the City
of Owatonna claiming that the city had been negligent in issuing
a building permit for construction which violated its building
code. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
all actions against the city, holding that a recently enacted statute waiving municipal tort immunity did not create any new
liability for a municipality. Since building codes are intended
for the general public rather than to provide for private causes
of action for individuals, the court held that the city owed the
plaintiffs no duty of care upon which liability in negligence
could be premised. Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne, Inc., 199
N.W.2d 158 (Minn. 1972).
Minnesota Statutes § 466.02 provides that "every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers,
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function."9 In Hoffert, the court properly construed
the statute to impose tort liability only in situations where the
defense of sovereign immunity had previously been available.
It is clearly established in Minnesota that building inspections
are for the benefit of the general public and do not provide a
9.

MINN. STAT. § 466.03(6)

(1971)

preserves immunity for discre-

tionary acts, but in the instant case the city waived its right to this
exception by obtaining liability insurance pursuant to MINN. STAT.
§ 466.06 (1971).
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cause of action for individuals injured by negligent enforcement
of the codes.' 0 A city is not made an insurer of proper construction merely by conducting an inspection and issuing a building
permit. The waiver of sovereign immunity was irrelevant in
the instant case since the city owed no duty to the plaintiffs as
individuals.

D.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Employee-relator was temporarily disabled for 203.8 weeks
as a result of a job-related back injury. Shortly after he was
injured, he underwent an operation which left him completely
unable to work for almost a year. For several months thereafter he worked part time while he unsuccessfully attempted to
retrain in another occupation. It then became apparent that the
first operation had not been effective and he underwent a second. Although the second operation was sufficiently successful
to enable him to resume employment, he was still left with a 30
per cent permanent disability. The Workmen's Compensation
Commission awarded him the scheduled benefits under Minnesota Statutes § 176.101(3) for permanent partial disability, which
limits the compensable healing period to 104 weeks. However,
the employee claimed additional compensation for the remaining
99.8 weeks under subdivisions (1) and (2) of the statute, which
permit the payment of temporary disability benefits for up to
350 weeks. The Commission rejected this claim on the ground
that the employee was entitled to the greater of either temporary disability payments or peranent partial disability payments, but not both. On certiorari, the supreme court reversed,
holding that an employee who suffers a permanent partial disability may recover compensation for such disability as scheduled in Minnesota Statutes § 176.101(3), and, if temporarily totally or partially disabled after the 104 week healing period provided therein, may recover further benefits under subdivisions
(1) and (2) for an additional period not to exceed 350 weeks for
both the healing period and the period of temporary disability.
Mechling v. Jasper Stone Company, 293 Minn. 309, 198 N.W.2d
561 (1972).
10. Roerig v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 541 (1919). See
also Hitchcock v. Sherburne County, 227 Minn. 132, 34 N.W.2d 342
(1948), and Stevens v. North States Motors, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201
N.W. 435 (1925), both involving negligent maintenance of public roads,
and Op. ATT'Y GEN. Mnmix., 59a-32 (no. 6a) (Jan. 12, 1965).
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Under Minnesota Statutes § 176.101 (1) and (2), an employee
who is temporarily either totally or partially disabled can recover benefits according to specified formulae for up to 350
weeks. In the case of a permanent partial disability, subdivision
(3) of the statute provides for these same payments during a
"healing period" and additional compensation thereafter according to a schedule listing specific types of permanent partial disability. However, while the amount of payments made during
the healing period is determined under subdivisions (1) and (2),
the healing period itself is limited to 104 rather than 350 weeks.
As a result, employees suffering injuries specifically covered by
subdivision (3) have sometimes claimed benefits under the temporary disability provisions in order to take advantage of the
longer payment period. The court previously has held that such
employees are not always bound by subdivision (3) and that
these claims may be allowed.1 It also has held that where an
employee receives concurrent or successive injuries entitling him
to separately designated periods of benefits, the maximum allowances for these injuries can be accumulated. 2 The precise issue
here, however, whether an employee with a permanent partial
disability can claim benefits under both subdivision (3) and subdivisions (1) and (2), was one of first impression.
Attempting to resolve the employee's claims, the court
looked first to the "letter of the law,"' noting that subdivision
(3) of section 176.101 is not expressly made an exclusive remedy,
and therefore, an employee is not specifically precluded from
also receiving benefits under subdivisions (1) and (2). It concluded, however, that a literal application of these subdivisions
together would yield an unreasonable result-either the doubling of payments during the 104 week healing period or a pyramiding of compensable periods into a total of 454 weeks. Further, the court refused to give customary deference to administrative interpretation of the Commission because such an interpretation was "not to be found in the letter of the law" and the
statutory language does not require an election of benefits. On
the other hand, the court recognized that allowing any benefits
1. See, e.g., Salmon v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 281 Minn. 406,
161 N.W.2d 682 (1968).
2. Durant v. Butler Bros., 275 Minn. 487, 148 N.W.2d 152 (1967).

3.

MINN. STAT.

§ 645.16 (1971) provides in relevant part:

When the words of a law and their application to an existing

situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of
the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing
the spirit.

(Emphasis added.)
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under subdivisions (1) and (2) beyond 104 weeks would also be
inconsistent with that specific limitation in subdivision (3).
The court therefore considered the statutory objective of
subdivision (3). That objective was declared to be the compensation of an employee having a permanent partial disability, regardless of the amount of wages he had lost or might lose and
regardless of the disability's effect on his future employability.
The court then reasoned that restricting an employee to either
temporary or permanent partial disability benefits under the
Commission's interpretation would not attain this objective,
since it can effectively deprive the employee of any compensation for his permanent partial disability. This could occur, as
in the present case, where the employee has a long period of
temporary disability with little or no actual healing and a residual permanent partial disability. If he receives compensation for
his permanent disability under subdivision (3), he can recover
temporary disability benefits only during the 104 week healing
period. But if he receives the longer temporary benefits under
subdivision (1) or (2), he loses the scheduled compensation for
the permanent partial disability. The objective is attained, the
court concluded, by allowing such an employee to receive the
scheduled compensation for his permanent disability and temporary disability benefits for up to 350 weeks. These temporary
benefits would consist of the usual payments during the 104
week healing period followed by further payments under either
subdivision (1) or (2) if appropriate. The court recognized that
this interpretation might seem inconsistent with the plain language of subdivision (3), but rationalized that requiring a choice
between scheduled compensation for the permanent disability
and additional necessary temporary benefits would be even more
inconsistent with the statutory purpose.
In effect, the healing period of subdivision (3) is now co-extensive with the duration of temporary total and partial disability contained in subdivisions (1) and (2).4 The statute does not
define "healing period," and administrative and judicial applications of the term are not completely reconcilable. 5 In the present case, the court attempted to avoid the specific statutory lan4. For a general background on the cases prior to the present

decision and an argument for this result, see Bellis, Benefits Under the
Compensation Law, in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
mEN's COmPENSATION (Practice Manual 49) (1971).

MINNESOTA

WORK-

5. Guertin v. Overland-Knight Co., 179 Minn. 38, 228 N.W. 169

(1929); Radell v. First Nat'l Bank of Hibbing, 22 Minn. W.C.D. 20

(1961); Tapolo v. Inland Steel Co., 3 Minn. W.C.D. 37 (1925).
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guage, apparently because the inequity that was obvious here
was actually inherent in prior efforts to provide additional temporary benefits. Focusing on practical considerations enabled
the court to successfully resolve the issue without becoming entangled in semantics.
Although the court refused to be restricted by the stated
104 week limitation, it failed to adequately explain why it
thought an overall limit of 350 weeks was any more reasonable
than a limit of 454 weeks, which would result from "tacking"
the temporary disability period to the healing period. The choice
of 350 weeks clearly is not unreasonable, especially since the statute twice places this limit on the receipt of temporary benefits.
But the same practical considerations which support the court's
allowance of 350 weeks of benefits would also seem to support
benefits for up to 454 weeks. Thus the opinion does not indicate the proper limitation in cases where the employee suffers
temporary disability in excess of 350 weeks.
As a result of this decision, an employee who suffers a permanent partial disability will no longer be denied temporary
disability benefits after 104 weeks and may continue to receive
them for up to 350 weeks if necessary. This particularly benefits the employee with a high permanent partial disability rating
who makes continued efforts to return to employment. Moreover, this decision is consistent with the general policy of construing the Workmen's Compensation Act broadly and liberally
in favor of the claimant's interests. 6 It allows the payment of
the maximum amount available under the statute, yet avoids an
unreasonable accumulation of benefits.

E.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The supreme court decided one major case dealing with the
Uniform Commercial Code (Code) last term. On February 20,
1968, Noyes Paving Company (debtor) entered into a conditional
sales contract for the purchase of two dump trucks and related
equipment. The next day a financing statement was filed,' naming Noyes as debtor and plaintiff as assignee of the secured
party. The statement described the collateral as "Construction
6. Radzak v. Mercy Hospital, 291 Minn. 189, 190 N.W.2d 186
(1971).
1. Plaintiff's financing statement was properly filed with the
Secretary of State pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 336.9-402 (1969).
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Equipment, Motor Vehicles." In May, debtor entered into two
leases with defendant bank for three additional dump trucks and
other construction equipment. The leases provided that debtor,
if not in default, could purchase the leased goods at the end of
the lease term for one dollar. Defendant did not file financing
statements for the leased equipment at that time.
Debtor had difficulty making payments on the conditional
sales contract, and on January 30, 1969, plaintiff agreed to extend the time for payment. In consideration, debtor gave plaintiff, who was unaware of the vehicles leased from defendant
bank, a security interest "in all goods whether . .. now owned
or hereafter acquired." 2 However, no additional financing statement was filed by plaintiff. Debtor subsequently experienced
additional financial difficulty and defaulted on both the conditional sales contract and the equipment leases. On May 21, 1970,
copies of the leases were filed by defendant bank as financing
statements. Some time during the same month 3 the bank repossessed the leased equipment. Plaintiff then sued for possession
of the leased trucks, arguing that they were covered by the "all
goods" security agreement it had with debtor. Reversing judgment for defendant bank, the supreme court held that a financing statement perfecting an interest in existing goods constitutes
a perfected security interest in after-acquired goods of the same
nature,4 where the security interest is so amended, even absent
filing of the modification. Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin National
Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972).
Several important issues under Article 9 were raised. The
threshold question was whether the equipment leases that gave
the lessee an option to acquire title created a security interest.
Article 9 applies to transactions "intended to create a security
interest."5 Since the lessee was to become the owner of the
leased property for only a nominal sum, the court found the
lease was intended to create a security interest within Article 9
pursuant to the literal language of Minnesota Statutes § 336.12. The goods were to be "as defined in Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code." Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d
775, 778 (Minn. 1972).
3. The record is unclear as to the exact date of repossession or
the date when the dispute arose. 194 N.W.2d at 785.
4. The after-acquired goods must be of the type contemplated in
the underlying security agreement and of the same nature as those described in the original financing statement. This requirement insures
adequate notice to future creditors. See text accompanying notes 13-17
infra.
5. MmN. STAT. § 336.9-102(1) (a) (1969).
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201(37). Thus reservation of title by the bank was irrelevant as
a distinction in form only. Since defendant failed to perfect its
security interests by filing financing statements within ten
days,0 its security interests did not have priority over conflicting
security interests perfected earlier.
The second question before the court was whether debtor
"owned" the leased equipment pursuant to the extension agreement which covered all goods "owned or hereafter acquired" by
the debtor. Since Article 9 applies whether title to collateral is
in the secured party or in the debtor,7 the court reasoned that
the Code's draftsmen "intended that its provisions should not be
circumvented by manipulation of the locus of title."" Thus, the
bank's retention of title was irrelevant.
The third issue raised was whether the description "all goods
now owned or hereafter acquired" in the extension agreement
was sufficient to "reasonably identify" the secured property as
required by the Code for enforceable security interests. The
court defined the principal function of a description of collateral
in a security agreement as enabling the parties themselves to
identify the secured property. Recognizing the policy of upholding security agreements according to their terms, 10 the court
held the description sufficient since a "security agreement should
not be held unenforceable unless it is so ambiguous that its
meaning cannot reasonably be construed from the language of
the agreement itself.""
6.
7.

MINN. STAT. § 336.9-312(4) (1969).
MINN. STAT. § 336.9-202 (1969) provides:

8.

Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn.

"Each provision of

this article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies applies
whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."
1972).
9. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-203(1) (b) (1969) requires that a security
interest, to be enforceable against debtor or third parties, must contain

"a description of the collateral." To be effective, the description must
"reasonably identify" the property being described. MINN. STAT. §

336.9-110 (1969).
10. The court added:
Better practice might dictate that, in framing a description
in a financing statement, it be made more restrictive than "all
goods" or "all goods except inventory."

In

the instant case,

however, that problem does not arise, and we are not called
upon to decide where to draw the line because, although plaintiff's security agreement was very broad and did cover all

goods except inventory, its financing statement was much narrower and specifically covered only the debtor's construction
equipment and motor vehicles.
194 N.W.2d at 782 n.3.
11.

1972).

Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 782 (Minn.

This liberal construction contrasts with the description de-
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The bank's principal defense was that plaintiff failed to perfect its security interest in all the debtor's goods because plaintiff did not file an amendment to its original financing statement when it entered into the extension agreement. While this
was persuasive to the trial court, 12 the supreme court disagreed;
noting that a financing statement may be filed before a security
agreement is made' 3 and that the Code does not require a
reference in the financing statement to after-acquired property,"
the court held it was unnecessary to amend the financing statement when the security agreement was altered1 5 in order to provide notice to subsequent creditors. In addition, the court noted
that the Code expressly approves the inclusion of after-acquired
property in a security agreement.
Thus, the court reasoned
that once a financing statement describing property by type is on
file, "the entire world is warned [thereby] that the secured party
... may later acquire a perfected security interest in property
7
of the same type acquired by the debtor in the future."''
Despite the court's acknowledgement of plaintiff's perfected
security interiest in the leased equipment, the priority of plaintiff's interest with respect to the defendant's had to be determined. Since the record failed to reveal the date on which defendant bank repossessed the equipment and hence the time at
manded in a financing statement which is primarily intended to alert

third parties to the existence of secured property and restrict what
property creditors may reach. MINN. STAT. § 336.9-201 (1969).
The
Code demands that a financing statement be more specific. MnN.
STAT. § 336.9-402(1), (3) (1969).
12. The trial court found that the extension agreement added new
collateral and relied upon MImN. STAT. § 336.9-402 (4), which states:
The term "financing statement" as used in this article
means the original financing statement and any amendments
but if any amendment adds collateral, it is effective as to the
added collateral only from the filing date of the amendment.

13.

MN. STAT.

§ 336.9-402 (1969).

14. MtNm. STAT. § 336.9-402(4) (1969).
15. The court improperly analogized the facts in the instant case
to those of an advance in which the existing collateral is sufficient to
allow debtor to receive additional credit. But in that situation the
transaction concerns only the debtor and the original creditor. In the
present case, interests of a third party, the creditor bank, are directly
involved. It is one thing for a lender to advance money on property
for which he has filed a financing statement and quite another for
him to do the same thing on the condition that the debtor give him a
security interest in all the debtor's goods which fall within the description in the financing statement. In the case of an advance, the
lender is dealing with property he has already financed; whereas in
the latter case he is dealing with property others have financed.
16. MNq. STAT. § 336.9-204(3) (1969).
17. Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn.
1972).
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which the dispute arose, the court was unsure as to which Code
provision to technically apply. The court nevertheless found
that plaintiff had a superior interest whether subsection (a) or
subsection (b) of Minnesota Statutes § 336.9-312(5) applied. Under (a) if two competing security interests are perfected, the order of filing financing statements determines priority regardless of which security interest attached first. Therefore if the
dispute between the parties had occurred after defendant had
filed, both interests would have been perfected by filing, and
thus subsection (a) would apply and plaintiff would prevail
since he had filed before defendant. On the other hand, if the
dispute had arisen before defendant had filed, subsection (b),
which grants priority in the order of perfection regardless of
which security interest attached first and whether it attached before or after filing, would apply. Although defendant's security
interest attached before plaintiff's, it remained unperfected until
the 1970 filing. Plaintiff's interest, however, was perfected in
1968, before it attached, by the filing of the original financing
statement and was thus prior to defendant's interest which was
still unperfected at the time of the dispute.
Whenever broadly identified collateral is subject to a filed
security interest in Minnesota, subsequent purchase money creditors should diligently file their interest to perfect it within ten
days of the financing transaction. The result of the instant case
was deemed necessary by the court, which reasoned that requiring prior secured parties to file amendments covering any subsequent modification of the security agreement would "have a
disastrous effect upon financing transactions."18 Despite the surprise of the instant defendant, future purchase money creditors
will have notice from the prior filing. Only those statements
indicating broad categories of collateral descriptive of the subsequent creditor's collateral, however, should be of concern since
the statement must still reasonably identify the collateral.

IX. TAXATION
In one tax case decided last term, the court clarified the
application of the state sales tax to cooperatives. Taxpayer-appellant operated a cooperative selling hardware and building
supplies to its members at predetermined prices. At the end of
18.

Id. at 786.
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the fiscal year, taxpayer determined its net income and, after
deducting income taxes, stockholders' dividends, and transfers to
retained earnings, distributed the balance, which amounted to
20% of gross receipts, as a patronage refund. Taxpayer then determined its sales tax liability on only 80 per cent of its gross receipts. A deficiency was assessed which taxpayer paid under
protest. In the refund suit, the trial court held for the commissioner on cross motions for summary judgment. The supreme
court affirmed, holding that the sales tax should be imposed on
the full purchase price of goods where the patronage refund is
dependent on discretion exercised at the end of the fiscal year in
consideration of total sales for the year, and is thus determined
by events occurring after the consumation of the sale. Tyler
Lumber Co. v. Logan, 195 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. 1972).
Minnesota Statutes § 297A.02 imposes a retail sales excise
on "gross receipts," a term defined in Section 297A.01(9) as the
annual aggregate of sales prices.' "Sale price" is defined in Section 297A.01 (8) as "the total consideration valued in money, for
a retail sale ... without deduction for [a] discount allowed after
the sale is consummated .... ."2 To determine the moment of
consummation of a cooperative sale, the court looked to the definition of "sale" in Section 297A.01 (3):
A "sale" . . . includes, but is not limited to, each of the
following transactions:
(a) Any transfer of title or possession, or both, of tangible personal property, whether absolutely or conditionally
3

1. MINN. STAT. § 297A.02(2) (1971) specifically includes cooperatives in the list of "persons" subject to the tax. The tax is now four
per cent of gross receipts. Prior to 1972 it was three per cent.
2. MINN. REG. TAx S & U 23(d) provides that, "In computing
'sales price', the total consideration for the sale shall not be reduced by
the discount allowed where the amount of the discount is determined
by events that occur subsequent to consummation of the sales."
3. MINN. REG. TAx S & U 3 (a) states:
Section 297A.01, Subd. 3 (a) provides that a transfer of title
constitutes a sale. Title to goods passes from the seller to the
buyer in any manner and on any condition explicitly agreed
upon by the parties.... Unless otherwise explicitly agreed,
title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the
seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods. Although the seller retains the legal
title to the goods, title passes if the purchaser has the right to
the use, possession and enjoyment of such goods.
MINN. REG. TAx S & U 4 further defines "sale":

In the ordinary course of business in accordance with Sections 297A.01, Subd. 3 (a), a sale is usually evidenced by transfer of possession, either actual or constructive, from the seller
to the buyer at the time the seller completes his performance
under the contract. The most obvious example of a sale by
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Since there was no dispute that title and possession passed at the
time of the original purchase, and since the fact and amount of
the refund were not determined until the end of the year, there
4
was no alternative to the court's decision.
The taxpayer argued that the sales were not consummated
until the refund was determined, since in the contemplation of
the parties this was the time when the sales price was finally
fixed. Under this view, the amount originally paid would be
treated as a deposit. This argument was rejected because the
taxpayer had the absolute right to determine the fact and
amount of the refund; customers could not legally compel a refund or determine its amount. By implication, it would appear
that if the taxpayer had been legally obligated to refund part of
the original amount paid, the refund might have been found to
be "allowed [before] the sale [was] consummated."'
The supreme court also was faced with a claim of ad valorem
tax exemption for school district property leased by an alleged
nonprofit corporation. In Minnesota, real property otherwise exempt from ad valorem taxation becomes taxable in two instances: first, if it is property "leased [to a] corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit," and second, if it
is property leased to a corporation in connection with a business
not conducted for profit when the lease is for a term of three
7
or more years.
On April 9, 1963, North Star Research and Development Institute, a corporation organized under the Minnesota Nonprofit
Corporation Act," leased certain real estate owned by the Minpassing of both title and possession is a sale for cash at the

time of delivery of the goods.
4. The court also tacitly approved the trial court's observation
that "considering the number of cooperatives in the state, their great
volume of business, and the great number of people involved in cooperative work and the importance of cooperatives to the economy of this
state, it can be assumed that the legislators were well acquainted with
cooperative organizations and operations concerning the patronage dividend or refund.

The legislature did expressly set out certain items

which can be deducted before application of the tax. The legislature
could have just as easily included the patronage dividend as one of
those items." 195 N.W.2d at 822.
5. In an Ohio case, cited and indirectly approved by the court,
the taxpayer was allowed to deduct from gross receipts the amount of a
refund given to a customer pursuant to a contract to reduce the retail
price an additional ten per cent on all goods sold if the customer pur-

chased materials in excess of $900,000.

Columbus Southern Lumber

Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 564, 113 N.E.2d 1 (1953).
6. MINN. STAT. § 272.01(2) (1971).
7. MINN. STAT. § 273.19(1) (1971).
8. MINN. STAT.. § 317.01 et seq. (1971).
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neapolis School District. North Star had been initially funded
by donations from business and industrial interests. These contributors did not directly become members or directors of North
Star, nor did they receive any special benefits from its operation
other than as purchasers for full consideration of the various
industrial research activities North Star rendered. The school
district property was initially leased for a term of two years and
11 months. On February 21, 1966, a new lease was executed for
another term of two years and nine months. The trial court
held that North Star was liable for ad valorem tax on the school
district property. The supreme court reversed, holding that
North Star was an organization not conducted for a profit occupying public lands under leases for terms of three years or less,
and that therefore it was entitled to an exemption from ad
valorem taxes under Minnesota Statutes §§ 272.01 (2), 273.19(1),
and 317.02(5). State v. North Star Research & Development Institute, 200 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. 1972).
Minnesota Statutes § 272.01 (2), provides in relevant part
that any tax exempt property leased by a private individual, association, or corporation "in connection with a business conducted for profit" shall be taxed as if the individual or corporation were itself the owner of such property. Utilizing the definition in Minnesota Statutes § 317.02 (5) of the Nonprofit Corporation Act,9 the court found that North Star was a "non-profit"
corporation for the purpose of Minnesota Statutes § 272.01 (2).
Next, the court reviewed the relevant portions of Minnesota
Statutes § 273.19 (1), which extends the scope of the ad valorem
tax on real property by providing for taxation of school property or other state lands not taxable under Minnesota Statutes
§ 272.01(2) if such property is "held under a lease for a term
of three or more years." The court ruled that no tax evasion
was involved despite the fact that North Star held the property
under leases for a period in excess of three years. The court literally construed the wording of the statute which requires for
taxation that the property be held under a lease with a term of
three years or more.
The opinion was largely devoted to a demonstration that
North Star was a valid nonprofit corporation. Critically, the
business interests which had contributed to North Star were not
members' 0 or directors who, under the Nonprofit Corporation
9.

Id.

10. A member of a nonprofit corporation is analogous to a shareholder in a business corporation. See MnN. STAT. § 317.02(11) (1971).
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Act, are barred from receiving profits.1 Furthermore, even if it
were impermissible for contributor-incorporators to profit, it can
hardly be said that the North Star contributors profited, since
they paid full value for research services and were treated in
this respect no differently than all other purchasers, including
their competitors, who used North Star's services.' 2 Citing a
number of cases from other jurisdictions, 13 the court also stated
that the business community's general benefit from North Star's
research did not deprive North Star of its nonprofit status because the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that a
nonprofit corporation may have a purpose of overall benefit to
the business community.' 4
The court noted that a minority of the members of North
Star were employees of companies doing business with defendant but observed that there had been no showing that these
members used their influence for the benefit of their companies.
The court relied extensively upon an analogy to a nonprofit public hospital, noting that just as a director of a nonprofit hospital
may use its facilities, as would any other member of the general
public, without the hospital losing its tax-exempt status, the contributors to and members of North Star were entitled to avail
themselves of its services if no special consideration was af15
forded them.
Principally, the court failed to deal properly with the issue
of whether North Star was connected with a business conducted
for profit. In analyzing Minnesota Statutes § 272.01, the court
interpreted the test of whether North Star was a "corporation in
connection with a business conducted for profit" to mean simply
whether it was a nonprofit corporation. This interpretation did
not recognize that a business may be a nonprofit corporation
properly organized under the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation
Act and yet be a corporation in connection with a business conducted for profit. It was not disputed that most of the businesses
for which North Star performed services were conducted for
profit.
11.
12.

200 N.W.2d at 420-21.
Id.

13. Chamber of Commerce of Hot Springs v. Barton, 195 Ark. 274,
112 S.W.2d 619 (1937) (chamber of commerce held nonprofit); Burley
Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Rogers, 88 Ind. App. 469, 150 N.E. 384
(1926) (marketing association held nonprofit); Snyder v. Chamber of
Commerce, 53 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E. 33 (1895) (chamber of commerce held
nonprofit).
14. MINN.

15.

STAT. § 317.64(1) (1971).
200 N.W.2d at 423-24.
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In a lengthy dissent, Justice Murphy maintained that the
cost of North Star's operation should not be subsidized by other
real estate taxpayers. He felt that if an exemption was to be
allowed, something must be contributed to the public as a whole
in return for the loss of revenue. Expressing disapproval of
the majority's hospital analogy, he distinguished a hospital's contribution to relief of human suffering from what he characterized as North Star's narrow contribution to a special class of
the public. Justice Murphy also contended that the question
whether a business is one conducted for a profit is one of fact
to be determined on the trial court's record, and that according
to that record, North Star was a business conducted for a profit. 10
The court also dealt with ad valorem taxation of property
owned by a nonprofit corporation organized by a church organization, alleged to be exempt as "church property." The Minnesota Conference of the United Churches of Christ organized appellant, United Church Homes, Inc., under the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act. Appellant thereafter purchased a 9-story
building in Minneapolis and converted it to a residence for senior
citizens. Appellant argued that the church body was the parent
and in control of appellant corporation and claimed that its property, real and personal, was exempt from taxation under Minnesota Constitution article 9, section 1, and Minnesota Statutes §
272.02(5) as "church property."' 7 The supreme court rejected
the claim for tax exemption, holding that the church body did
not own appellant, having no authority to direct and control it,
and thus appellant's assets were not "church property."1s State
v. United Church Homes, Inc., 292 Minn. 323, 195 N.W.2d 411
(1972).
Prior to this decision, litigation of church property exemption claims generally involved the question whether the property
16. Id. at 425-38.
17. MnmN. CONST. art. 9, § 1 provides in relevant part:
[C]hurches, church property, and houses of worship . . . shall
be exempt from taxation ....
MNN. STAT. § 272.02 (1971) provides:
All property described in this section to the extent herein
limited shall be exempt from taxation: ... (5) All churches,
church property, and houses of worship.
18. The court also rejected a claim based on the exemption in
Mnm. CoNsT. art. 9, § 1 and in MIN. STAT. § 272.02 (1971) for a
"purely public charity." Madonna Towers v. Commissioner, 283 Minn.
111, 167 N.W.2d 712 (1969) denied the "purely public charity" exemption to a retirement home operating in a manner almost identical to
appellant. Therefore, the court held that appellant could not claim
the "purely public charity exemption."
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was being used for a proper purpose by the church body.' 9
Church property is not exempt from taxation if it is used for
purposes unrelated to the normal spiritual, educational and charitable purposes of religious organizations. 20 Since appellant apparently operated the retirement home only for those sufficiently wealthy to pay large initial entrance fees, the exemption
could perhaps have been denied on the grounds that the property
was not used for a conforming purpose. 2 1 However, the court
cannot be faulted for avoiding the difficult task of judging
whether a particular use of church property is too secular to
qualify for the tax exemption when a narrower, more certain
ground for denying the exemption existed. Church ownership
of appellant's property was lacking and therefore appellant's
property clearly was ineligible for the "church property" exemption available under Minnesota Constitution article 9, section 1 and Minnesota Statutes § 271.02(5).22
It is unclear from the court's opinion whether actual control
of a subsidiary corporation will constitute sufficient ownership
to qualify the subsidiary's property as "church property." The
fact that the alleged parent body, United Churches of Christ,
had in fact no authority to control appellant seems to have been
the main consideration in the determination that ownership of
appellant by a church body was lacking. But the court also emphasized that appellant's articles of incorporation did not provide that upon dissolution the contributing "parent" corporation would have a claim for its contribution to capital. Appellant's articles granted to its board of directors the power to distribute its assets upon dissolution to any charitable organiza23
tion.
19.

See, e.g., State v. Union Congregational Church, 173 Minn.

240, 216 N.W. 326 (1927).
20. See State v. Carleton College, 154 Minn. 280, 283, 191 N.W.
400, 402 (1923).

21.

Life-time contracts with appellant cost between $3,250 and

$18,000, depending upon the age of the applicant and the type of ac-

commodation he would occupy.

In addition, there was a monthly fee
The life
contract provided that appellant would furnish board, room and medical care to residents.
22. In Christian Business Men's Comm. of Minneapolis, Inc. v.
State, 228 Minn. 549, 554, 38 N.W.2d 803 (1949), the court stated:
of $150 to $390 depending on the type of facility occupied.

In order for any institution to qualify for tax exemption un-

der Minn. Const. art. 9, § 1-and M.S.A. 272.02 enacted pursuant thereto-there must be a concurrence of ownership of
the property by an institution of the type prescribed by the
constitution and a use of the property for the purpose for
which such institution was organized.

23.

292 Minn. at 331, 195 N.W.2d at 415.
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The court's attention to the dissolution provision in the articles of incorporation should not be interpreted to suggest that
a parent-subsidiary arrangement wherein the parent church
body has legal and actual control of the subsidiary but no right
to reclaim its contribution to the subsidiary's capital upon dissolution will not be a sufficient ownership relationship to qualify
the subsidiary's property as church property. If the parent corporation has legal control, it can obviously arrange an amendment to the articles of incorporation that will require that the
assets be returned to the parent upon dissolution, if it sees fit.
Requiring such an article in addition to legal control would be
superfluous.

X. TORTS
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for structural damage
to its apartment buildings caused by defendant's pile driving in
performing a highway construction contract with the state of
Minnesota. Although its memorandum is unclear, it appears
that the trial court thought defendant shared the state's immunity from suit and granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment." The supreme court reversed, holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect a public contractor
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity,- even if he has carefully
followed the specifications and directions of the state. Lowry
Hill Properties v. Ashbach Construction Company, 291 Minn.
429, 194 N.W.2d 767 (1971).
The policy choice reflected in this decision is clear; losses occasioned by the performance of public construction contracts
should fall not on fortuitous third parties but should be
absorbed in the bargain between the contractor and the state.
These parties are well equipped to distribute such losses. Liability insurance and surety bonds are available to the contractor,
and the cost of these loss distribution mechanisms, to the extent
1. The trial judge suggested that plaintiff's proper remedy was
inverse condemnation. Plaintiff thereupon instituted inverse condemnation proceedings which eventually produced two cases decided by the
court last term. These cases are considered in Section V.A. of this
Note, supra.

2. Pile driving was held to be an ultrahazardous activity in
Sachs v. Chiat, 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968).
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reflected in the contract price, can be distributed by the state
through its taxing power. Moreover, it was clearly the intent of
the parties that the contractor should pay for such damages.
Their agreement incorporated by reference the highway department's Standard Specifications for Highway Construction which
provides, inter alia, that the contractor assumes full responsibility for any damage resulting from his operations, and that the
contractor will indemnify the state for all claims for damages
caused by his operations.
This decision overruled Nelson v. McKenzie-Hauge Co.,!'
which on indistinguishable facts 4 held the contractor not liable.
At the time of decision of both Nelson and the present case,
strict liability could be imposed for pile driving-in Nelson by
reason of the Minnesota nuisance statute and in Lowry Hill because pile driving had been determined to be an ultrahazardous
activity. However, when Nelson was decided, the rationale for
strict liability was not sufficiently understood to overcome the
confusion generated by the agency relationship between the
contractor and the state. Accustomed to thinking in terms of a
system of tort reparations in which liability was predicated on
fault, the court was reluctant to impose liability on a party who
skillfully executed his contract in the only way it could be performed. Liability in such a case, even if strict, had to be imposed
on the principal, but the principal was immune from suit under
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In the context of strict liability, however, the notion that an
agent who executes his contract skillfully and in accordance with
his principal's instructions should not be liable is an anachronism. Where strict liability is imposed because the defendant is
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity, culpability is irrelevant.
3. 192 Minn. 180, 256 N.W. 96 (1934). In Lowry Hill the court
stated that Nelson was overruled sub silentio by Sachs v. Chiat, 281
Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968), which held that pile driving was an
ultrahazardous activity, i.e., an activity for which strict liability ob-

tains. This is only partially correct. Strictly speaking Sachs did not
change the law as stated in Nelson in any significant way since at the
time Nelson was decided pile driving was already an activity for which

strict liability could be imposed under the Minnesota nuisance statute
in effect at that time. Lowry Hill, on the other hand, does change the
result in a case such as Nelson in that the defense of sovereign immunity is no longer available, even though a contractor complies
strictly with the state's contractual specifications.
4.

In both cases the defendant was a public highway construc-

tion contractor whose non-negligent pile driving caused structural
damage to adjacent property owned by the plaintiff.
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What matters is who, because of foreseeability and economic
resources, can protect against and absorb or distribute the loss.
In the case of a public construction contract this is dearly either
the contractor or the state. Because the state is immune from
suit and the contractor agreed to pay for damages, the court in
Lowry Hill properly placed this burden on the contractor. However it does not follow, as suggested by the court in Nelson, that
if the contractor can be held liable he can also be enjoined." In
the case of injunction, public contractors are properly cloaked
with the sovereign's immunity. If a public contractor can be enjoined from performing contracts which necessarily cause damage to third parties, the state's functions are unacceptably inhibited. Sovereign immunity is properly applied in those instances when the state would otherwise be prevented from fulfilling the legitimate obligations it owes the citizenry.
The court also addressed itself to problems arising out of
interpretation of the state's comparative negligence statute. In
one case, plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident at an uncontrolled intersection. Even
though defendant failed to yield the right of way and did not
see plaintiff until after impact, recovery was denied plaintiff because the jury found that he was 80% negligent.0 Appealing
from the trial court's orders denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, plaintiff contended
that the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury that defendant
was negligent was reversible error as a matter of law, and that
the jury's apportionment was untenable. The supreme court affirmed, holding that while the defendant was negligent as a matter of law, the trial judge's refusal to so instruct was not prejudicial because the jury nonetheless found him negligent. The
court also held that a jury's apportionment of negligence will
not be overturned "unless there is no evidence reasonably tending to sustain the apportionment or the apportionment is manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence." Martin
v. Bussert, 193 N.W.2d 134, 139 (Minn. 1971).
In deciding that it was not prejudicial for the trial judge to
refuse the requested instruction, the court relied on Mutual
Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. Overholser.7 There the court
5. 192 Minn. 180, 187, 256 N.W. 96, 99 (1934).
6. Ainnesota's comparative negligence statute, MINN.

STAT.

§

604.91(1) (1971), denies recovery to a party whose negligence is "as
great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought."

7. 239 Minn. 243, 58 N.W.2d 268 (1953).
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said it was not reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury
that the defendant was negligent as a matter of law where a
finding of defendant's negligence was implicit in the verdict.
However, in Overholser it was the fact of the defendant's negligence that was important, whereas in Martin, because of the
comparative negligence scheme involved, it was not only the fact
of negligence but also the degree of the defendant's negligence
that was crucial. Thus, it is likely the jury in Martin under the
subjective influence of a solemn judicial pronouncement of defendant's negligence 8 would have found the defendant more than
20% negligent. Unless the court was of the opinion that on all
the facts the plaintiff's negligence was at least as great as the
defendant's, the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was prejudicial.
The second issue in Martin, the tenability of the jury's negligence apportionment, was related to the first. The correctness
of the jury instructions was a question of law involving the propriety of the process by which the jury determined "the percentage of negligence attributable to each party."
However, the
second issue involved the scope of appellate review with respect
to the result of that process rather than the process itself, that
is, application of jury instructions. The final jury apportionment arrived at by applying instructions is a question of fact
which, within broad limits, deserves the respect of an appellate
court. This explains the court's refusal to substitute its judgment for that of the jury so long as the apportionment was not
manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evidence.
Applying this test to the facts, the court reasoned that although
it seemed unfair to attribute only 20% of the negligence to the
defendant who was negligent as a matter of law, the vagueness
and inconsistency of the plaintiff's testimony justified the verdict.
In a subsequent decision, Riley v. Lake, 203 N.W.2d 331
(Minn. 1972), the court did find a jury's apportionment of negligence manifestly and palpably against the weight of the evi8. This issue should be distinguished from the issue of whether
in addition to taking the determination of negligence away from the
jury the trial judge should also give a special instruction where the
negligence as a matter of law results from the violation of a statute,
e.g., a safe place act or a highway regulation. For contrasting views
on this question, see Lovesee v. Allied Development Corp., 45 Wis. 2d
340, 347, 173 N.W.2d 196, 200 (1970) and Gregory, Loss Distribution by
ComparativeNegligence, 21 MiNN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1936).
9. MWN.STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
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dence where the jury attributed no negligence to plaintiff even
though she was negligent as a matter of law for failing to
yield the right of way. Thus the court had to determine the
proper appellate response to an untenable apportionment. It
adopted the approach suggested by dictum in Martin that rather
than reapportion the negligence, the injustice is best corrected
by finding the benefactor of the jury's malapportionment was at
least as negligent as the other party, thus in effect eliminating
plaintiff's recovery.
Despite the court's disclaimer of reapportionment as an acceptable response, the approach adopted is a form of gross reapportionment. Whereas the jury found that 0% of the negligence
was attributable to the plaintiff, the court found that at least
50% of the negligence was attributable. Moreover, the implicit
suggestion that an appellate court must either reapportion or in
effect reverse ignores retrial as an alternative. 0 In addition
there are at least two cases in which such an approach is too imprecise to be effective. First, for example, if in Martin the apportionment had not been upheld, the effect of the court's all or
nothing approach would have been to grant the plaintiff recovery without any determination of amount."
This problem is
exacerbated in the common case of multiple parties. Second,
where the party appealing from the jury's apportionment is not
a plaintiff who was denied recovery (Martin) or a defendant who
seeks to escape liability (Riley), but is seeking to increase his
recovery, the court's approach is unavailable since the benefactor
of the malapportionment has already been found at least 50%
negligent. However, in such a case it is likely that the limited
scope of review articulated in Martin would prevent the court
from overturning the apportionment in the first instance.
10. In 1971 the court tacitly approved retrial where there has
been a malapportionment of negligence. Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn.
365, 184 N.W.2d 423, noted in 56 MIuNN. L. Rsv. 973 (1972). See note
11 infra.
11. Moreover, such a case could not be remanded solely to reapportion the negligence. In Juvland v. Mattson, id., the court held that
when a trial court grants a new trial because of malapportioned negligence the new trial cannot be limited to the issue of apportionment; it
must consider all the issues.
These problems can be avoided if the appellate court elevates one
party's negligence to exactly 50%, thereby equalizing the parties' negligence in a two-party case. In such a case each party's negligence
would be "as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." See note 6 supra. A situation where the difference
between 49% and 50% negligent means the difference between partial
and no recovery is unacceptably arbitrary.
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In another case, plaintiff's automobile collided with defendant-corporation's train at a grade crossing. The trial court
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict, holding that
plaintiff was sufficiently negligent as a matter of law to preclude
recovery under the comparative negligence statute.1 2 On plaintiff's appeal from denial of a motion for a new trial, the supreme
court held that while the comparison of negligence is normally
a jury question, a directed verdict for defendant is proper if the
evidence compels a finding that plaintiff's negligence was equal
to, if not greater than, the negligence of defendant. Winge v.
Minnesota Transfer Railway Company, 201 N.W.2d 259 (Minn.
1972).
Before Minnesota adopted its comparative negligence statute, a finding of any contributory negligence by plaintiff was
sufficient to bar his recovery. Thus, under prior law, a directed
verdict for defendant was proper if there was conclusive evidence of any contributory negligence whatsoever. Under the
comparative negligence statute, however, plaintiff is barred from
recovery only if his negligence was equal to or greater than that
of defendant. Accordingly, the court in the instant case held
that a directed verdict requires conclusive evidence that plaintiff's negligence was equal to or greater than defendant's.
Since the Minnesota statute is patterned after the Wisconsin
comparative negligence statute, 13 Wisconsin decisions are generally a valuable guide. Thus, as it frequently does in this area,
the court adopted the rule followed by Wisconsin courts.1 4 However, there are some Wisconsin decisions on the propriety of directed verdicts in comparative negligence cases that Minnesota
courts should reject. Wisconsin courts seem to have created a
dichotomy between cases in which the negligent acts of both
parties are similar in nature and those in which they are not.'"
12.
13.
14.

MNN. STAT. § 604.01 (1971).
WIS. STAT. ANNt. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973).

See Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 377, 180 N.W.2d 870

(1970) for the Minnesota Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the
precedential value of Wisconsin decisions. The Wisconsin decisions
permitting the directed verdict are Schleuter v. Grady, 20 Wis. 2d
546, 123 N.W.2d 458 (1963); Schwarz v. Winter, 272 Wis. 303, 75 N.W.2d

447 (1956).
15. See Williams v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 37
Wis. 2d 402, 155 N.W.2d 100 (1967); McGuiggan v. Hiller Brothers, 209
Wis. 482, 245 N.W. 97 (1932).

In Davis v. Skille, 12 Wis. 2d 402, 107

N.W.2d 458 (1961), the court admitted that in certain fact situations justice would require a directed verdict be rendered even though the
negligent acts of each party were not of the same character. How-
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In the latter case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that a
directed verdict is improper because the court has no legal yard-

stick by which it can measure dissimilar acts of negligence. The
rationale for this dichotomy is weak, however, and it is hoped
that the Minnesota court will not follow these cases.
For the purposes of a directed verdict, a court should apply

the same standard to negligent acts of differing natures that it
applies to acts which are similar. Assume, for example, a record
which conclusively shows that plaintiff-motorcyclist had operated his machine at night without lights in violation of the speed
limit, but that defendant-pedestrian was negligent only as a result of a failure to observe plaintiff. The negligent acts of the
parties are different, yet no reasonable person would conclude
that plaintiff's negligence was less than that of defendant A
directed verdict would be wholly appropriate in such a case.
Thus the extent to which each party's departure from the standard of reasonable care contributed to the resulting injuries can
be assessed despite the dissimilar nature of their acts.
The Wiinge court instructed trial courts that it is preferable
to take a motion for directed verdict under advisement and allow
the jury to decide the issue first This would be a sound procedure. One advantage of allowing the jury to return its own verdict is that it may reach the same result as would be reached
by the court. This preserves the traditional function of the jury
and also spares the court the decision. Moreover, a jury's decision is apt to be somewhat less disturbing to the losing party.
A further advantage is that if the trial court grants judgment
notwithstanding the verdict which is reversed on appeal, the original jury verdict may be reinstated, thus obviating the need
for a new trial. On the other hand, a directed verdict before the
case gets to the jury saves the time and expense of argument,
jury instructions and deliberations. The advantages of postponed direction, however, seem clearly to outweigh the disadvantages.'8
In a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff was denied recovery because, notwithstanding
defendant's negligence, plaintiff had assumed the risk. On appeal, the supreme court abolished assumption of risk as a comever, the later date of the Williams case, supra, suggests that the dichotomy is still recognized in Wisconsin.
16. For a complete discussion on this problem and of directed verdicts generally, see Cooper, Directionsfor Directed Verdicts: A Compass
for Federal Courts, 55 Mzsx. L. REv. 903 (1971).
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plete defense, holding that risk assumption is an aspect of contributory negligence to be apportioned under the comparative
negligence statute. 17 Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192
N.W.2d 826 (1971).
Prior to enactment of the comparative negligence statute it
made little difference whether a plaintiff's conduct was characterized as contributory negligence or risk assumption since both
were complete defenses. While the comparative negligence statute codified the meritorious policy determination that contributory negligence should reduce rather than bar recovery, it created the anomalous situation in which characterizing a plaintiff's conduct as contributory negligence reduced his recovery,
whereas characterizing it as an assumption of risk barred recovery altogether. This decision eliminates that anomaly by recognizing "assumption of risk is but a phase of contributory negligence and is properly included within the scope of that term."' ,,
Another case involved interspousal recovery rights. A
wife cannot recover medical expenses caused by her husband's
negligence. Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile driven by
her husband, was injured as a result of an accident caused by
his negligence. In a suit for personal injuries brought against
the husband, the trial court awarded plaintiff $2,500 in medical
expenses as part of a $5,000 total damage award. The supreme
court reversed as to the medical expenses, holding that a cause
of action for a wife's medical expenses was the husband's alone
unless the wife had paid the bills herself or had personally assumed liability for them "by contract, express or implied in fact
from the circumstances." Janke v. Janke, 292 Minn. 296, 299, 195
N.W.2d 185, 187 (1972).
The court reasoned that the married women's acts' 9 were
not intended to abrogate a husband's common-law duty to provide for his wife's necessities such as medical care. Thus, absent specific evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that liability
for a wife's medical expenses falls exclusively on the husband.
The case, however, is inconsistent with Beaudette v.
MINN.STAT. § 604.01(1) (1971).
18. Hubenette v. Ostby, 213 Minn. 349, 351, 6 N.W.2d 637, 638
(1942). Assumption of risk is that phase of contributory negligence
where the unreasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct inheres in his
decision to encounter a known risk. The court expressly retained the
terminology of assumption of risk. Ostensibly this means that the defense that the plaintiff's choice was negligent will still be called assumption of risk.
19. Mi-. STAT. §§ 519.01, 519.03, 519.05 (1971).
17.
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2
Frana
which in 1969 abrogated interspousal tort immunity in
Minnesota. The rationale of Beaudette was that an injured
party should not be deprived of the benefit of a tortfeasor's liability insurance by the fortuitous fact that the injured party
was the tortfeasor's spouse. The instant case, which carves a
substantial exception out of Beaudette by holding that a wife
may not ordinarily recover medical expenses in a personal-injury action against her husband, is inconsistent with this theory
since it restricts a wife's ability to benefit from her husband's
liability insurance. In view of the policy of the safety responsibility act 21 that victims of negligent driving should be compensated through the mechanism of liability insurance, the courts
conclusion is subject to criticism.

Three cases. dealt with notice to municipalities of tort claims.
On February 6, 1970, plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk in Bemidji and was injured. On March 4, 1970, she served
timely notice2 2- of a possible claim on the proper city officials.
In addition to the date and description of the injuries, the notice
described the place of injury as "an icy, slippery sidewalk on
Beltrami Avenue between Fifth and Sixth Streets." In her suit
against the City of Bemidji, plaintiff alleged negligence in the
design, construction and maintenance of the sidewalk "in front
of 507 Beltrami Avenue." The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the notice did not
comply with statutory requirements because the place of injury
was not sufficiently described. On appeal, the supreme court
reversed, holding that the provisions of the statute relating to
notice of the time, place and circumstances of the injury are satisfied by substantial compliance with the statute, rather than
the previously required strict compliance. Olander v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 293 Minn. 162, 197 N.W.2d 438 (1972).
Minnesota's statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for tort
liability is conditioned on plaintiff's service of written notice to
the governing body of the municipality within 30 days of the alleged injury.23 The 30 day notice requirement is strictly applied
20. 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969).
21. MIN. STAT. §§ 170.21-.58 (1971).
22. Pursuantto MmN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1971).
23. MmNx. STAT. § 466.01 et seq. (1971). M'Nx. ST&T. § 466.05(1)
(1971) provides that:

Every person who claims damages from any municipality for
or on account of any loss or injury within the scope of section
466.02 shall cause to be presented to the governing body of
the municipality within 30 days after the alleged loss or injury
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even where there are allegations of fraud 24 or where traditional
notions of estoppel would seem to preclude the municipality's
assertion of the statutory bar. 25 Wibstad v. City of Hopkins 20 is

indicative of the strict application of the statutory bar. There,
service on the 33rd day after injury was held defective even
though the injured party was not ambulatory for at least two
days following the accident.2 7 The statute further provides that
notice shall be given to "the governing body of the municipality. ' 28

This "manner of notice" requirement has also been

strictly enforced, even where the governing body had actual notice of the accident. 29 Recent cases have adopted no less rigorous
an application of the statute's timing and manner of notice requirements. Service on the mayor ° or the city attorney31 alone
has been held ineffective for the reason that such officials are
not representative of the governing body.
This strict standard of compliance for the timing and manner of notice seems well-founded. Strict compliance with the
timing requirement is essential to enable the municipality to investigate claims before they become stale. Also unless the notice
is served upon the officials responsible for handling such claims,
an investigation while the evidence is still fresh might not be
possible.
Where the notice was timely and served upon the proper
officials, prior cases employed a substantial 32 or reasonable "'
certainty standard in determining the sufficiency of the contents.
a written notice stating the time, place and circumstances
thereof, and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded.
24.

(1966)

Hirth v. Village of Long Prairie, 274 Minn. 76, 143 N.W.2d 205

(after plaintiff received negligent medical treatment at defend-

ant's hospital the municipal employees fraudulently concealed that
fact until two years had elapsed).
25. Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 24 N.W.2d 232
(1946) (following the accident plaintiff was told by municipal officials
that nothing need be done to perfect a tort claim against the city).
26. 291 Minn. 206, 190 N.W.2d 125 (1971).
27. Id. at 210; 190 N.W.2d at 127.
28. MINN. STAT. § 466.05(1) (1971).
29. Johnson v. City of Chisholm, 222 Minn. 179, 24 N.W.2d 232
(1946).
30. Jensen v. Downtown Auto Park, Inc., 289 Minn. 436, 184
N.W.2d 777 (1971).
31. McGuire v. Hennessey, 292 Minn. 429, 193 N.W.2d 313 (1971).
32. Lyons v. City of Red Wing, 76 Minn. 20, 22, 78 N.W. 868, 869
(1899).
33. Russell v. Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 355, 357, 107 N.W.2d 711,
713 (1961).
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That is, the contents were sufficient "if the place of accident is
so described that the proper municipal officers, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, may be able to locate it .... ,,14
This standard satisfies the purpose of the statute "to furnish the
municipal officers information ... to the end that due investigation may be made to determine the truth and merits of the
claims made. 35 Therefore, any notice that conveys information
sufficient to enable city officials to determine the place and nature of the accident is sufficient, even if there are some inaccuracies in the notice. 36
The Olander court agreed that this is the proper standard to
37
apply where notice is timely served in the proper manner.
The innovative aspect of Olander, then, lies in a different area.
Under prior case law, if the contents of the notice were ambiguous, no duty was imposed upon the city to resolve the ambiguity by questioning the claimant. These cases simply required city officials to make a diligent inspection of the area described in the notice. The contents were sufficient if an investigation could have clarified the ambiguity or revealed the inaccuracy. 38 A corollary of such holdings would seem to be that
if the defect could not have been discovered by a reasonable investigation of the area described, then the notice would be ineffective.
Under Olander, however, if there is any uncertainty over
the area described in the notice, a city is now required to question the claimant in an effort to resolve that uncertainty. The
notice in Olander described only a one block area rather than the
34. Louko v. Village of Hibbing, 222 Minn. 463, 466, 25 N.W.2d 234,
235 (1946).

35. Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn. 55, 58, 124 N.W. 449, 450

(1910).

36. See, e.g., Russell v. Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 355, 107 N.W.2d

711 (1961); Terryll v. City of Faribault, 84 Minn. 341, 87 N.W. 917
(1901); Nicol v. St. Paul, 80 Minn. 415, 83 N.W. 375 (1900); Lyons v. City
of Red Wing, 76 Min. 20, 78 N.W. 868 (1899).
37. Nothing more should be required than that it give notice
of the claim reasonably sufficient to alert the municipality
to the alleged incident and allow it to initiate investigative
procedures to more adequately determine the nature and validity of the claim.
293 Miin. at 171, 197 N.W.2d at 443.
38. In Russell v. Minneapolis, 259 Minn. 355, 107 N.W.2d 711 (1961),

an error of nine to fifteen feet was held not to invalidate the notice because the condition complained of could have been seen during an inspection of the area described. In Kandelin v. City of Ely, 110 Minn.
55, 124 N.W. 449 (1910), the notice was held sufficient notwithstanding
an error of 75 feet.
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specific place within that area where the accident occurred.
Thus, city officials could not make a proper investigation without
more information. The court claimed that a "simple telephone
call" would have resolved the doubt and would not have been an
unreasonable burden on the city.3 9 Although this clearly is a
reasonable requirement, the court failed to define the outer limits of this duty. The court, did, however, state that the notice
would be sufficient if it functioned simply to "alert" the city to
the existence of a possible claim. 40 Nevertheless, it would seem
appropriate to require as a minimum that the notice state the
general vicinity where the accident occurred. Otherwise, the
city always would be forced to contact the claimant, who might
be difficult to reach, for more specific information that could
easily have been supplied in the first instance. To allow a very
general description might enable a claimant to "discover" after
the fact, for example, a place on a sidewalk which has been negligently maintained. Moreover, if a dangerous condition does
exist, a more specific description of the area would enable the
city to more promptly remedy the situation. In any event, the
scope of the "duty to inquire" seems unclear at present.
The 30 day limit on notice was challenged in two other cases
decided last term. Both raised the issue of the fundamental unfairness to potential claimants that results from a strict application of the time period for filing notice. In one case a child
who had been injured while swimming when another child dove
on him from a railroad bridge sued the railroad. Within 30 days
of receiving a summons, the railroad as a third-party plaintiff
filed notice of a claim against the city. Apparently the city had
actual notice of the accident almost immediately after it happened. The supreme court held that the notice was invalid because it was not filed within 30 days after the injury in compliance with the statute. Hansen v. D.M. & I.R. Ry., 292 Minn. 503,
195 N.W.2d 814 (1972).
Although the court, as is now customary, deplored the
harshness of the result, it stated that any relief would have to
come from the legislature. However, this case seems exceptionally harsh. Previous cases which have held notification invalid involved an element of fault on the part of the injured
party or the injured party's attorney. It was impossible for the
railroad to satisfy the notice requirement since it apparently was
39.
40.

293 Minn. at 170, 197 N.W.2d at 443 (1972).
Id.
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unaware of the occurrence until suit was instituted one and
one-half years after the injury. The statute thus completely
fails to protect third-party plaintiffs who potentially have a right
to contribution from the municipality but who did not learn of
the incident giving rise to liability until after the expiration of
the 30 day period.
It seems clear that where a municipality is potentially liable,
the plaintiff-victim should give the statutory notice. Further,
notice to a defendant in the railroad's position within 30 days
would also allow it to file against the municipality in a timely
fashion. In any case, once the municipality has received proper
notice from the plaintiff-victim, that notice should be valid for
all plaintiffs.41 This would fulfill the statutory purpose because
the city would be able to commence an investigation and often
would be able to discover the existence of other possible plaintiff-victims.
In another case, Altendorfer v. Jandric, Inc., 42 defendant

styled itself a third-party plaintiff and sought to proceed against
the city as a third-party defendant. Homeowners had sued a
developer, alleging negligence in the construction of their sewer
system. The developer, who had donated the system to the municipality, sued the municipality for negligent operation of the
system. The court decided the case on another gound, but the
issue was similar to that in Hansen. The developer argued that
it could not have given notice because it was not even aware of
the damage and that application of the notice requirement thus
violated due process. 43 The court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute in narrow terms but stated that it would
reserve the determination of the constitutionality of the entire
statute pending legislative action on "the several situations in
41. This issue has been reserved for future consideration by the
court. Jensen v. Downtown Auto Park, Inc., 289 Minn. 436, 439, 184
N.W.2d 777, 778 (1971).
42. 199 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. 1972). See text following note 3 of Section VIILC. of this Note supra for further discussion of this case.
43. The developer's due process argument is not clearly stated and
seems to be basically a charge of fundamental unfairness. The gist of
the argument appears to be that since the legislature has granted a
right to sue a municipality on tort claims, it becomes a vested right
which must be given fairly to all. Since the third-party plaintiff was
disabled by lack of knowledge of the claim, he is without means to
protect his right of indemnification against the city. The developer
contested that this relief could be granted without defeating the purposes of the statute since the city would have access to the discovery
products of the original litigation as a means of investigating the
claim. Id. at 815 n.8.
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which the statute seemingly produces harsh results." 44 The legislature has not amended the statute since 1963, and then the
changes were not substantive. Certainly the problem of thirdparty plaintiffs is an appropriate subject for legislative action.
In the event the legislature does not act, the court's temper on
this subject is illustrated by its statement in Olander that here
"judicial patience should not be confused with judicial impotence,
especially where constitutional rights may be concerned. ''14
In a case involving a welfare lien against tort recoveries,
plaintiff, a minor, was seriously injured when she was struck
by a car. Since neither she nor her father was able to pay for
her extensive medical care, the Hennepin County Welfare Board
provided more than $28,000 in financial assistance. Pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes § 393.10(1), the county then filed a lien
for that amount against any personal injury judgment that plaintiff might recover. Plaintiff accepted a damage settlement of
$27,500 and argued that the lien should apply only to the share
of her total recovery that could be apportioned to medical expenses.46 In rejecting this view, the court held that the lien
applies to the entire amount of plaintiff's recovery. 47 Molberg
v. Marsden, 200 N.W.2d 298 (MAinn. 1972).
Minnesota Statutes § 393.10 (1) provides that a county welfare
board which pays for medical expenses shall have a lien "upon
any and all causes of action accruing to the person to whom
such care was furnished." Given the statute's clear and unambiguous language, the court's result is proper even though the
injured person will be left with no recovery when the amount
of his damage judgment is less than the amount of his medical
expenses paid by a county welfare board. If an injured person
does not enlist medical assistance from a welfare board, no part
44.

Id. at 816.

45. Olander v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 293 MAnn. 162, 164-65,
197 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1972).
46. It was stipulated that plaintiff sustained general damages of
$300,000 due to the permanent and disabling nature of her injuries.
The much smaller settlement was agreed to because the tortfeasor's
insurance and personal assets were insufficient to pay the full amount.
47. Plaintiff had argued that because she was a minor, her father
and not she, was legally obligated to pay for her medical care, and
thus, the county's lien should apply only to her father's cause of action
for medical expenses. In rejecting the plaintiff's position, the court
noted that the statute made no reference to the legal responsibility of
the person to whom the services were provided. Rather the lien attaches to any cause of action that that person might assert on account
of the injuries necessitating the welfare assistance.
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of his damage recovery is immune from the claims of his doctor.
Thus, the effect of the court's decision is to establish parity between the welfare recipient -andthe accident victim who pays his
own medical expenses. Any injustice to an indigent victim results from the fact that a party responsible for the accident does
not have sufficient resources to pay both medical expenses and
general damages, and not from the fact that the county welfare board seeks complete reimbursement for medical costs.
However, in Robertson v. Johnson,5 decided the same day
as Molberg, the court departed from the rule of equal treatment
of injured welfare recipients and accident victims who do not
receive public assistance. In that case the court held that a
county welfare board must bear a pro rata share of the attorney's fees generated in obtaining the damage recovery to which
the county's medical lien attached. Plaintiff in Robertson was
injured in an automobile accident and, as a public assistance recipient, had his medical expenses paid by the Steele County Welfare Board. A tort action arising out of the accident resulted in
a judgment for plaintiff of $88,102 which was subject both to the
lien of plaintiff's attorney and the $37,000 medical lien of the
county welfare board. The court interpreted the language in
Minnesota Statutes § 393.10(1) which provides that a county's
medical lien is subject to "any attorney's lien" to mean that the
welfare board must assume a pro rata share of the attorney's
fee.
The Robertson court noted that a different result "would
often reduce the injured party's dollar recovery to nothing in a
case where the county furnished no attorney's services to obtain
the judgment." 49 The practical result, the court felt, would be
to keep the accident victim on the welfare rolls and thus defeat
the purpose of a statute which was part of a "statutory scheme
to reduce the tax burden of furnishing medical assistance to
needy persons." 50 But if an injured person were to obligate himself to pay his own medical bills, his doctor would not be required to pay a pro rata share of the attorney's fees if the recovery was sufficient to pay all claims in full. In a sense, a county
welfare board that provides medical services to an injured indigent stands in the shoes of the doctor who performed the services. Because the doctor would not be required to share pro rata
48.

200 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1972).

49.

Id. at 319.

50.

Id.
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in the injured party's attorney's fees, the "subject . .. to any
attorney's lien" language of section 393.10(1) was probably
meant to insure only that the county welfare board's medical
lien was subordinate to the lien of the attorney. Thus, in Robertson the opposite result would have been more consistent with
both the intent of the legislature and with Molberg's equal treatment of welfare recipients and accident victims who did not receive public assistance. 6 '

51. The court pointed out that a contrary interpretation of a
similar statute in Illinois led to the statute being amended. Id. at 318
n.4. However, the fact that the Illinois legislature later amended the
Illinois medical lien statute is not very meaningful evidence as to how
the Minnesota statute is to be construed.

